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USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 3, February 1985

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2 May 1985

USSR REPORT

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 3, February 1985

Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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DEMOCRACY AND DISCIPLINE

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[Editorial--capitalized words published in italics in original]

[Text] Today it is hardly necessary to demonstrate at length that the normal vital activity of socialist society in general, and developed society in particular, is impossible without the consistent implementation of democracy and the maintenance of discipline in all its forms at the highest level. We find scientific-theoretical and practical-political foundation for this truth in the works of V. I. Lenin, in fundamental party documents, speeches by leaders of the communist party and the Soviet state, the works of Marxist scientists and propagandist literature.

However, even having been sufficiently elucidated, the question of democracy and discipline is always topical because in everyday life their optimum correlation is not established without difficulties. The awareness and conduct of a considerable number of people still do not correspond in every way to the highest principles of socialism which essentially impedes both the normal implementation of democracy and the strengthening of discipline and the establishing of proper order. What is more, socialist democracy, which has already traversed a fairly sound historical path and the profound deep essence of which lies in "the management of the people through the people" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 17, p 350), like any other social phenomenon, is constantly developing from the lower forms to the highest and being perfected, and, thus requires further interpretation and the finding of new ways by which it can function efficiently. Soviet society's ascent up the ladder of maturity also causes the concept of discipline to be filled with new content, which must also be recognized in good time.

The most important thing for the Soviet individual's correct attitude toward democracy and discipline is his understanding of their unity and indissoluble mutual connection. It is not simply the fact that democracy without discipline inevitably acquires the features of anarchy, which runs counter to the very essence of the people's social life, but also that discipline without democracy always signifies the greater or lesser infringement on personal rights and freedoms. Under socialism, they have one and the same root--the principle of collectivist social organization and collectivist social

relations in all spheres of vital human activity, these relations definitely presupposing awareness of the necessity for unity of human actions, their orientation toward achieving the common good and the harmonious combination of public and personal interests.

The existence of social ownership of production means, which lies at the basis of the socialist system, both determines the truly democratic nature of this system and predetermines the necessity for general concern for the reproduction, multiplication and security of social property, the fair distribution of material and spiritual goods and the development of society's main productive force--the working man. Concern for the common good and for observance of the principles of socialism is engendered by a sense of personal responsibility for social affairs and for order within these affairs. DISCIPLINE IN ITS SOCIALIST INTERPRETATION IS THE MANIFESTATION OF THE COLLECTIVIST ESSENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS CLEARLY EXPRESSED AWARENESS OF HIS SOCIAL DUTY.

Lenin pointed out the direct connection between the socialist restructuring of society and a new approach to discipline. "There was a time," he noted, "when it was impossible to run the economy without serf discipline and when there was one discipline alone--the stick. This was the time of capitalist domination, when hunger was discipline's strength. Now, on the other hand, since the Soviet revolution, since the beginning of the socialist revolution, discipline must be formed on totally new principles--discipline of trust in the organization of the workers and the poorest peasants, comradely discipline, discipline of all possible respect and discipline of independence and initiative in struggle" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 500). The question here, as we can see it, is precisely one of THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF SOCIALIST DISCIPLINE and the role of the working masses in establishing and consolidating this discipline.

Consequently, those who regard discipline and democracy as phenomena that are not interconnected or, worst of all, offset them against one another, either do not know what they are talking about or with such talk conceal their own lack of discipline, laxity, individualist outlook and fear of the organization and order standing in the way of every form of self-will and abuse. Incidentally, these "fighters for democracy" never forget their rights by the disorder created by others' lack of discipline.

Yes, the essence of socialist democracy lies in the REAL, as Lenin emphasized, DECISIVE participation of the masses in the management of all social life, in the REALITY of their influence on domestic and foreign state policy and on the ways of implementing this policy, and in the REAL, GUARANTEED safeguarding of civil rights and freedoms. The all-embracing system of our democracy provides the Soviet individual with very broad possibilities for this. However, primarily essential is the interest of every individual in utilizing these possibilities correctly, fully, but without going beyond the bounds of the legal and moral norms developed by the people themselves, that is, voluntarily observing definite social discipline.

Comrade K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, spoke of this very interest in

all state and social affairs and of the striving to make a personal contribution to the management of these affairs which must be felt by the citizens of developed socialist society at the All-Union Conference of People's Controllers: "Every--note, every--Soviet individual must recognize himself as a people's controller and must think and act in conformity with this lofty civic duty."

Indeed, the communist party and the Soviet state regard the working masses not only as an object, but also as a subject of policy. In full accordance with this principled attitude toward the people as the conscious creator of history, they show a constant concern to steadily improve the standard of the population's material well-being and to more and more fully satisfy its social, spiritual and moral needs, which is served by the development of socialist democracy. In our society, it is becoming increasingly essential that the individual feel himself to be an historic figure and be able to actively influence the formation and implementation of policy and to show creative initiative in his work, production management, the organization of cultural life and the maintenance of public order.

In this respect, socialist society naturally approves only creative activities that pursue aims useful to this society. While granting all of its citizens the most extensive possible democratic (political and socioeconomic) rights, it presupposes the strict observance of the laws, norms and rules of conduct which reflect the collectivist nature of the Soviet system and ensure the perfection of developed socialism.

The greater the organization and discipline, the more stable the material base and the moral-political unity of society, the more effective the functioning of the socialist democratic system and the greater the fulfillment of Soviet people's rights.

Collectivity is a most important feature of the whole of our vital societal activity: the organization of labor, the management of production, economic, state and party leadership and the work of the mass social organizations. But collectivity yields positive results only when organically combined with one-man management, which is an objectively necessary organizational element. The resolution of any more or less important problem--political, economic or cultural--is preceded in our country by thorough discussion of this problem, the exchange of opinions and the elucidation and interpretation of collective experience so that planned measures are comprehensively substantiated, do not suffer from superficiality and guarantee against erroneous actions to the maximum extent. And when a decision has been made, it must be jointly, amicably, unanimously, consistently and strictly implemented irrespective of who held what opinions on the given problem earlier. In this lies the practical implementation of our fundamental principle in the directing of social processes--democratic centralism.

In his program article "To the Level of the Requirements of Developed Socialism," Comrade K. U. Chernenko points out: "The policy of calling people to account for laxity and breaches of fulfillment discipline must be especially toughened. Without the strictest discipline, the finest decisions and plans will simply remain good intentions. Discipline, in our

understanding of it, is by no means the opposite of democracy. On the contrary, it makes it possible to fulfill the practice the interests of the majority and the will of the party and the people. Without discipline and firm public order, democracy is simply a fine phrase. But discipline, it is clear, must not fetter initiative. The struggle for precise organization must not turn into excessive organization."

The question therefore comes down to the point that in democratic society every worker--irrespective of whether he is directly involved with the manufacture of a certain product or holds a high leading post--must primarily be a good executor, both disciplined and enterprising. These qualities proceed from the civic spirit of the individual and from the awareness that, whatever place he occupies in the national economy, he is connected with many other workers and that the results of common labor and general well-being depend to a certain extent on his attitude in the matter. He is personally responsible to all the people and cannot shift this responsibility onto anyone else.

The party's struggle to strengthen labor discipline--not in its formal interpretation, but in the whole of its fundamental significance to the cause of perfecting developed socialism--permeates all CPSU activity at the present time. This problem has been examined both specifically and in connection with others at all Central Committee plenums held in recent years. In July 1983 the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Central Trade Union Council adopted the resolution "On Intensifying Work To Strengthen Socialist Labor Discipline" which states in particular that comprehensively strengthening discipline is "a most important condition in successfully fulfilling plans for economic and social development, increasing the efficiency of the national economy, further strengthening the foundations of the socialist way of life, increasing the working and political activeness of the masses and perfecting democracy." Further, it emphasizes that labor discipline cannot simply be reduced to the observance of the internal order established at enterprises and in institutions and organizations, but also includes the kind of attitude to work which ensures the high quality of the latter and productive use of work time.

From this point of view it would seem that various breaches of labor and technological discipline, which ultimately become breaches of plan and state discipline, such as absenteeism, being late for work, losses of work time for other reasons, drunkenness, careless fulfillment of duties by members of the administrative apparatus, red tape and bureaucracy, are equally inadmissible. Measures for struggling against these breaches of discipline must, of course, be taken in various directions, but there is no doubt that the most important of these measures in work connected with education and the strengthening of socialist labor discipline is that of enhancing the role of the labor collectives and making effective use of the rights granted them.

It is well known that the question of labor discipline stands best of all where the collective is stable and its cadre corps sets the tone in forming and maintaining a healthy moral-psychological atmosphere and organizing work well. In contemporary conditions, there are no fundamental obstacles to creating such a climate everywhere so that the individual values his work,

cherishes it and considers the opinion of the collective, while the absentee, the drifter, the drunkard and the careless worker cannot count on an unimpeded move to another position where he will be received with open arms and higher wages to boot. Unfortunately, even progressive collectives often hasten to rid themselves as quickly as possible of workers who are constantly in breach of discipline instead of bringing the force of the entire collective to bear on them, as they say, and forcing them to conduct themselves properly with regard to their work and comrades, while other collectives indiscriminately take on anyone who turns up at the cadre department without considering how he will work. The cadre turnover which is virtually encouraged by this practice causes a great deal of harm to the national economy.

No less well known is the fact that when a leader who has lost his authority continues to remain in his position contrary to the opinion of the labor collective or is helped into another leading armchair with the blessing of higher organs, an armchair his business and moral qualities do not qualify him to fill, this also has a negative effect on discipline and order. Meanwhile, the USSR Law on Labor Collectives stipulates consideration of public opinion and comprehensive, critical appraisal of official activity as among the most important principles of their participation in the management of enterprises, institutions and organizations.

The collective of the production brigade enjoys the most extensive rights in this sense. The law directly states that the collective gives its consent to the appointment of the brigade leader and that it is within its rights to demand that the administration release him from his duties in the event they are unsatisfactorily fulfilled. Brigade members also participate either directly or through their council in resolving the problems of bringing the brigade up to full force, planning and organizing its work, remunerating and stimulating labor and calling to account those in breach of discipline. Democracy is a compulsory component of the new method of economic operations without which the economic potentials of this method will not be exercised. But the labor collective of the workshop, other production subdivisions and the enterprise as a whole is also competent to resolve these problems to a certain extent. It is for this purpose that democratic institutions have been formed such as the workers meeting, the permanent production conference, posts and groups of people's controllers and Komsomolskiy Prozhektor, groups for economic analysis and norm setting, the comrades courts and so forth. The party, trade union and Komsomol organizations of the labor collective are called upon to organize and direct their work and to draw as many working people as possible into this work. The party bureaus and party committees must more fully exercise their right to control the activities of the administration and the entire life of the labor collective, while setting an example in organizing mass struggle to strengthen discipline and order.

In this respect, particular attention should be paid to ensuring that the very organization of work does not weaken interest in it and does not provide grounds for a frivolous attitude to order. Any interruptions in the production process arising from a "lack of coordination" in various forms, administrative inefficiency and the unwarranted distraction of workers from the immediate cause in hand, as well as idling and consequently rushed work, ultimately cause a chain reaction of breaches of labor discipline. Then

people cease to see anything outstanding in wasting work time, being late for work and being absent. An equally negative role is played by the imprecise assignment of duties, vague ideas of one's functions and frequently observed underemployment of members of the administrative apparatus. The employee who literally has to kill time at work sees nothing shameful in using this time for his own personal aims.

It is difficult to overestimate the educational influence of properly organized socialist competition, which significantly increases the interest of members of the collective in strengthening discipline and order in production. The aim of comradely rivalry at work is not only to achieve outstanding personal results, but also mainly to increase general labor productivity, make more efficient use of material and labor resources and develop collective initiative. Socialist competition helps to forge the feeling of being master of one's country--a feeling so essential to the Soviet individual--and the attitude that work is one's first vital need, and it also compels the individual to penetrate more deeply into the affairs of the labor collective and to more actively struggle against any negative phenomena.

But socialist competition--one of the most democratic forms of social relations--requires the constant attention of party and all social organizations, which are called upon to direct the process of developing work competition also for the purpose of intensifying the struggle for discipline and order.

The role of the public in the fair evaluation of every worker's labor contribution and the reward he deserves for his work is great. Frequently, instead of noting excellent, worthy workers, economic leaders, with the concurrence of social organizations, engage in leveling and in the infamous practice of "deducibility," [vyvodilovka] when the results of both good and bad work are virtually put on the same level, honest workers receive almost the same as idlers and bad workers, the former are not placed in esteem and the latter are not publicly reprimanded, and everyone is paid a bonus, thereby giving rise to justified indignation on the part of honest, conscientious workers and discouraging them from showing initiative, adopting a creative attitude to work, increasing their productivity and struggling for discipline and order. At times, the trade union committees are equally indiscriminating when they allocate living space and passes to sanatoriums and rest homes and render material aid. Only through the joint efforts of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and organs of workers' self-initiative is it possible to put an end to this insuitable practice.

In their resolution "On Additional Measures To Strengthen Labor Discipline," the USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Central Trade Union Council committed the leaders of associations, enterprises, organizations, sovkhozes and kolkhozes to make more extensive use of the privileges and benefits for encouraging progressive workers and production innovators and also those who have worked for many years in the same labor collective and simultaneously to apply disciplinary measures to negligent workers more decisively. This must be done consistently and in the conditions of full publicity, with the participation of social organizations, correctly combining material and moral incentives and ensuring the differentiated application of punishments.

One must not permit a breach between word and deed or a frivolous attitude to the implementation of democratically adopted decisions when developing the forms and methods of socialist self-management of the working people and cultivating conscious discipline.

If these decisions are not fully carried out or are completely consigned to oblivion, the social activeness of the masses is greatly harmed. Guilty in this respect is the harmful practice of some activists in social organizations who implement measures simply in order to "get them off their hands" [dlya galochki] and to then be able to give an account of their "furious" activity and reluctance to come into conflict with the administration, which "never gets around to" implementing decisions adopted by the permanent production conference and the workers meeting and to implementing points of the collective agreement. But the USSR Law on Labor Collectives unequivocally states the obligatory nature of such decisions and the calling to account of those persons who ignore them.

The right of labor collectives to raise questions of calling to account, within the established order of workers, those who are guilty of squandering or plundering socialist property, of inefficient utilization of material and financial resources, or of providing poor quality products, too, has been determined by legislation. However, as things stand now, these questions are usually raised--and not always in a principled manner--only by inspectors of higher state organs, militia workers and procurators. Concerning reports about mismanagement, abuses and violations of legality and order which come directly from labor collectives, there are usually in the form of complaints by individuals or groups, often anonymous, which are received by party committees, ranging from the rayon level to the level of the central committees and by the editorial offices of newspapers and journals.

The number of workers joining the struggle against production shortcomings and for discipline and order is still insufficient, or many workers participate in this struggle rather formally, so to say, maintaining benevolent neutrality because open statements of criticism of negative phenomena and of unworthy behavior on the part of some individuals quite often result in considerable trouble for the individual making such statements. Victimization for criticism is contrary to the democratic norms of the Soviet way of life, it is incompatible with the title of communist, and is forbidden by the CPSU Statute and the USSR Constitution. For a strong plunderer, like an old bird, is not caught with chaff; he will find the means invisible to the naked eye, to discredit the "quarrelsome" individual and present him almost as an enemy of the collective and, in addition to that, as though to mock democracy, skillfully cover his unlawful actions with the authority of social organizations if these organizations are under his thumb, as happens quite often. You see, in order to teach others not to "seek justice," you make the one who does pay dearly for it. Thus, people close their eyes to the outrages committed, they are upset about them among themselves but do not dare to speak about them out loud.

Increasing the social activeness of the people depends, first and foremost, on the militancy of party organizations, on their correct and attentive attitude

toward criticism, and on their objectivity in analyzing conflict situations resulting from actions of members of the collective in connection with shortcomings and abuses in production operations. Principled criticism must be resolutely supported by primary party organizations and all party committees. And this support must not be only verbal but must be expressed in deeds and, once again, be of a broad public nature.

The question of strengthening discipline and improving the harmony and organization of work concerns all levels of our administrations and all spheres of state and party activity. However, it often happens that the party and state directives, the instructions of higher organs, and one's own resolutions and decisions are actually not carried out, although it is perfectly clear that any deviation from the fundamental principle of administration of the socialist society, the principle of democratic centralism, causes great harm. Both leaders and ordinary workers who are negligent in fulfilling their direct obligations are guilty of this.

What is still found in our country at various levels of the national economic organism are carelessness and inaccuracy in the conduct of affairs and an inclination to substitute work with endless discussions, agreements, coordination, ordinary bureaucratic red tape and shifting of responsibility for the fulfillment of a concrete decision onto others, considering that responsibility is not always clearly determined. "Irresponsibility covered by invocations of collegiality is a most dangerous evil...", Lenin noted ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 46). On some occasions this appears as a lack of persistence, and passiveness in implementing certain outlined measures, on others this appears as a campaign-like approach when some tasks are seemingly taken up with zeal at the beginning and then that zeal quickly cools, and then again this appears as waiting for things to somehow settle down by themselves, usually relying on the enthusiasm of others. Many serious omissions in the national economy, failures in production operations, and shortcomings in cultural and everyday services for the people and in the observance of socialist legality result precisely from a negligent attitude to tasks, from the lack of organizational abilities of official persons and, finally, from the reluctance of some of them to trouble themselves with the strict fulfillment of binding resolutions, decisions, or instructions of competent organs. The longer such unconscientious workers succeed in continuing in their ways with impunity, the more their disorganizing activity intensifies the atmosphere of absence of exactingness and obligations.

High exactingness, well-organized control, and verification of fulfillments, carried out not from case to case but daily, are the obligatory conditions for the normal functioning of the system of socialist democracy. It goes without saying that they must be combined with trust and with sincere respect for the human dignity of workers. Whether control is "from above" or "from below," a lack of objectivity, tendentiousness, suspiciousness, and rudeness toward those who are being controlled must not be allowed. It must be always remembered that the existence of bureaucrats, of those who engage in deception, of squanderers of socialist property, of speculators, of bribe takers, and other similar individuals who behave contrary to the principles and norms of the socialist way of life, is no reason at all to show ill will

and be cautious toward all and everyone. Exactingness and intolerance toward shortcomings and abuses produce the best results when they are accompanied by striving to help the individual who has accidentally allowed a mistake, has digressed, or has been unable, because of his inexperience, to perform his official duty in the way he should have performed it.

The soviets of people's deputies must play an especially great role in strengthening state discipline. Organically combining in themselves the legislative and executive power within the boundaries of territories within their jurisdiction, the soviets must draw as many voluntary assistant activists as possible into the administration of all public affairs and utilize to the maximum possible extent the collective experience and initiative of the masses in solving economic, cultural and social problems and problems of everyday services. In recent years and especially following the adoption of the new USSR Constitution, the range of authority of the soviets at all levels has constantly increased. However, their enormous potential is insufficiently utilized. Comrade K. U. Chernenko said in this connection at the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "In general, there is a certain contradiction, a discrepancy, between the richest possibilities of the soviets and the way these possibilities are utilized in practice. It is impossible in this connection not to recall Lenin's thought that 'it is not enough to merely formally determine the sovereign power of the soviets..., but it is also necessary to adjust and verify it in practice in the course of the regular everyday work of administration'" (op. cit., 36, p 278). The sovereignty of the soviets, determined by the Constitution, must be embodied everywhere both in the style and the content of their activity.

A concrete approach to the organization of problems, a lively exchange of views in discussions about these problems, and systematic operational control over the fulfillment of adopted decisions are important in the work of the sessions and of permanent commissions and executive committees of the soviets. Of primary importance in this connection is the persistence of local soviets in strictly implementing the directives of the central authority as the main condition for the balanced and complex development of the entire national economy of the country, including each of the regions involved. It is necessary to speak about this because the soviets frequently exercise poor control over the activities of the enterprises and organizations located in their territories, and subordinate to the republic or the union, something that contributes to the rise of departmentalism--which contradicts the higher national economic and correctly understood local interests--and to the nonfulfillment of plans for the social, everyday service and cultural development of towns, settlements and rayons.

The April CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted that a major shortcoming in the work of the soviets lies in the fact that deputies make few inquiries in relation to the questions that agitate people and are raised by them in their letters to various levels of authority and to the editors of newspapers and other mass information media. It is clear that when the elected representatives of people submit such vital issues of our life to general and public discussion, this is considerably more effective than any private requests to various individual officials. This is confirmed, for instance, by the experience of the organization of the open letter days by the responsible

workers of the executive committees of the soviets, the open letter days that help to quickly eliminate disorders in the communal and everyday services for the people, in trade and in public transport, and to actively struggle against drunkenness and hooliganism. In their inquiries the deputies can and must raise these problems in a more generalized and thorough way, thereby forestalling a considerable part of personal claims of citizens and revealing the fundamental causes of the existing shortcomings.

It is a natural obligation of the soviets, as the organs of authority, to intensify the struggle for respect for socialist legality and for law and order and to more effectively control the work of the organs of justice. It is incumbent upon them more than upon anyone else to bring to bear the entire force of their authority on the violators of the laws on state plans and labor collectives and on those who fail to implement their own resolutions that also have the power of law, and to create an atmosphere in which neither violations of the rights of citizens nor the citizens' deviations from their civic obligations is possible.

In its resolution "On Further Improving the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies" the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted the need to "increase the effectiveness of control by the soviets of people's deputies over the work of the organs of administration, the need to strive to ensure that the soviets will be more exacting and objective in evaluating the activities of officials and of economic leaders of all levels and devote greater attention to fulfilling instructions received from voters, to perfecting and reducing the administrative apparatus, to strengthening law and order, and to increasing the authority of the laws of the power of the soviets."

The plenum discussed the importance of utilizing all methods of party influence on the activity of the soviets in order to increase their effectiveness and eliminate all elements of formalism. This is the demand that is addressed to party committees and, of course, also to deputies--communists through whom the party realizes its leading role in the soviets. The communists are called upon--with their personal example of a responsible attitude toward their obligations as deputies of a truly democratic approach, and of discipline--to introduce the organizing principle into the work of the organs of state authority, to rally around themselves all elected representatives of the people, to stimulate and direct their creative initiative and to educate them in the spirit of high ideological awareness, principled attitude, exactingness and efficiency.

The communist party's enormous organizational and educational work aimed at developing the socialist democracy, at possible broader inclusions of people in the administration of all public affairs, and at forming the new man, a man communistically convinced, consciously disciplined, and socially active, has made it possible to basically affirm in the psychology of the masses the principles and norms of behavior that emanate from the internally inherent collectivist principles of socialism. This is graphically manifested by the conscientious and creative work of millions of citizens for the good of the fatherland--citizens who consider this work as their primary civic obligation--by the care for preserving and multiplying the socialist property, for the fulfillment of state plans for the country's economic and social

development, for the high quality of products and the economizing of resources and by many other kinds of good work that is dictated by a genuinely patriotic interest in accelerating the progress of the new society.

At the same time, all this work can and must be carried out even more successfully in order to ensure that we will rid ourselves even more quickly of the negative phenomena that unfortunately are still quite numerous and which for a long time we used to call vestiges of the past but which we now also call the opposite of communist morals and of the socialist way of life. The ability of everyone who, in the performance of his official duties and by his commanding conviction, is engaged in the communist education of people, to correctly concretize the general theoretical theses and political goals contained in the party and state documents for practical implementation, is of great importance for the struggle against these phenomena. If these general theoretical theses and political goals are accepted only formally at the lower levels of our democratic system or are even simply forgotten in the course of everyday affairs, we will not obtain the expected results.

The question of interdependence, mutual interweaving, and mutual reciprocal influence between democracy and discipline requires a thorough study in application to any given conditions and to any level of social organism. It should not be hoped that our democratic institutions will function in the best way, so to say, on their own and supposedly automatically reveal their disciplining potential. It is known, for instance, what difficulties are experienced by workers of the party and trade union committees of enterprises, institutions and organizations when they seek concrete and effective forms of implementation of a number of provisions of the Law on Labor Collectives. Permanent production conferences, comrade courts and some other institutions still do not function with full force and, here and there, they only drag out a miserable existence. And it seems that what is involved in this connection is the fact that their significance in the struggle to strengthen discipline and order is underrated or simply the efforts that should be made to perfect their organization and activity are lacking. The fact that advanced experience in this sphere has been sufficiently studied, generalized and disseminated is also not last among the factors that have resulted in this situation, and the insufficient study, generalization and dissemination of advanced experience has resulted in many respects from the very same scholastic theorizing of which the social sciences are guilty and which, as the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted, it is very difficult to overcome. Science must provide practical recommendations and sensible and substantiated advice across the entire spectrum of problems of the effect of democratic institutions on the strengthening of discipline and order.

Interaction between the individual and the microsocial environment in which the individual constantly exists, motivations of human behavior, the causal-consequential link between the individual's moral awareness and social awareness in the broadest sense of the term, and any kind of reasons for so-called socially deviant behavior have been poorly researched in our country.

The results of this situation are amateurish methods of education, a lack of skill in adopting a correct approach toward offenders against discipline, and the fact that, at times, the expenditure of many forces and resources fails to

produce due effect. However, regardless of how widely and comprehensively the scientific methods of reeducation of undisciplined individuals may be worked out and introduced, the force of social influence continues to be the main force in strengthening discipline and order.

We will be able to fulfill in the best possible way the task set by the party of reaching every individual with our ideological work if we do not begin to consider the call for an individual approach merely as recognition of the need for a "heart-to-heart talk." The "heart-to-heart talk" is certainly necessary and quite often it is very effective, but on no account does it ensure everything, just as various disciplinary sanctions do not always "work out." There is a category of individuals in whose minds and hearts the kindest and most convincing words evoke no response and for whom punishment is merely a temporary discomfort that passes more or less quickly and does not force them to seriously think about their improper behavior. No matter how hard one may try, the feelings of these individuals cannot be touched by "soul-saving" talks in personal contact, and their ways cannot be corrected by punishment. What they need is a hard framework of permanent social control as well as the sobering effect of social contempt. Therefore, the actions of only individual social workers or officials in the role of educators are of little benefit. A well-organized labor collective purposefully oriented toward an uncompromising struggle for discipline and order, and a healthy microsocial environment using all their democratic rights are able to quickly "get through" to any offenders and put them in their proper place in good time.

A large part of those members of the society who have an incorrect attitude toward socialist discipline does not commit this offense because of any kind of antagonistic refusal to accept it. The reasons in this connection are different and they are connected with multifaceted defects in the education of man as a collectivist and especially with his poor ideological tempering and poor training for working life, as well as with various organizational shortcomings and an inconsistent implementation of methods of directing the social processes, methods that are characteristic of our society. In every given case it is very important to know the concrete reasons for undisciplined behavior in order to be able to find those means of influencing the individual involved which will produce positive results. However, it goes without saying that the main thing in this connection is the need to eradicate in everyday life, both in the sphere of production activities and the sphere of everyday existence, those very conditions that objectively contribute to undermining discipline and order.

However, quite often it is necessary to clash with, so to say, "ideological" offenders against discipline, deliberate opponents of order, and hardened individualists who enter, at times in an underhanded way but also openly, into an antagonistic confrontation with the collectivist social relations that have mainly become firmly consolidated in all spheres of everyday existence of the developed socialist society, individuals for whom antisocial behavior is a rule and not an exception. Proceeding from the real state of affairs, the complete liquidation of antagonistic classes and class struggle in our society and the constantly growing social unity of the Soviet working people--we have in fact denied for a long time the very possibility of the existence under socialism of any antagonisms on a personal level, as though all this were one

and the same thing! However, if an individual places himself in an antagonistic relationship toward the order and social discipline conditioned by the socialist system, why should that be called by a different name? It is difficult to make out an individual with a "double personality" who carefully conceals from his surroundings his purely individualistic self. It is simpler to recognize an individualist who is convinced of his own egotistical "rightness." However, both should be treated "on merit" equally without any constraint and without any fear of characterizing their behavior as ANTISOCIALIST with all the resulting consequences. This is particularly true when it is a question of those among them who have managed to work their way into the party.

The individual violations of discipline and order, considered on their own, may not necessarily turn out to be a great evil. However, in their sum total, on the scale of our enormous country, they merge into and amount to very tangible economic and moral losses. Late arrivals at work, idleness, and inefficient utilization of work time amount to hundreds of thousands and millions of unproductive man-hours and turn into a powerful brake on the growth of social labor productivity, the main basis of economic and social progress. They represent a large quantity of products that have not been delivered, products on which society counted; a reduction of the planned rates of growth of national income and, consequently, of the standard of living of people; and many disorders in life which then darken the moral-psychological atmosphere of the country and the mood of honest working people. Any violations of work, production, or state discipline represent essential obstacles that very negatively affect our own plans for economic and social development, the fulfillment of which is necessary for the prosperity and defense capability of the fatherland and the authority of real socialism in the world.

And finally, greater attention must be devoted to an aspect of the topic under consideration such as the methodological discipline of thought, the need for which was discussed at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and which concerns, first and foremost, the ideological workers and especially the social scientists. The party has always considered the indispensable conditions for the development of science to be a free exchange of views, a contrasting of different viewpoints, and a democratic scientific examination of topical problems in comradely discussions taking place without tendentious evaluations of one or another scientist, without affixing any ideological "labels," and the like. But methodological omnivorousness, deviations from the dialectical-Marxist methodology, and a shabbiness of world outlook that appears at times under the influence of fashionable non-Marxist or even directly anti-Marxist currents of social thought, are contrary to Marxist-Leninist science. It is the duty of the Soviet scientist and every ideological worker to subject to merciless but strictly scientific and soundly substantiated criticism all attempts at thrusting upon Soviet social science any views that are alien to it. Freedom of scientific criticism should not be artificially limited and should not be considered limitless. In other words, it should not be a freedom that would open up possibilities for an actual revision of the world outlook and class foundations of our scientific teaching.

An absolute majority of the Soviet people has enthusiastically responded to the intensification of the struggle to strengthen discipline and order. Great positive results have been achieved in this task in the recent period. It is the duty of every communist and every aware citizen to make these results even more impressive by utilizing all the possibilities provided by socialist democracy. It must be remembered that socialist discipline is impossible without an understanding of the need for self-discipline as well as of the need for mutual exactingness engendered by the active position in life of all those who cherish the great achievement of socialism and its future.

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K. U. CHERNENKO'S ADDRESS TO THE READERS OF THE JOURNAL SOVETSKIY SOYUZ

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85) pp 15-16

[Text] Dear readers:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to address myself to you on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory over German fascism and its ally, Japanese militarism. I believe that you will agree with me that there is no nation on our earth that will not remember this date forever.

The intention of German fascism was to impose an inhuman "new order" not only on continental Europe, most of which had its blood drained for more than 51 years under the boot of the fascist monsters. Hitler tried to establish himself in North Africa. He was preparing to invade England, the United States, Canada, Latin America, the Near and Middle East and South Asia. His Japanese allies were throwing their weight around in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

Mankind had to pay a high price to defend its right to life and to put an end to the most devastating and monstrous war in history, unleashed by those who aspired to global domination.

It was the lot of the Soviet Union to experience just about the most difficult and terrible trials. We defended our freedom and independence and revolutionary gains. However, in the war which became the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet people, we lost 20 million people. One-third of our national wealth was destroyed by the aggressor. To this day, 40 years later, pride in the victory won by the Soviet people in the war is inseparable from sorrow for those who fell and from the bitter memory of the tragedy experienced by the people.

The decisive role which the Soviet Union played in World War II has been universally acknowledged. However, by no means do we belittle the significance of the struggle waged by other countries and people. Our victory in the Great Patriotic War is inseparably linked with the antifascist struggle waged by many countries, the European resistance movement and the operations of the armed force of our allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. The Soviet people are deeply grateful to all those who, together with them, arms in hand,

laid a path to the victory over fascism. The USSR remembers and highly values these efforts.

Neither differences in the historical destinies and traditions nor opposite socioeconomic systems and ideologies of the countries in the anti-Hitlerite coalition formed during the war prevented them from jointly striving for the objectives consistent with the interests of all mankind. The defeat of Hitlerism and Japanese militarism allowed the peoples of dozens of countries to regain their honor, freedom, and independence. It created prerequisites for profound democratic and social changes on our planet.

The world has changed unrecognizably in 40 years, but no one has the right to forget the lessons of the struggle against Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism. Mankind is actually faced with a dilemma as a result of the arms race imposed on the world by imperialism: either disarmament and life or continuation of a dangerous growth of nuclear arsenals and the doom of our civilization. The harsh truth is that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that no political objectives can be achieved with its help. Yet there are forces who are relying on an unrestrained arms race on land, in the air and at sea and its spreading into outer space. They do not conceal their objectives, which are to suppress socialism, to suppress the liberation struggle of the peoples and to delete the results of World War II and the entire postwar development. For the sake of this they do not hesitate to risk the lives of hundreds of millions of people and the fate of world civilization.

To do everything possible to prevent a new tragedy and to exclude war as a means of resolving disputes and differences means to observe the solemn obligations assumed by the allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Such precisely is the objective of our country, engaged in peaceful constructive toil.

History teaches us that one must struggle against war before it has begun. This too is a most important lesson learned from World War II, reminding us that today there are no tasks more important than restraining the arms race, nuclear above all, and then steadily advancing toward the radical reduction of nuclear weapons until they have been totally eliminated everywhere, until universal and total disarmament has been achieved. Such is the position held by the USSR and the members of the socialist community. It is permanent, firm and constructive.

Our country is ready for equal and honest cooperation in the struggle for such objectives with all countries and social and political movements. Along with the other countries, we are trying systematically and steadily to rescue mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe once and for all, and to channel all the creative forces of humankind toward constructive purposes and the solution of problems common to all peoples on earth.

May the present year of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory over fascism and the future years bring the peoples a lasting peace, reliable security and well-being under conditions of mutual understanding, cooperation and friendship.

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K. U. CHERNENKO'S REPLY TO A LETTER FROM LAURIE PIRAUX, A STUDENT FROM CANADA

LD240729 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85)
pp 16-18

[Text] Dear Laurie Piraux:

It was with much attention and interest that I read your very serious letter, an emotional, sincere letter full of alarm for something that is most important--how to avert nuclear catastrophe and preserve peace. The very fact that at the age of 18, when you are just entering life, you think about the grave danger overhanging people speaks for itself. I felt that your thoughts are full of concern not only for your own present and future. You feel you are a part of the huge family of nations on our planet which we are dutybound to preserve as beautiful as it is both for ourselves and for those who will live after us. It is precisely such thoughts that today occupy the minds of millions upon millions of people in scores of countries--participants in the antiwar and antinuclear movement. These are different people of different convictions, traditions and creeds. But what unites them is more important than any difference, for they are motivated by the main concern--to prevent nuclear annihilation.

Just like the young generation of Canadians, Soviet young men and women have grown up in conditions of peace. Our young people have all the opportunities to show their worth in study and work, to carry on the cause of the older generations, to be friends with their coevals in other countries. The Soviet Union's young generation is convinced that the people of the planet earth are capable of resisting the threat of war and upholding peace.

This year Moscow will become the city of the world festival of youth and students. There is no doubt that your fellow countrymen will be among the participants of the festival. This will be a rare opportunity to see and understand one's coevals from all parts of the globe, to realize how great is the strength of solidarity in the struggle for universal security.

It seems to me that you view the following questions in your letter as especially important ones: "Why can't all people, all races live in peace? Why is there such a struggle?" I will give a most definite answer: Nobody can achieve power over the world but attempts to fulfill such a mad plan may cost the whole of mankind very dearly.

Soon we will celebrate a big anniversary--the 40th anniversary of victory over fascism in the Second World War, in which the Soviet Union and Canada were allies. The attempts made by the fascists at the time to win power over the world ended in failure and the "crusade" against the Soviet state ended in defeat. In that war the Soviet people lost 20 million lives--this equals almost the whole of Canada's present population. And the war veterans, the older generation pass on to the Soviet youth the behest to strengthen peace and hate war.

The essence of your letter, as I see it, is such: What can and should be done for people to live in tranquility and peace, for there is to be no threat of war. The answer is simple: it is necessary to renounce forever the use of force or the threat to use it, it is necessary to do everything for mutually advantageous cooperation of countries to become a standard of international life. And these, putting it briefly, are the principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence which my country proposed to the world community immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917.

It is necessary to stop the arms race. The great Lenin viewed disarmament as an ideal of socialism. As early as in 1946 the Soviet Union proposed to ban forever the production and use of nuclear arms, and to destroy their stockpiles. Can you imagine what our world would be like today if this proposal of ours were adopted? How much easier it would be to breathe throughout the world if the other states had followed our example and also pledged not to be the first to use nuclear arms. The Soviet Union stands for freezing nuclear arsenals, for totally prohibiting nuclear weapons tests and the development and use of other types of weapons of mass annihilation. My country wants outer space to remain peaceful forever. The liquidation of nuclear arms totally and everywhere is the ultimate aim of these initiatives.

We are convinced that only by taking concrete actions in the name of peace it is possible to do away with the fear of the future and ensure confidence in the morrow. And, of course, for this we must better know one another. This helps to overcome prejudices and achieve mutual understanding and trust. This is a powerful weapon in the struggle of peace.

Quite a lot is known in my country about your country, its economic accomplishments and culture. Soviet people have feelings of respect and goodwill for Canada and its people. Our people want Soviet-Canadian relations to develop for the good of both nations and states, for the good of universal peace. In the year that has begun I wish you and your countrymen confidence in the future for which it is necessary to struggle stubbornly and with perseverance.

Respectfully yours, K. Chernenko.

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K. U. CHERNENKO'S ADDRESS TO FRENCH READERS

PM281135 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85)
pp 18-20

[From K. U. Chernenko's book "Narod; Partiya Yediny" [The People and the Party Are United], published by the French Publishing House Plon]

[Text] I have had occasions, in particular, during my visit to France, to see that much interest is displayed by your countrymen in the Soviet Union and in the life of the Soviet people. That is why I responded to the offer of the Plon publishers to put out a book of my collected speeches and articles and agreed to write an introduction to it. I am thankful for this opportunity.

I would like to begin by stressing that the past and present of the French people, their culture and their contribution to the treasure-house of world civilization are known and valued in our country. From the outset of the Russian democratic and revolutionary movement, its best representatives studied the development of progressive thought in France and the revolutionary traditions of the people, who destroyed the Bastille, established the Paris Commune and enriched mankind with an experience of struggle for progress, democracy and freedom.

Good relations between the Soviet Union and France are an important factor of security and stability on the European continent, where, as is known, two devastating world wars were unleashed. We were allies in the struggle against Hitler's fascism. There are no conflict situations between our countries. Although we don't see eye-to-eye on all the problems of present-day international affairs, we can note with satisfaction the broad coincidence of our national interests on the basis of our common care for peace.

The experience of Soviet-French cooperation, which we had an opportunity to sum up recently in connection with the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the USSR and France, makes it possible to state that when we pool our efforts in strengthening peace and developing cooperation, not only the peoples of our two countries but the peoples of other European nations and international security as a whole stand to gain. It is likewise indubitable that setbacks in Soviet-French cooperation--as we have already had to stress on more than one occasion--benefit no one: neither our countries nor world peace.

All this comes to mind today because the world, including our countries, has reached a dangerous point. The international situation is uneasy [trevozhna]. People everywhere are realizing ever more the need to check the avalanche of armaments threatening to crush mankind and wonder what should be done to avert war. To ward off the worst from all of us, it is necessary to understand clearly whence the threat comes.

It is a question of principle and small wonder that those whose policies pose a threat to world peace try to misguide the public. They claim that the source of military danger ignore today's realities. Responsible statesmen in the West, including France, are aware of this. The danger facing the world today has different sources and this is also known in your country.

What is the cause of fever in Europe today? First and foremost, it is the beginning and continued deployment of new U.S. first-strike missiles in a number of West European countries. We have already explained more than once, citing facts and figures, that the deployment of these missiles is aimed at tipping military parity in Europe and securing unilateral advantage for the USA and NATO. A grave threat has been posed to the peaceful life of the Soviet people. But do they alone face it? Can the British, Italians, West Germans and all the other Europeans feel more secure? Hardly so. The blame for this lies with those who forced the turning of the territories of several West European countries into American launching sites. It should also be said unambiguously that the responsibility is shared by all those who in one way or another--by deeds, words or even silence--contributed to the actual export of U.S. nuclear missiles to Europe. The situation here today is such that the restoration of stability and security on European soil has become an imperative. It is also important to raise a barrier in the way of the militarist and revanchist forces. The Soviet Union has been doing and will continue to do in this respect everything it can.

At the same time it is my conviction that at the present-day dangerous turn of history the Soviet Union and France could do a good deal jointly in this area. I drew this conviction, in particular, from the results of the recent Soviet-French summit talks and our conversations with President Francois Mitterrand, which open fresh opportunities for the development of our relations--of course, provided there is reciprocal--I stress, reciprocal--desire for this.

Guns went silent in Europe 40 years ago. The Soviet people had to heal gaping wounds, which still ache from time to time even today. The French nation and other European peoples were scarred as well. So may the forthcoming 40th anniversary of great victory over the forces of fascism and aggression become an occasion for all of us to give more serious thought to the destinies of peace, to what every government, every nation, everyone should do to prevent past tragedies from being ever repeated.

The Soviet people are engaged in peaceful labor. This book describes our plans of construction. The reader will find concrete proof in it of the unbreakable linkage between these plans and care for peace as well. The situation makes us concern ourselves with improving our defenses but we never even think of folding up economic and social programs. More than 1,000

enterprises were put into operation in our country during the past 5-year period. Trunk gas pipelines with a total length of 40,000 km have been built. The Baykal-Amur railroad, called the construction project of the century, has recently been opened for traffic. We are now working on a comprehensive program of scientific and technical progress to the year 2000 and beyond.

All peoples, I am certain, would like to spend money precisely to resolve their problems rather than throw it into the furnace of the wasteful arms race. The Soviet state has been tirelessly calling upon others throughout its history: Let us compete not in producing means of destruction but in producing material wealth for the people.

We want and seek to make our society meet in every respect the loftiest and most exacting ideas of socialism, the ideas that inspire working people and the mass of the population all over the world to struggle for socialism, the ideas that have never let us rest content with what we have achieved or reconcile ourselves to shortcomings and flaws.

The Soviet people generally feel today that their life is growing better already. They do not know what uncertainty of the future is poverty or homelessness. They do not have to knock at the doors of labor exchange offices: The very concept of unemployment has long been ousted from our life. Soviet socialist democracy is being perfected, the personal freedoms of citizens extended and basic human rights--the right to work, to personal freedoms of citizens extended and basic human rights--the right to work, to rest, to education and to health care--enlarged. We will continue to follow this road.

Wishing well-being and happiness to the readers of this book and in their persons to all the French men and women, I would like to hope that all of us will try to ensure that there is more security and stability in every French home, in every Soviet home, in our common European home, that mutual understanding and trust rather than suspicion and enmity live in it and that it is securely protected from the flames of war.

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K. U. CHERNENKO'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS BY CNN CORRESPONDENT STUART H. LOORY

LD11118 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85)
pp 20-23

[Text] Question: Do you think the agreement reached between the United States and the USSR in Geneva on the negotiations beginning March 12 creates the conditions needed for serious and fruitful discussions that can prevent an arms race in space and halt it on earth?

Answer: We have no doubts about it. As a matter of fact, the accord on the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. negotiations does open up such an opportunity. It contains a correct scheme of solving the problem of nuclear and space arms--the only possible one under the present conditions I would say. Today, no limitation and, still less, reduction of nuclear arms can be attained without taking effective measures which would prevent the militarization of outer space. This organic interrelationship has been clearly recorded in the joint Soviet-U.S. document.

Another fundamental point: The document explicitly states that efforts by the two sides to limit and reduce arms should ultimately lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. I should like to recall that this is precisely what the Soviet Union consistently has been advocating since the emergence of atomic weapons. I may also point out that so far the United States has been unwilling even to talk about the subject.

A basis for negotiating in a serious and purposeful manner, I repeat, does exist. What is required now is to abide in good faith by the Geneva agreement and to strictly adhere to every part of it in practice.

We are giving our clearcut instructions to proceed accordingly. We expect the same from the U.S. side.

Question: Why does the Soviet Union so forcefully object to the United States' idea for a "strategic defense initiative," taking into account that at present the U.S. government is speaking only of conducting scientific research in this field?

Answer: Using the term "defense" is juggling with words. In its substance this is an offensive, or to be more precise, aggressive concept. The aim is

to try to disarm the other side and deprive it of a capability to retaliate in the event of a nuclear aggression against it.

To put it simply, the aim is to acquire the capability to deliver a nuclear strike counting on impunity, with an ABM "shield" to protect oneself from retaliation. This is the same old policy to achieve decisive military superiority with all the ensuing implications for peace and international security.

I believe this clarifies why we are so resolutely opposed to this concept and such plans.

All talk that what is involved here has so far been limited to scientific research can only be misleading. Let us recall that the A-bomb also appeared as the result of scientific research under the Manhattan Project. Everyone knows how it turned out for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then the entire world and the Americans themselves have lived under the shadow of nuclear weapons. It should not be allowed for an awesome danger to come from space now as well.

I would like to be understood correctly. We are so vigorously opposed to the arms race spreading into outer space not because we will be unable to respond to Washington's plans: If we are compelled, we shall do our utmost, as we have done more than once in the past, to protect our security and the security of our allies and friends.

But one should face the truth: The militarization of outer space would upset the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, which is of unlimited duration, as well as many other international agreements presently in force. The militarization of outer space would not only mean in effect the end of the process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, but would become a catalyst of an uncontrolled arms race in all directions.

Questions: Many U.S. officials recently have said that the new negotiations will be difficult and will not result in quick accords. Do you share that view? What do you consider to be the most serious obstacle to a successful outcome of the talks?

Answer: Indeed, we are aware of such statements made by some people in the United States, including those involved in preparations for the negotiations. Before the negotiations have even started, there is talk already about insurmountable difficulties; public opinion is being prepared in advance for the prospect of years of fruitless discussion; appeals are made not to yield to the "Geneva hypnosis" but to continue an accelerated buildup of nuclear weapons and to intensify space programs. If mention is made at all of the possibility of reaching an accords, only individual--and naturally beneficial to the United States--questions pertaining to nuclear weapons are meant, while it is suggested that the problem of outer space should be postponed forever.

However, I would not like to make it look as if we, in the Soviet Union, expect the forthcoming negotiations to be easy. We take a realistic view of the situation and see the existing difficulties. And those are no small ones.

But they are surmountable. What is required is goodwill on the part of both sides, willingness for reasonable compromises and strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

It is certainly inadmissible that any steps be taken that impede constructive negotiations and run counter to the task of preventing an arms race in outer space and halting it on earth.

The thinking should take a different direction--how to create a climate favorable for the talks. There exist real opportunities for this.

Would it not be helpful for the talks and promotion of the goal jointly set by the two sides, i.e., ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons, if the United States, following the Soviet Union's example, renounce the first use of nuclear weapons? Freezing the nuclear arsenals and completely banning all nuclear weapon tests could securely put the brakes on the nuclear arms race and thus also help the talks.

Question: What effect does the state of Soviet-U.S. relations at present have on the international situation generally? How can the forthcoming talks change that situation?

Answer: Regrettably, things are not working out too well between the Soviet Union and the United States. Of course, this cannot fail to affect the general international situation which remains complicated and strained.

Indeed, agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to hold negotiations on issues central to universal security. It is only natural that this step met with approval and raised hopes throughout the world. But it is not to be overlooked that the causes of tensions existing in the world have not been eliminated.

Has the United States cancelled a single of its programs aimed at achieving military superiority? No, it has not. On the contrary, in order to attain that goal the assembly line is churning out armaments at full capacity. Or perhaps the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe has been discontinued? No, it has not either.

Nor will the United States renounce the methods of diktat in regard to other states. The international situation today comprises both the undeclared war against Nicaragua, support for the Israeli aggression in the Middle East and abetment of the racist terror in the south of Africa--in other words, the type of manifestations of a policy rejected by an overwhelming majority of people of all continents. The peoples repudiate and condemn such policies and resolutely demand that they be ended.

To sum up, I would say that mankind is at a critical point in its history: The very future of human civilization depends on whether the major tasks facing the world today are resolved--first and foremost that of removing the nuclear threat, preventing the militarization of outer space and using space

exclusively for peaceful purposes; and combining the efforts of the peoples to resolve global economic and ecological problems.

Incidentally, I believe this also answers the second part of your question. A positive outcome of the new Soviet-U.S., negotiations on nuclear and space arms would favorably influence the world situation and would greatly contribute to solving the cardinal problems of today.

The Soviet Union will work towards this goal seeking meaningful and concrete results in Geneva. But not everything here depends on the Soviet side alone.

People are not merely aware of the dramatic times we are living through; they are coming to understand ever more clearly where the watershed lies dividing the two major policies--the policy of peace and the course aimed at war preparations. The peoples and governments resolutely speak out in favor of a healthier international situation, halting the arms race, ensuring peaceful outer space and eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

Just recently this was rightly and forcefully stated by the heads of state or government of India, Mexico, Sweden, Tanzania, Argentina and Greece in a declaration adopted in New Delhi.

This is the imperative for our two countries following from their high responsibility before the present and future generations.

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TO ADVANCED FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

AU060701 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85)
pp 24-37

[Article by V. Grishin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom]

[Text] In its movement along the path of social progress, our country is currently at the initial stage of developed socialism. Consistently and steadily fulfilling the complex and responsible tasks that comprise the substance of the multifaceted, historically protracted and vast work aimed at comprehensively perfecting develop socialist society, the CPSU primarily concentrates its efforts on completing the transition to intensive methods of economic operations and on improving the efficiency of social production in every possible way. The creative forces inherent in the very nature of the economy of developed socialism make it possible and urgently necessary that the fulfillment of a task of program significance--that of ensuring the country's reaching the highest world level of social labor productivity--be shifted onto a practical plane.

"The first and obvious thing that must be done," notes Comrade K. U. Chernenko in his article "To the Level of Requirements of Developed Socialism," "is to mobilize the organizational efforts and the material resources necessary for technically reequipping all branches of the national economy as soon as possible and for ensuring the rapid assimilation into production of the most progressive technologies. This is a task of key significance. To fulfill this task also means resolving the problem of intensifying and increasing the economy's effectiveness."

There is only one path to follow here: that of accelerating scientific-technical progress in every way possible, extensively introducing the latest scientific-technical achievements into production and qualitatively transforming the productive forces.

The fulfillment of this key economic and political task requires thoroughly generalizing the experience accumulated by party organizations and organs of economic management and creatively interpreting and utilizing all the best in the practice of socialist construction.

Preparing for the 27th CPSU Congress, the Moscow party gorkom channels the attention of party organizations and labor collectives into making the transition to intensive methods of economic operations, which will make it possible to achieve a sharp increase in production efficiency. We have the necessary prerequisites for this.

Thanks to the constant concern of the party and state and the help of all the Soviet people, Moscow has become a major economic, administrative-political, scientific and cultural center.

The industrial potential of the city today consists of approximately 1,000 industrial enterprises whose basic funds amount to many billions of rubles.

The workers and employees of Moscow form one of the most major and most progressive detachments of the Soviet working people. The majority of them are active production workers and people engaged in social affairs, people with a high level of general and professional standards capable of fulfilling the most complex and responsible tasks.

Large cadres of engineering-technical intelligentsia are concentrated in the capital who are equal to any problems set by the scientific-technical revolution. Moscow is a recognized center of domestic and world science and a city with progressive scientific schools and traditions.

The varied activities of Moscow's working people are directed by the city's party organization, which numbers more than a million communists who are deeply aware of their responsibility for successfully fulfilling the economic and social development plans and for implementing the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums.

Considerable success was achieved by the capital's labor collectives during 1984. On 25 December, the city's industry completed the year's plan in terms of production volume and sales. Last year, the volume of industrial production increased by 3.5 percent and by more than 7 percent over the course of the 4 years of the current 5-year period, thus exceeding the plan task by 1.6 percent. Branches determining scientific-technical progress have developed at an accelerated rate.

As in the preceding period, the growth of labor productivity in 1984 steadily outstripped the increase in production volume. The entire growth in production was achieved by means of increasing labor productivity while simultaneously reducing the numbers of industrial-production personnel. The Moscow enterprises successfully fulfilled their socialist obligations of increasing labor productivity over and above the plan and reducing prime production costs. The growth in labor productivity over and above the plan was twice as high as that envisaged in the adopted obligations. These obligations were also exceeded 1.6 times regarding reductions in prime production costs, which were 0.8 percent lower than the plan stipulated. Tasks for the 4 years of the five-year plan period were fulfilled ahead of time.

At the same time, to quote Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "not every task and problem facing us has been resolved at the level of the requirements of developed socialism." It is precisely for this reason that today the Moscow party gorkom regards its prime duty as being that of even more thoroughly analyzing the processes taking place in the production and scientific-technical complex of the capital, looking into the essence of existing shortcomings, adopting the necessary measures to eliminate these shortcomings, broadly disseminating progressive experience and valuable undertakings and significantly accelerating scientific-technical progress on this basis in all branches of the national economy.

The Moscow enterprises, on the whole equipped with advanced technology, are distinguished by their efficient organization of production and high level of labor productivity. All this, together with the high professional level of the workers, engineers and technical workers, determines the contemporary aspect of Moscow industry. However, alongside the progressive enterprises are enterprises utilizing obsolete equipment and technology and predominantly staffed by low-skilled labor.

In view of this, party organizations and working people in Moscow concentrate their efforts on building and introducing new equipment and technology capable of ensuring higher growth rates in labor productivity in comparison to the growth in production volume, as well as ensuring the vital economy of labor and material resources and the more effective use of the scientific and production potential concentrated in the capital.

The powerful Moscow industry plays an important role in furnishing the country's enterprises with progressive forms of equipment, machines and apparatus. Moscow produces a considerable proportion of the automobiles manufactured throughout the country as a whole, 7 percent of the metal-working equipment and a significant proportion of the goods manufactured by the instrument-making, light and food industries.

The Moscow enterprises engaged in machine-tool manufacturing, automobile, electrical engineering, electronics, instrument-making and other branches of industry are the pride of the Soviet Union.

The specific features of the capital party organization's tasks connected with the acceleration of scientific-technical progress are determined by the fact that most of Moscow's workers and employees are employed in those sectors of social production that in many ways play a determining role in intensifying the country's economy.

The very structure of Moscow's industry creates its great potential for directly ensuring scientific-technical progress and implementing its latest achievements. Thus, almost 60 percent of all industrial-production personnel and approximately half of the capital's industrial-production funds are concentrated in the machine construction and metal-working branches, which are called upon first and foremost to "open their doors wide to the new."

As is well-known, the intensification of social production can be most effectively ensured on the basis of reconstructing and technically reequipping

operating enterprises, while simultaneously intensifying their specialization in the production of goods of a high technical level and quality. For Moscow's industry, this is an extremely topical task.

Many of the capital's plants and factories were built during the years of the first five-year plans, and some of them even originated during prerevolutionary times. At a number of industrial enterprises that have been operating for more than a decade, elements of basic industrial-production funds (the buildings and structures, operating machines and equipment, apparatus, means of transport and so forth) have essentially become both outdated and physically obsolete.

Old, obsolete equipment holds back the process of assimilating the results of scientific work and slows down the manufacture of products meeting contemporary standards. What is more, the use of obsolete technology and worn-out machine tools and equipment leads to the increased expenditure of labor resources and the overexpenditure of material, raw material, fuel and energy resources. Meanwhile, the possibilities of building new enterprises in Moscow and of attracting additional labor resources here are virtually exhausted now. Under these conditions, the general line of industry in the capital is that of reconstructing and technically reequipping operating enterprises, which must be run not only by not reducing, but, on the contrary, by increasing their production output and improving the quality of their products.

The paramount importance of reconstructing and modernizing production is now recognized by all enterprise and department leaders. In this, considerable merit goes to the city party organization. Very recently, people had to be firmly persuaded of the correctness of this approach and its necessity through the examples of progressive collectives. Suffice it to say that as early as 1977, 20 percent of all capital investments of operating enterprises, more than 33 percent into reconstruction, and only 11 percent into the technical reequipping of these enterprises. A similar picture was also observed in previous years.

Having examined the problem of improving the use of basic production funds and speeding up the process of bringing new capacities into operation, the June 1978 CPSU Moscow Gorkom Plenum condemned former practices and demanded that economic leaders increase their attention to modernizing industrial production. This course was then approved by the 24th and 25th city party conferences. Now the state of affairs has radically changed.

In 1985, approximately 60 percent of capital investments will be expended on reconstructing and technically reequipping enterprises.

In order to more successfully fulfill the tasks connected with reconstructing and technically reequipping operating enterprises, a comprehensive, special-purpose program for developing Moscow's industry during the period 1981-1990 has been drawn up at the initiative and under the leadership of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom. The practical implementation of the measures envisaged by the program has made it possible to increase the rates at which the enterprises

are reconstructed and technically reequipped and to accelerate the process of comprehensively mechanizing, automating and robotizing production processes.

During the first 4 years of the 11th Five-Year-Plan, the first section of the metal-rolling workshop at the Serp i Molot Metallurgical Plant was commissioned and the newly introduced capacities of the cold-rolled stainless metal strip workshop were commissioned for regular production. The country's first combined catalytic cracking installation was built and commissioned for regular production at the petroleum refining plant. The volume of production of petroleum products at the plant increased by 22 percent, while the number of workers did not change.

The collective of the Krasnyy Proletariy Machine-Tool Construction Plant is comprehensively and purposefully resolving the problems of reconstructing and technically reequipping operating production units. This work is being conducted here in close cooperation with scientific organizations. All the plant's workshops are being reconstructed and technically reequipped in order to liquidate bottlenecks and ensure the harmonious development of production. Obsolete equipment is being replaced and updated at the plant, production technology is being perfected, labor-intensive technological processes are being automated and transport, loading-unloading and warehouse operations are being mechanized.

The plant's party organization controls the implementation of planned measures. A commission for implementing control over administrative activities works effectively under the party committee. A climate of great mutual exactingness and responsibility for the matter at hand is being persistently established in the enterprise collective. Public open discussions of successes and shortcomings and the participation by leaders of all ranks in political-educational work creates a favorable social climate that facilitates the fulfillment of production tasks. Since the beginning of 1985, the plant has completely gone over to producing machine-tools with automatic numerical control.

Among the complex of problems resolved by the party organizations of industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes and by the rayon party committees, an important place is occupied by the problem of improving the quality and technical level of products. In order to coordinate this work and enhance the degree of its scientific validity, the Moscow city system for controlling production quality was developed under the leadership of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom and registered by the USSR State Committee for Standards in 1981.

Introducing this system has made it possible to achieve vital improvement in the quality of products manufactured during the current five-year plan period. The specific proportion of high-quality goods within the total volume of products liable to certification currently amounts to 47.5 percent. By 1986, the specific proportion of high-quality products manufactured by industrial enterprises is expected to reach 53.5 percent.

Vast reserves for accelerating scientific-technical progress and further enhancing the efficiency of social production lie in the economic utilization

of all forms of resources. Speaking at a CPSU Central Committee Politburo session on 15 November 1984, Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized in this connection: "To be zealous economic managers and to struggle for greater economy--this is the prime task." Today the party regards economy not as some kind of addition to constantly growing resources, but as a most important source of production growth.

Under the leadership of the party organizations, Moscow's labor collectives have accumulated a great deal of experience in the thrifty and economic use of raw material, material, energy and other forms of resources. Permanent commissions for the economic expenditure of material and fuel-energy resources effectively operate under the party committees and bureaus of the industrial enterprises, institutions and organizations; plans for organizational-technical measures to reduce the consumption of metal, cement, building materials, fuel and energy are drawn up and implemented annually; and reviews of the economy's reserves are systematically carried out. The practice whereby workers adopt personal economy accounts has been further developed. At many enterprises, efficiency in the utilization of resources has been enhanced and production growth ensured without any increase in material expenditure through the introduction of low-waste and waste-free technology, energy-saving machines and processes, progressive materials and new design schemes into production.

In the conditions of setting the economy on the rails of intensive development, the use in production of fundamentally new equipment and new technological processes capable of increasing labor productivity many times over acquires paramount importance. One of the most important aspects of this work is the comprehensive automation of production on the basis of introducing flexible robot-technological, easily resettable, automated production operations and sections.

The city party committee constantly keeps sight of problems arising in this sphere, discussing them at bureau meetings, meetings of the aktiv and scientific-practical conferences. A vital role in the resolving of these problems is played by the Scientific-Methodological Council for the Problems of Building and Introducing Industrial Robots and Manipulators at Moscow Enterprises and Organizations, which was formed in 1980 under the CPSU Moscow Gorkom. In recent years, the council has provided a great deal of methodological, technical and organizational help for the city's enterprises in the matter of further perfecting production and raising its technical level on the basis of introducing robot-technological means.

Together with the Moscow Robototekhnika Scientific-Educational Center, which was formed at the initiative of the party gorkom, the council has organized special training for economic leaders, chief engineers and specialists at enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design offices in a broad range of problems connected with the use of robot technology. Permanent consultation centers have been opened under the auspices of the Moscow Hall of Scientific-Technical Propaganda and the Experimental Scientific Research Institute of Metal-Cutting Machine Tools and schools and seminars have been organized for the exchange of experience in building, introducing and utilizing robot-technological means.

The CPSU Moscow Gorkom Bureau has approved the "Program for Introducing Automated Systems and Technological Complexes Into Production on the Basis of Utilizing Robot-Technological and Microprocessing Means at Enterprises in Moscow for the Period 1984-1990," which envisages building automated plants and workshops and introducing large-scale flexible production systems, technological complexes using industrial robots and microprocessing means and automated sections and lines at enterprises in the city.

Several hundred comprehensively automated and mechanized workshops and sections have been brought into operation in the capital's industry during the 11th Five-year Plan Period.

Great success has been achieved by innovators at the Likhachev Automobile Plant, the Lianozovskiy Electromechanical Plant and a number of others. The introduction of innovations, accompanied by growth in labor productivity at a given workshop, in a given sector, on a given conveyor not only yields economic effect, but the standard of production improves at the same time. The introduction of automatic systems is becoming a serious socio-psychological factor conducive to enriching the substance of labor activities, erasing differences between physical and intellectual work and creating an atmosphere of creativity and bold innovation in the collectives.

Today, industrial robots are more and more frequently becoming one of the links in large-scale automated complexes. In the long term, they will serve entire workshops and automated plants under the supervision of operators and dispatchers.

The extensive introduction of electronic computing means plays an important role in accelerating scientific-technical progress and perfecting production management on the basis of utilizing the contemporary achievements of science and technology. Work to build automated control systems in industry, construction, transport, trading and public catering enterprises, public services, housing and communal services and in the sphere of public health care and social insurance has developed on a broad scale in Moscow.

The party gorkom and rayon committees concentrate the attention of the party organizations and economic leaders at plants, scientific research institutes and design offices on increasing the efficiency of existing electronic computers makes it possible to improve the basic technical-economic indexes of enterprise work, to reduce nonproductive losses and to free a large number of workers from routine calculating operations.

Discussion of the problem of efficiency in the utilization of automatic control systems at enterprises and organizations in Moscow has shown that the utilization of the systems yields considerable economic effect.

Interesting experience in the efficient utilization of computing equipment has been accumulated at the Leninskiy Komsomol Automobile Plant, the Plastic and Khromatron scientific-production associations, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Metallurgical Machine Construction, the S. A. Lebedev Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Technology of the USSR Academy

of Sciences, the All-Union Scientific Institute of Construction and Road Machine Building, Hidroproekt and others.

Among the progressive forms of production organization in the capital, the experience, approved by the CPSU Central Committee, of the work of the collective of the Dnepropetrovsk K. Ye. Voroshilov Combine Plant to enhance the efficiency of utilizing production capacities on the basis of certifying work places and making them more economical has been given broad support.

The management and party committee at the Second Watch-Making Plant efficiently control the implementation of measures aimed at ensuring the efficient planning of equipment and the scientific organization of work places. Accountability reports are regularly submitted there by the leaders of brigades and workshops on the efficient utilization of capacities. Work is actively conducted at the plant to reveal superfluous equipment and transfer it to other spheres of the national economy. Fulfilling planned measures has made it possible for the collective to significantly increase the shift index of highly productive equipment and to manufacture additional products worth tens of millions of rubles. Work is successfully carried out in the matter of certifying work places and making them more economical at the I. A. Likhachev Automobile Plant production associations, the Moscow Sergo Ordzhonikidze Machine Tool Construction Plant, Manometr, the Stanko-Agregat plants, the Moscow Automobile and Tractor Equipment Plant and others.

Setting Moscow enterprises on the rails of an intensive economy is, of course, a complex and difficult matter. A certain conservatism and inertia in the activities of some economic leaders and party organizations will have to be overcome. "...It is no secret," notes K. U. Chernenko in this connection, "that the attention of some comrades working in the national economy is at times wholly swallowed up by immediate individual problems." The effectiveness of work for introducing new technology is considerably held back by an absence of real interest on the part of production workers in extensively utilizing technical and technological innovations. Particularly complex is the process of introducing scientific achievements requiring fairly long stoppages while operating production units are reconstructed. The ministries, departments and party organizations of industrial enterprises still do not devote sufficient attention to fulfilling plans for new equipment. These plans have not yet become one of the basic criteria for evaluating economic activities.

For the same reason, reconstruction plans at a considerable number of enterprises are not oriented toward fundamentally new scientific technical decisions capable of increasing labor productivity many times over. Reconstruction at many enterprises drags on for many years and, as a result, even progressive scientific-technical decisions inherent in the projects become obsolete before reconstruction has been completed. In a number of cases, reconstruction is not carried out comprehensively and only some sections and processes are modernized and renovated, and therefore the nature of production as a whole does not change.

Real results in increasing the economic leaders' interest in accelerating scientific-technical progress are being yielded by the economic experiment in

industry in which 30 Moscow enterprises participated in 1984. This experiment was preceded by a great deal of organizational work on the part of the party committees in order to explain the aims and advantages of working in the new way and to increase the responsibility of workshop and section leaders for organizing production to meet the requirements of intensification.

Analysis by the CPSU Moscow Gorkom Bureau of the results of the work of these enterprises has shown that the conditions of economic operations stipulated by the experiment are having a positive effect upon the activities of associations and plants. Labor collectives' responsibility for the fulfillment of set targets has increased, as has their interest in achieving high final results. Plans for introducing new equipment and progressive technology and for removing obsolete types of products from production are being fulfilled in full. The main condition of the experiment--strict observance of production deliveries in accordance with concluded agreements and obligations--is being successfully fulfilled by the majority of the enterprises.

In those labor collectives participating in the economic experiment, the organization of production and work has improved and lost worktime due to internal shift hold-ups, absenteeism, and administrative leave have significantly decreased. It is characteristic that at these enterprises, the number of brigades working on a unified system and utilizing the elements of economic accountability is growing more rapidly than in Moscow's industry as a whole. The new approach to forming and utilizing the forms of wages in conjunction with other levers included in the experiment has had a positive influence on the development of multimachine operations and the combining of professions, and has made it possible to fundamentally reduce the number of industrial-production personnel. This year the economic experiment at Moscow enterprises will be expanded.

The CPSU Moscow Gorkom also channels the daily activities of the party raykoms, primary party organizations, and labor collectives into resolving the complex problems facing industry in the capital.

The special responsibility of communists and all the working people of Moscow in the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and the intensification of social production is connected with the capital's great scientific potential. The development of science, without which, as it was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress, the construction of the new society is inconceivable, forms the basis of scientific-technical progress.

Moscow is a recognized center of native and world scientific thought. The headquarters of Soviet science, the USSR Academy of Sciences, is located here, as well as the Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Hundreds of scientific research and planning-design institutes and higher education establishments are to be found. The scientific potential of the capital is not only characterized by the number of scientific cadres, but also by their high degree of qualification.

More than half of all scientific workers from the USSR Academy of Sciences are concentrated in Moscow's research institutes and laboratories. It is

important to note this primarily because it is precisely fundamental scientific ideas that determine the paths and prospects of scientific-technical progress. Science is called upon to outstrip production in its development, and the more fruitfully it feeds practice with new ideas and designing and technological solutions, the more rapidly social production will develop.

Many Moscow scientific research institutes are leaders in their fields. This places double responsibility on their collectives and compels them to be highly exacting in their approach to evaluating the effectiveness and scientific level of elaborations. True leaders of scientific-technical progress are: the I.P. Bardin Central Scientific Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy in native metallurgy, the Experimental Scientific Research Institute of Metal-Cutting Machine Tools in machine tool construction, the Central Scientific Research Institute of Automobiles and Automobile Engines in automobile construction and the V. I. Lenin All-Union Electrotechnical Institute in energetics. Their work is distinguished by boldness of creative search and persistency in the struggle to introduce all that is most progressive and place it at the disposal of industry. Each of the aforementioned collectives has a considerable number of interesting developments and inventions to its credit that are highly essential to the national economy.

Consistently implementing the party course aimed at comprehensively intensifying social production, the CPSU Moscow Gorkom and the city's party organizations conduct purposeful work to mobilize the scientific and design collectives, significantly raise the level of scientific-technical and design elaborations and strengthen the links between science and production.

The tasks of the collectives of scientific research institutes, design offices, higher education establishments and production enterprises connected with accelerating scientific-technical progress have been discussed at the CPSU Moscow Gorkom plenum and meetings of the capital's party-economic aktiv. Implementation of the adopted measures is constantly controlled by the gorkom, party raykoms and primary party rectifications at enterprises and institutions.

During the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the practical contribution of party organizations to work aimed at improving the utilization of the scientific-technical potential accumulated in Moscow, enhancing the effectiveness of scientific research and reducing the time taken to introduce its results into production has tangibly increased.

The problems of actualizing scientific research, reducing the time it takes, concentrating resources on the main aspects of scientific-technical progress and extending the subject matter have begun to be more frequently brought up for discussion by party bureaus and at meetings of scientific research and project-design organizations.

At present, the efforts of scientific collectives are primarily concentrated on drawing up and introducing major special-purpose programs based on the results of fundamental research and aimed at creating fundamentally new

equipment and technology corresponding to the best native and foreign achievements and, in a number of cases, even superior to these achievements. While directing the work of scientific institutions, the city party organization pays particular attention to ensuring that their subject matter plans constantly adhere to leading trends in scientific-technical progress and that the priority development of the most long-term research is ensured.

Moscow scientists have carried out major theoretical work in the spheres of physics, chemistry, biology, the study of outer space and the creation of new energy sources. On the basis of this work and through the joint efforts of academic and branch institutes, higher education establishments, and industrial enterprises, new materials with unique properties have been developed and the laser processing of metals, powder metallurgy, methods of directly transforming thermal energy into electrical energy and other highly effective technological processes are being introduced into production.

The work carried out at the P. N. Lebedev Physics Institute, the Institute of General Physics and the Institute of Spectroscopy of the USSR Academy of Sciences has made it possible to vitally improve the characteristics of lasers and broaden the sphere of their application. A group of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences have created glass fibre light conductors that serve as the element base of optical fibre communications systems.

The Institute of Molecular Biology and the M. M. Shemyakin Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences have developed biotechnological methods of obtaining valuable, physiologically active preparations--insulin, interferon and others.

Considerable success in the development of industrial robots for various purposes has been achieved by scientists, engineers and designers at the A. A. Blagonravov Institute of Engineering Science of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Experimental Scientific Research Institute of Metal-Cutting Machine Tools, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Transport-Lifting Machine Construction and the N. E. Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School.

Vital work results have been achieved by the collectives of branch scientific research, planning and design organizations. In all, the collectives of scientific research institutes and planning-design organizations in Moscow completed research on 50,000 subjects during the period 1981-1984. Since the beginning of the five-year plan, approximately 40,000 developments have been introduced into the national economy, every second one of which has been connected with the creation of new machines, equipment, apparatus, instruments, materials and new technological processes. Every ruble spent on carrying out and introducing developments connected with the creation of new equipment yields an economic effect of 3.2 rubles. The introduction of measures on new equipment has made it possible to conditionally release approximately 60,000 workers in industry since the beginning of the five-year plan period.

At the same time, shortcomings exist in the work of the collectives of academic and branch scientific research institutes and higher education

institutes that must be overcome as soon as possible. It is precisely on the weak links that the attention of party organizations must be concentrated.

Some institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences do not fully exert influence on the formation of a unified scientific-technical policy that is in line with the key tasks of economic and social development.

In a number of cases, the acceleration of scientific-technical progress in branches of the national economy is impeded by the low quality of design for new machines, mechanisms and technological processes. Analysis by the CPSU Moscow Gorkom Bureau of the course of fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On Measures To Accelerate Scientific-Technical Progress in the National Economy" by Moscow organizations and enterprises has shown that the specific proportion of models of new equipment developed in planning design and scientific research organizations and adopted by industry, the technical level of which surpasses that of the best native and foreign analogous models, has not increased to the proper extent in recent years. Obsolete solutions are sometimes included in designs. On average, every fourth worker on mechanized flow lines in the city's industry and every sixth worker on automatic lines fulfills work manually.

The party pays special attention to the necessity of speeding up the introduction into practice of completed scientific elaborations capable of bringing about truly revolutionary changes in branches of the national economy. It was emphasized at the 26th Congress: "The decisive and most important sphere today is the introduction of scientific discoveries and inventions. Scientific research and planning-design work must be more closely connected, from an economic and an organizational viewpoint, with production."

Today, special-purpose comprehensive programs, as well as programs for resolving the most important scientific-technical problems, which determine the strategic directions of fundamental, applied research and design work carried out in accordance with the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, are an effective means of overcoming shortcomings in the work of scientific research institutes and design offices, combining science and production, developing scientific-technical progress and pursuing a unified scientific-technical policy in our country. Within the plan system, these programs primarily make it possible to establish the priority of work on a nationwide scale and to fully realize as yet unutilized reserves of science and technology. They are wholly oriented toward the practical utilization of scientific achievements in various branches of the national economy.

Academic and branch scientific research institutes and design offices, higher education institutes and industrial enterprises in the city participate in carrying out the majority of all-union scientific-technical programs, including programs aimed at resolving the most important scientific-technical problems and special-purpose, comprehensive programs. They cover the most important branches of the national economy: machine construction, energetics, transport, light industry and others.

Scientific-technical programs on the most important, long-term aspects of science and technology make it possible for the party organizations to soundly

determine which scientific subjects must be elaborated first and foremost and to adopt measures for concentrating scientific and material technical resources on the most topical research.

Thus, new, more favorable conditions have arisen for the implementation of concrete party control over science.

The CPSU Moscow Gorkom has adopted measures to ensure control over the implementation of all-union and special-purpose programs. In accordance with a resolution adopted by the CPSU Moscow Gorkom plenum, collections of "Scientific-Technical Programs for 1981-1985."

"Tasks and Stages of Programs Fulfilled by Organizations and Enterprises Located on the Territory of Moscow" have been compiled and distributed among rayon party committees, which has made it possible for them to precisely know the scientific collectives engaged in fulfilling the programs and the extent of their participation, as well as to organize control over the course of work in good time. CPSU Moscow Gorkom departments control the fulfillment of tasks set by scientific-technical programs in the branch section.

The party raykoms have accumulated certain experience in this aspect. For example, in 1981, the CPSU Oktyabrskiy Raykom Bureau approved the initiative of progressive collectives in the rayon on the adoption of socialist obligations aimed at the early qualitative fulfillment of tasks set by all-union scientific-technical programs. Contracts have been concluded between the executor organizations, and the fulfillment of tasks is regularly analyzed at meetings of party organization secretaries. As a result of the purposeful activities of the Council for Science and Higher Education Institutes attached to the Oktyabrskiy party raykom and of the primary party organizations in scientific collectives, the volume of important, topical subjects in the plans for scientific research work has increased here by 20 percent during the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan Period and comprises approximately three-quarters of all research conducted. Similar work is conducted in the Leningrad, Kalinin and other raykoms.

At the same time, the effective utilization of the advantages of the program-special purpose method of planning is held back by shortcomings in the organization of management and control over the fulfillment of scientific-technical programs.

Practice has shown that in recent years, in connection with the increase in production volumes and the list of manufactured goods, as well as the increase in specialization and the volumes of cooperative product deliveries, a management of all spheres of social production has become a great deal more complex. The task of ensuring the optimal combination of branch and territorial principles of national economy management is acquiring increasing importance. In these conditions, regional programs making it possible to more fully take the city's interests into account and to more effectively utilize local potential and labor, energy and other resources are called upon to play an important organizational role.

The Moscow planning organs and a number of scientific research institutes have drawn up the "Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Progress in Moscow in 1986-2005." It is a component part of the all-union program for scientific-technical progress. While taking the tasks of developing the capital into account, it determines the main aspects of the scientific-technical policy aimed at the maximum utilization of progressive scientific and technical achievements in the national economy.

At present, Moscow is implementing special-purpose comprehensive programs covering various spheres and sectors of the city's economy: the development of industry up to the year 1990, and the reconstruction and technical reequipping of branch enterprises; the development of the energy system up to the year 1990; the development of all forms of transport; the mechanization of manual labor and the efficient utilization of labor resources. The special feature of the aforementioned regional programs is their orientation toward progressive scientific and technical achievements and the utilization in production of the most progressive types of machines, mechanisms, materials and technological processes.

Work to extensively introduce scientific-technical achievements into production and to utilize the experience of the best workers, engineering-technical workers and advance production collectives has developed on a large scale. It is one of the most important aspects of the activities of the party organizations.

The party raykoms and party organizations do a great deal to introduce new forms and methods of cooperation between scientific research institutes and design offices and production. The practice of concluding economic contracts and agreements on creative cooperation between scientists and production workers, as well as forming joint creative brigades, is being increasingly developed.

In accordance with the agreements on creative cooperation, the collectives of academic and branch scientific research and planning-design organizations and higher education institutes render scientific-technical aid to almost 1,000 Moscow enterprises.

A convincing example of the fruitful creative union between science and labor is provided by the cooperation between the I. A. Kihachev Moscow Automobile Plant Production Association and a number of the country's major scientific enters, such as the M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, the V. I. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, the Ye. O. Paton Electric Welding Institute, the All-Union Scientific Research and Planning-Design Institute of Metallurgical Machine Construction, the Tula Ferrous Metallurgy Scientific Production Association, the Scientific Research Institute of the Technology of the Automobile Industry and others.

A special feature of today is the expansion of direct contacts between communists at scientific research institutes and enterprises at various levels from the party group and workshop organization to the party bureau and party committee. The most important and responsible elaborations are taken under

the joint control of the party organizations at scientific institutes and production enterprises.

Channeling their efforts into fulfilling party decisions, the capital's scientists and production collectives have been the initiators of a number of valuable undertakings. Indicative in this respect is the work experience of the collective of the Gidroproekt Institute, which has been approved by the CPSU Central Committee. There, under the leadership of the party organization and in close cooperation with builders, specialists from other institutes, and industrial workers, careful analysis has been made of the estimated costs of construction-assembly work, the indexes of hydroelectric power station operation, the progressive experience of builders in other branches of the national economy and the potentials of native machine construction. As a result of the work done, it has become possible to significantly raise the standard of design and to reduce the estimated costs of constructing hydroelectric power stations. The initiative of the Gidroproekt Institute has been supported by the labor collectives of more than 100 scientific research institutes, scientific-production associations, and higher education institutes in the capital, which has made it possible to ensure considerable economy of labor and material resources.

Scientific-production associations with a powerful scientific, experimental and technological base at their disposal have recommended themselves as an effective form of integrating science and production. The integration of science and production helps to concentrate material and labor resources on the most important aspects of scientific-technical progress. For example, the Khimavtomatika Scientific-Production Association has succeeded in almost halving the time from the initial development to the introduction of goods into production, and has also vitally improved the growth rate of labor productivity.

While organizing work to accelerate scientific-technical progress in branches of the national economy in Moscow, the party raykoms strive to draw a broad range of scientists and specialists as well as the party aktiv into studying and generalizing the experience of progressive production collectives and practically coordinating their creative plans with the plans of Moscow's scientific research institutes, planning-design organizations and higher education institutes.

It is with this aim that public councils and organizational and methodological centers that provide effective aid in strengthening practical cooperation between science and production have been formed in all CPSU raykoms.

Thus, for example, it has become the firm practice for the technical-economic council attached to CPSU Leninskiy Raykom to hold field sessions of a section of the council at enterprises and organizations in the rayon, at which issues are discussed connected with studying the work experience of the party organizations of scientific research institutes and industrial enterprises to speed up the introduction of technical innovations into production, perfect the planning and organization of research and raise the technical level of production. Many of the issues are then brought up for discussion by the CPSU

Raykom Bureau and examined at seminars of party organization secretaries and economic leaders.

As a whole, the work conducted by the city's party organizations and labor collectives has made it possible to vitally strengthen the union between science and labor, and it has had a positive effect on the results of the economic activity of enterprises. During 1984 alone, Moscow industry began the production of more than 200 new types of complex technical goods, machine tools and equipment ensuring a significant increase in labor productivity.

At the same time, it is still early to speak of a radical improvement in the work of industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes connected with accelerating scientific-technical progress. As practice shows, there is no shortage of fruitful ideas and highly effective elaborations. However, their introduction into production is frequently dragged out over many years or, for the most part, is carried out only at one or two enterprises. The broad circulation of the results of scientific research and experimental-design elaborations is hindered by departmental barriers. Scientific research institutes and design offices sometimes even located next to one another, but affiliated with different ministries, conduct research on the same subjects, which entails an unwarranted expenditure of labor and material resources. Ministries and departments include elaborations in plans for new equipment while being guided by a desire to ensure the fulfillment of these plans through the resources of branch institutes, and not through considerations of scientific innovation and the effectiveness of proposed solutions.

The potentials of the scientific-production associations are not fully utilized for the purpose of speeding up scientific-technical progress in industrial branches. Possessing as a rule a sufficiently powerful experimental-production base, scientific-production associations are frequently unable to ensure the rapid manufacture of experimental models, as the experimental plants incorporated in these associations are overloaded with serial production, the proportion of which seriously exceeds the volume considered optimum for enterprises of this kind.

An inalienable part of the work of the Moscow party gorkom to accelerate scientific-technical progress is its constant concern to perfect the training of specialist cadres and the scientific-technical intelligentsia. The task of perfecting the structure of a specialized profession, in which training is given in Moscow's higher education institutes and technical colleges, is being consistently fulfilled. The training of cadres in specialized professions of which there is a shortage but which are most important to the national economy is increasing, while training in superfluous professions is being reduced. Widely developed, for example, is the training of specialists in the sphere of robot-technological systems, flexible automated production organizations and automated design systems.

Bringing the training of specialists closer to the needs of the national economy is also facilitated by the expanding practice of forming branches of specialized training departments at enterprises. Today, approximately 70 such branches have been formed, including 30 at plants and factories. Educational-

scientific centers actively function in the spheres of robot technology, laser technology and others.

The USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, the Moscow Gorispolkom, and other interested organizations are now drawing up a comprehensive program for developing higher education in Moscow up to the year 2000.

However, the standard of training of cadres, including highly qualified ones, in specialized professions that determine scientific-technical progress is still, unfortunately, inadequate, which naturally slows down the rates at which new equipment is mastered. Scientific research institutes, design offices and higher education institutes do not fully utilize the potentials of the competitive system of filling vacant posts and of the certification of cadres for attracting the most highly-trained specialists, including young scientists, into work. Despite the fact that the total number of engineers, technicians, candidates and doctors of sciences working in our city is great, for a number of years now there has been no success in overcoming the shortage of specialists in the sphere of electronic technology and energetics, and there is also a continuing shortage of specialists with the knowledge of contemporary technology in the sphere of construction and housing.

In its work to accelerate scientific-technical progress, the city party organization concentrates its efforts on three main aspects: the comprehensive perfection of production, the active development of scientific research and the constant strengthening of mutually enriching unity between science and practice. The CPSU city and rayon committees and the primary party organizations mobilize communists and the working people to bring every branch of the capital's economy to advanced frontiers of science and technology.

There is no doubt that the communists and working people in Moscow will commemorate this year of direct preparation for the next congress of the Leninist party, with new labor achievements and make a weighty contribution to accelerating the comprehensive socioeconomic progress of our socialist motherland.

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WAYS OF PERFECTING PLANNED PRICE SETTING

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[Article by N. Glushkov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Prices]

[Text] Planned price setting is a most important tool in the implementation of CPSU economic policy. Success in the implementation of measures to perfect the economic mechanism and to intensify its influence on upgrading the economic efficiency of developed socialist society greatly depends on the quality of price setting.

Price planning and setting at the stage which precedes production designing and manufacturing enables us to select the most efficient economic solutions, substantiatedly to allocate resources among the various areas and production sectors and to produce commodities consistent in terms of volume and structure with social needs, as defined by five-year and long-term plans.

On the one hand, the planned price is a standard of socially necessary production outlays and profitability (profit), which encourage the enterprises to reduce individual production costs, install new equipment and upgrade the economic efficiency and quality of produced commodities. On the other, the plant price is a norm which actively shapes the population's consumer demand and, as such, substantially influences the shaping of the socialist way of life.

Price is the base of cost accounting. Planned price setting proceeds from the need to ensure conditions for cost accounting for all normally operating economic sectors and enterprises--commodity producers and consumers.

The task of intensifying public production with a view to upgrading the living standard of the people and strengthening the defense capability of our state on the basis of scientific and technical progress and the further perfecting of the economic mechanism of the socialist economy--management, planning, price setting, financing, crediting and accounting--is the cornerstone of the present stage--the stage of developed socialism.

As Comrade K. U. Chernenko points out, the present time in the development of the socialist economy marks the beginning of a major and complex turn to resolving problems of perfecting socialism built in our country.

The conversion of the economy to intensive development means the expanded reproduction of products despite increasing limitations in the use of resources, including manpower. The need for intensification is dictated not only and even not so much by the shortage of resources but, above all, by the fact that our national economy has already reached a volume of output in which, in order to advance, we must not only expand but update it.

Public production intensification means accelerating the pace of economic growth while steadily increasing social labor productivity and reducing the cost of all commodities, goods and services per unit of newly created consumer value, i.e., the main prerequisite for intensification is the effective utilization of resources and maximal output with minimal outlays.

It is only on the basis of increasing labor productivity and reduced production cost, i.e., through intraeconomic accumulations, that a further growth of the gross public product and the national income is possible, guaranteeing the implementation of the socioeconomic policy of our state at the developed socialist stage.

The economic patterns we outlined have been inherent in the socialist society in all of its development stages. The historical experience of real socialism has convincingly proved the accuracy of CPSU economic policy.

Party decisions and addresses by party and government leaders constantly emphasize the fact that the growth of labor productivity and a strictest possible regimen of thrift are mandatory prerequisites for the development of the national economy.

As was pointed out in particular at the 24th CPSU Congress, "the ways and conditions under which profits are increased are not a matter of indifference to the socialist society. Increased production efficiency, reduced production costs and higher labor productivity are our ways of increasing profits. Any effort at earning profits by circumventing state prices or raising them...is antigovernmental practice."

These concepts remain relevant in the forthcoming period of socioeconomic development. The task is for the income of enterprises and associations to increase not by raising prices but by reducing production costs and eliminating negligence and all kinds of waste and losses.

We disagree with the opinion of those who do not always relate economic intensification and the creation of new equipment and technology with economic resources and economic results and with ensuring intraeconomic accumulations, thus ignoring our own experience. This leads to objectivized planning of so-called price-raising factors, worsened conditions governing the development and mastery of production capacities while, at the same time, ignoring or underestimating factors based on scientific and technical progress and, therefore, "justifying" low rates of growth in terms of labor productivity, reduction of production costs and increases in the national income.

Upgrading the scientific substantiation of methods used in defining economic efficiency and taking into consideration in economic practice and planning is of major importance in perfecting planned price setting and the other elements of the economic mechanism. The position held by the USSR State Committee for Prices on the use of prices in assessing economic efficiency may be briefly presented as follows:

The inseparable connection between the plan and prices in the economy of developed socialism, and the forms which such ties assume which are determined by the economic mechanism, require that the assessment of the economic efficiency of the overwhelming number of economic enterprises be based on prices and rates effective at the time. It is only in such cases that efficiency computations will enable us to formulate reliable indicators of real efficiency, on the basis of which planned decisions for average periods of time may be made, and daily activities in managing all economic units may be pursued.

Declining outlay indicators, established in accordance with the "Temporary Standard Method for the Economic Evaluation of Mineral Deposits," may also be used in resolving problems related to assessing the efficiency of long-term planned economic measures, above all in the fuel-energy and ore-mining industries, along with the current wholesale prices.

Tail-end outlays are the maximally admissible outlays for increasing the production of a given commodity under worse mining-geological conditions, maximally acceptable from the national economic viewpoint, when the developed and surveyed deposits fail to meet planned requirements based on current wholesale prices. The moment the extraction of fuel-energy and mineral-raw material resources is organized, the assessment of which was based on tail-end outlays, the effective wholesale prices for such commodities must be reviewed.

From time to time critical remarks come out in the press on the so-called "outlay method," which is allegedly inherent in our price-setting practice and which, allegedly again, fails to take into consideration both socially necessary outlays and the level of consumer usefulness.

In this connection, some authors suggest that the current price-setting methodology be replaced by stipulations based on the concept of the system of optimal economic functioning (SOFE).

The USSR State Committee for Prices can agree neither with said criticism nor with the suggestion of restructuring the existing price-setting practice on the basis of the SOFE, for the fundamental principles which govern the practical activities of price-setting organs are the result of the works of many dozens of scientists and specialists and recognized in the resolutions of CPSU congresses, including from the 22nd through the 26th. Although SOFE supporters argue that their system is consistent with the economic mechanism of developed socialism, in fact its price-related concepts resurrect, in our

view, the concept of "price balance" and a market-oriented economy, long rejected by science and practical experience.

It would be appropriate to discuss in greater detail the basic methodological concepts used by the price-setting bodies in their practical work.

As we know, the theory of the dialectical connection between the two sides of a commodity--consumer value and value--is the theoretical base of planned socialist price setting.

It is expressed in the concept formulated and substantiated by K. Marx to the effect that socially necessary labor, i.e., labor acting as a substance of cost is labor invested in a socially useful form for the creation of products which really satisfy social requirements. Working time itself, according to Marx, is "essentially the working time needed by society for the production of a certain consumer value, i.e., for the satisfaction of a specific need" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 13, p 19).

The value of the commodity is based on the quantity of socially necessary labor materialized within it, characterized by the socially necessary working time. "The socially necessary working time is the working time needed for the manufacturing of a consumer value under socially normal production conditions and a socially averaged labor standard, skill and intensiveness" (op. cit., vol 23, p 47).

In practice, said concepts of the theory of labor value are implemented by the price-setting bodies by comparing the socially necessary outlays for the production of a commodity and its consumer value, comprehensively expressed with the economic efficiency indicator, which is computed on the basis of technical-economic parameters as set in standardizing-technical documents.

The average sectorial production cost or planned-standardized production costs are taken as socially necessary outlays.

For example, the prices of finished goods in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and the chemical industry are based on the average sectorial (standardized) production cost and are uniform for the entire country. Enterprises in such sectors, whose production outlays are below the sectorial average, earn additional profits; plants with above-average production costs are operating on a planned loss basis. Production quality is expressed through base price markups or discounts or else bonus supplements for economic efficiency.

Here is another example. The average wholesale price of synthetic ammonia, made of natural gas, was 103 rubles per ton in the USSR in 1983; production outlays of individual enterprises ranged from 269 rubles per ton at the Rustavi Azot PO [Production Association] (which had not reached planned capacity) to 69 rubles at the Azot PO in Novgorod.

Such a price-setting procedure encourages enterprises to lower production costs. Thus, in 1982 the Togliatti Azot PO lost 30 rubles per ton of produced ammonia. Improvements in the situation as a result of reaching planned

capacity enabled the association to lower its losses to 6 rubles per ton of output in 1983.

Yet according to the view of the supporters of the SOFE theory, in order to ensure the profitable work of ammonia manufacturing enterprises, the wholesale prices of that commodity should be increased by a factor of more than 2.5, thus making the output at all sectorial enterprises profitable (including the Rustavi Azot PO).

This would result in price increases for all subsequent products of ammonia processing and would not encourage improvements in sectorial work efficiency.

In the case that a certain item is produced by a single enterprise (this is encountered most frequently in machine building), the plan-standard outlays are compared with the economic effect of the use of the item, and only then is a decision on the expediency of producing such an item made.

Extensive efforts have been made comprehensively to perfect the planned price system in recent years. New wholesale prices and rates were introduced in industry in 1982. The review of wholesale prices became yet another stage in ensuring quality improvements in the price structure and improving its role in accelerating scientific and technical progress, improving production quality, economizing on resources and ensuring the profound and comprehensive processing of mineral raw materials.

In many sectors, machine building in particular, profitability is usually determined only on the basis of enterprise outlays and sectorial capital-intensiveness; differentiation among profitability standards, based on efficiency and quality, has been intensified; the stimulating role of price markups and discounts has been increased and territorial price differentiation has been perfected.

The new wholesale prices and rates have been made consistent with contemporary production conditions and marketing and the requirements of the economic mechanism, thus creating the necessary conditions for the development and strengthening of cost accounting. This led to our decision to retain the current wholesale prices and rates in industry in the 12th Five-Year Plan.

New reduced wholesale prices of electronic industry goods, in which extensive possibilities of lowering production outlays based on the enhanced technical standard and quality of output exist, were applied as of 1 January 1985. The lowered prices of electronic parts will contribute to the accelerated use of the latest equipment in the other economic sectors.

Let us particularly mention the coal industry. The considerable increase of wholesale prices of output in this sector as of 1 January 1982 was considered sufficient to ensure its profitable work. Nevertheless, coal mining remained a losing sector as a result of the low pace of development of strip mining, the cost of which is lower than underground mining of energy-generating coal in the Donbass, the Moscow area and several other basins by a factor of 5-6. Furthermore, the cost of coal mined underground has increased as a result of insufficiently mastered production capacities, low labor productivity, lowered

quality caused by the slow application of progressive extraction technologies, the continuing depletion of the coal and the enrichment of insufficient amounts of it.

Bearing said circumstances in mind, it was resolved to retain in the 12th Five-Year Plan the current wholesale prices of coal and coal-concentration products for consumers of this commodity; starting with 1 January 1986, budget-subsidized prices which will compensate, the planned-standardized outlays for coal extraction and concentration, will be introduced in coal-extracting and concentration enterprises.

Currently, together with the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Finance, the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR ministries and departments and councils of ministers of union republics, the USSR State Committee for Prices is drafting a program for the further development of scientific price-setting principles and, on this basis, for improving future price systems.

The stabilization and lowering of current wholesale prices and rates in industry, transportation and construction, on the basis of scientific and technical progress, the growth of labor productivity and resource conservation, must become the guiding principles governing their further improvement.

Unquestionably, price stabilization presumes price flexibility and prompt reaction to economic decisions and changes in commodity production and marketing. However, the current procedure requires that any price correction must be reflected in the plan and the budget. This takes considerable time and lowers price control efficiency.

It has been suggested, therefore, to avoid always taking such price changes into consideration in plans and the budget and to compensate for possible losses from reduced prices by additionally lowering production costs. Such a procedure should be applied above all in lowering the prices of obsolete commodities, based on state certification or changes in consumer demand, and in increasing the use of recycled materials which allow us, without lowering the consumer qualities of an item, to replace primary with secondary resources making this profitable both for the manufacturer and the consumer.

In order to neutralize the opposition of economic managers and economists to set progressive price changes, we should consider, starting with 1986, the restoration of the fixed price system on the basis of which, along with current prices, basic social and economic development indicators could be determined and compared.

The price-setting agencies ascribe great importance to perfecting the method and practice of setting wholesale prices of new equipment. A set of steps has already been carried out aimed at stimulating the creation and utilization of new commodities to a greater extent through the use of prices.

Wholesale prices of new equipment are set within the limits of its economic efficiency, based on the recovery of all standardized outlays for the manufacturing of a new product during the very first year of its series

production and ensuring a profitability not lower than the one set in the plan for the enterprise at large or for the replaced items. Furthermore, in order to encourage the assimilation of new equipment, incentive markups for efficiency and quality are applied.

The wholesale prices of newly assimilated output, used to replace imported items, must fully compensate for production outlays and include a planned profit. The level of world prices (bill of sale cost) of said commodity is taken into consideration. Bonus markups for efficiency and quality are also added to the wholesale prices of such equipment.

If the initial prices of individual new commodities replacing imported items exceed world prices, the wholesale prices are set higher than those on the world market for a period not to exceed 2 years, in order to compensate for the high outlays.

Incentive markups of up to 30 percent of the wholesale price are added for new highly efficient commodities with parameters equal to the best domestic and foreign models. Up to 50 percent of savings may be taken into consideration in such markups; as much as 70 percent of savings may be included in bonuses for goods the production of which is based on developments legitimately classified as discoveries or inventions, manufactured for the sake of replacing imported items, for industrial robots. The balance of the savings is left at the disposal of the consumer to interest him in the use.

On an exceptional basis, incentive markups may exceed 30 percent of the wholesale price for some kinds of highly efficient commodities included in the USSR State Plan for Economic and Social Development.

Nevertheless, despite such additional incentives, industry is updating the machines and equipment it produces sluggishly; it is still insufficiently mastering the production of new highly efficient commodities and essentially new items which determine technical progress in the national economy. The number of wholesale prices set for new or updated machines and mechanisms in 1984 remained virtually the same as the 1983 level or even declined for some ministries (Heavy and Transport Machine Building, Construction, Road and and Municipal Building and others).

As a rule, the productivity of new equipment does not increase by more than 25-30 percent, i.e., it remains below the assignments set in the respective CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers 1978 decree. In terms of technical and economic parameters, a significant percentage of items the production of which has been mastered is hardly different from the older models. This does not allow us to add high bonus markups to their wholesale prices.

The expert assessment of draft wholesale prices indicates that the enterprises of many ministries (Heavy and Transport Machine Building, Automotive Industry, Power Machine-Building and Light and Food Industry) use their material resources inefficiently; their metal utilization coefficient remains low; they allow above-norm labor outlays and make poor use of the capacity of expensive equipment, as a result of which draft wholesale prices are increased without

justification. Thus, the draft wholesale price for a KLM-500 belt conveyor for the Berezovka GRES, to be produced by the Aleksandriyskiy Plant for Lifting-Transport Equipment of the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, submitted to the USSR State Committee for Prices, was lowered from 51.4 million to 43.6 million rubles, or by 7.8 million rubles.

Frequently problems of supporting the manufacturing and procurement of complementing items and materials are not comprehensively resolved in designing and organizing the production of new equipment.

Thus, for example, at the start of the series production of the VAZ 2108 motor vehicle, unresolved problems appeared relative to deliveries of plastic materials, electrical equipment and other complementing items. Currently, the production of such materials and items has not reached its full volume of output and they are being produced also on the basis of so-called circumvening technology. As a result, the plastic materials used in the VAZ 2108 model car cost 6.9 rubles per kilogram compared to the metal items they replace, which cost 25 to 30 kopecks per kilogram.

Commodity consumers do not bear proper responsibility for coordinating the amount of economic benefits. For example, savings of 108.8 million rubles were agreed upon for the use of a 1,400-mill model (manufactured by the Uralmash PO) for the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine. The expert evaluation conducted by the USSR State Committee for Prices established that the economic benefits did not exceed 34.6 million rubles.

With a view to the accelerated removal of obsolete equipment for the manufacturing of items inconsistent with the stipulations of superior or first-quality items, wholesale price discounts are set. An investigation conducted by Gosstandart, the USSR Ministry of Finance and the USSR State Committee for Prices in 1984, indicated that unsatisfactory work is being done on the certification and recertification of commodities in machine-building sectors, including wholesale price discounts for commodities the quality of which has not been certified and which are not in widespread use. Thus, for example, for the first 9 months of 1984 the amount of wholesale price markups for items produced by the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry totaled 106 million rubles, while discounts did not exceed 1.4 million.

Furthermore, in the discussion of the USSR State Plan for Economic and Social Development in 1985 at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session, Comrade K. U. Chernenko pointed out that in work to improve quality "no single opportunity should be ignored: use of contemporary equipment and technology, paying substantial bonuses for the development and mastering the production of new items and tangible price discounts for obsolete items...."

We believe that the practice of establishing such discounts, based on the certification of machines and equipment in accordance with the new higher requirements governing the assessments of their technical standards and quality, should be expanded.

Items which fail to meet the requirements of superior or first category quality should no longer be produced. In order to accelerate this process,

discounts of up to 30 percent on the wholesale price are made, appropriated as budget income and not considered in terms of plan fulfillment.

Economic penalties are also applied in the production of equipment the manufacturing of which must be stopped in accordance with the plans for economic and social development. Regardless of the quality category, the price-setting authorities set up discounts for such items to the extent of the profit which was set when their prices were approved, but not below 10 and more than 30 percent of the wholesale price.

The time has come to implement the following measures with a view to creating additional organizational-technical and economic conditions for stimulating improvements in the technical standards and quality of output and radically upgrading its efficiency.

In order to ensure the comprehensive development of machines and equipment as well as complementing items and materials for them, in planning and organizing the use of new equipment, the manufacturing ministries must mandatorily coordinate with the respective ministries the assignments on the development of contemporary materials and complementing goods for them and to ensure their faster production.

The insufficient extent of installation of new equipment and the unjustifiably increase in the scale of its output are major shortcomings. The consequence is that even before reaching the planned volume of output, some types of new commodities are no longer consistent with the necessary technical standard and must be either replaced or radically updated.

In this connection, it would be expedient, in this connection, for the industrial ministries, in coordination with the State Committee for Science and Technology, to set the maximal time needed for mastering the production of new commodities and undertaking their series manufacturing in accordance with planned volumes and deadlines.

The material and economic conditions for ensuring production associations (enterprises) are fully interested in manufacturing new equipment have still not been provided, despite the fact that prices are compensating for production outlays and ensuring, the very first year, a profitability no less than the planned figure. The volume of output and profits of enterprises frequently decline as a result of the reduced amount of new commodities produced during the first year, compared with the old. The use of a single science and technology development fund, which would compensate for the higher outlays related to mastering the production of new commodities, does not resolve the problem.

For that reason, the Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Ministry of Finance and the USSR State Committee for Prices should draft a procedure which would set up ministry financial reserves to compensate for the temporary losses suffered by enterprises mastering the production of new equipment. Wholesale price discounts for obsolete commodities the production of which is to be terminated should be used for the creation of such reserve funds. At the same time, we suggest that full amount of

wholesale price markups for high efficiency items be added to the economic incentive funds for the first production year. We deem it appropriate for the USSR State Committee for Prices, in coordination with the State Committee for Science and Technology, to reduce on an annual basis the wholesale prices for machine-building output certified as first-category quality but produced after the expiration of the legal deadlines for updating commodities the development of which would be consistent with the 18 August 1983 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Measures for Accelerating Scientific and Technical Progress in the National Economy."

In such cases, prices should be lowered by up to 30 percent with no changes in plan indicators or relations with the budget.

Higher purchase prices of grain products, animal husbandry products, sugar beets, cotton, potatoes and other agricultural commodities and supplements to purchase prices for commodities sold to the state by underprofitable or losing kolkhozes and sovkhoses were introduced as of 1 January 1983 in all union republics in accordance with the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, with a view to improving the economic situation and strengthening cost accounting in agriculture and ensuring profitable cultivation agricultural commodities.

The sum of 16 billion rubles per year, i.e., as much as total purchase price increases over the past 17 years, starting with the March 1965 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, was allocated for increases in purchase prices and markups. Furthermore, another 5 billion rubles were appropriated to compensate agricultural enterprises for additional outlays related to the 1 January 1982 increase in wholesale prices for the use of some kinds of industrial commodities in agriculture and the lifting of gasoline price subsidies.

This is the first time in price-setting practices that supplements to the purchase prices of agricultural commodities sold to the state by losing or underprofitable kolkhozes and sovkhoses have been applied. Their purpose is to create equal economic farming conditions for kolkhozes and sovkhoses operating under different soil-climatic and economic conditions.

At the same time, the levels of purchase prices by regions and republics with similar soil-climatic conditions were equalized; a consistent policy of eliminating drastic disparities in price levels between contiguous oblasts and rayons of neighboring union republics was pursued in cases of price differentiations within republics.

We must point out that under the new prices as well price supplements of 50 percent of purchase prices paid kolkhozes and sovkhoses for sales to the state of basic commodities over and above the average annual level of sales reached during the 10th Five-Year Plan have been retained.

As a result of the introduction of new purchase prices and price supplements, the economy and financial situation of kolkhozes and sovkhoses strengthened substantially; the necessary conditions were created for profitable farming on a true cost accounting basis. Within a single year the net income of kolkhoz and sovkhos profits increased from 1.3 billion to 24 billion rubles. The number of profitable farms increased by 81 percent and that of farms operating

at a loss declined by a factor of 3.9. Production profitability for milk, cattle, wool, sugar beets, potatoes and other basic staples substantially increased for the country at large. This considerably reduced the amount of credit resources used by kolkhozes and sovkhozes and improved loan repayments.

The purchase prices of agricultural commodities, enacted as of 1 January 1983, could be retained during the 12th Five-Year Plan with no major changes. Along with the draft of the next five-year plan, the USSR State Committee for Prices is formulating and will submit the USSR Council of Ministers proposals on standards of profitability and purchase prices for agricultural commodities (as well as supplements) in accordance with changes in the wholesale prices of industrial goods supplied to agriculture.

The establishment of normal cost accounting conditions in agriculture enables us to convert to the next stage in perfecting purchase prices, the main trend of which, as in industry, should be systematic lowering of their level on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress, agricultural industrialization and intensification, higher growth of labor productivity rates increased efficiency in the utilization of land, water, material and financial resources and lowered industrial wholesale prices.

Perfecting the retail trade prices of consumer goods plays an important role in the successful solution of the main task of the economy of developed socialism, as defined in the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee Plenums--enhancing the material well-being and standards of the people and strengthening the foundations of the Soviet way of life.

It is within the policy of retail prices that economic and social problems become most closely interwoven and distribution relations in the developed socialist society are manifested directly. Retail price planning is most closely related to the solution of most important socioeconomic problems of the development of socialist society, such as the accumulation and consumption ratio, state budget revenue, etc.

Bearing in mind the special social significance of retail prices, it would be erroneous to consider on an isolated basis the price levels of individual commodities or commodity groups regardless of the complex interdependencies which characterize the retail price system as a whole. Whereas the sum total of retail prices (the overall retail price) is based on the socially necessary labor outlays, the retail prices of individual commodities could and should be different from their value, depending on the social significance of the commodity, the differentiation in the population income levels and the need to establish an efficient consumption structure.

The basic principles governing the policy of retail prices were defined in the resolutions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, which stipulated the following: "With a view to upgrading the population's real income in accordance with the increased production of consumer goods and the accumulation of the necessary commodity and financial resources, steps must be taken to lower state retail prices of individual comestible and industrial consumer goods, goods for children above all." These stipulations were developed further at the 24th-

26th party congresses, in accordance with the specific conditions of economic development in our country. The "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the Period Through 1990," adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress, stipulate that the social development and enhancement of the people's well-being will continue to take place under the conditions of stable state retail prices of basic comestible and durable goods.

The system of stable retail prices guarantees the steady growth of the real population income as the production of consumer goods increases along with the increased monetary income and volume of social consumption funds, as stipulated in the national economic plan. The policy of stable state retail prices is consistent with the course of dynamic and proportional development of public production and its increased efficiency, orienting us toward stable and reduced production costs in all economic sectors and balanced economic development. It ensures the stable interconnection between production planning and incentives and has a positive impact on the purchasing power of the currency.

It is in accordance with this policy, despite the steady growth of wages and other population monetary income, that state retail prices for staple goods, including bread, bakery and spaghetti items, cereals, vegetable cooking oil and basic types of fish and canned goods and sugar will remain on the 1955 level and that of meat and dairy products on the level of 1962 prices. Low payments for housing and communal services and for most transportation rates, prices of some items for children and school use, and of potatoes, vegetables and canned fruits and vegetables will remain low. The state grants substantial annual subsidies to make this possible.

The state resolves one of the most important social problems and guarantees equal accessibility to such commodities and services to all population strata, including those with the lowest income level per family member, by maintaining on a relatively low and stable level retail prices of foodstuffs of prime necessity, standard clothing and shoes, a wide range of goods for children, a number of other basic commodities (including many types of medical drugs) and housing-communal services. Improvements in the production relations of developed socialism require the strictest possible observance and strengthening of the principle of payment according to labor and, consequently, preserving the differentiation among population monetary incomes, for which reason the continuation of such a policy of retail prices for prime necessity goods is socially substantiated.

Let us particularly emphasize that the stability of retail prices of basic food staples and the lowered prices of durable goods (as their volume of output and market saturation increased) are possible only on the basis of a faster growth of labor productivity and steady lowering of production costs in all economic sectors and spheres.

The CPSU and the Soviet government are always concerned with further increasing the production of consumer goods, and broadening the area of paid services to the population, i.e., with the steady increase in the volume of commodities put in circulation, while at the same time upgrading public production efficiency as a result of higher labor productivity and reduced

production costs. The Food Program, which was adopted at the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the Comprehensive Program for the Development of the Production of Consumer Goods and the system of population services between 1986 and the year 2000, play a special role in resolving this problem. We believe that the program for increasing the production of durable goods must be based on socially substantiated consumption norms, consistent with the Soviet way of life, which are to be formulated in the same way that a plan for basic food products was drafted for the Food Program.

Increasing the volumes of output of consumer goods, broadening and updating their variety, improving their quality and increasing the production and sale of new fashionable items which satisfy the varied and growing needs of the population, as well as inexpensive good quality goods which are in constant demand, presume a decisive increase in the active stimulating role of the price system. This means, above all, that the retail prices of new and improved items must be more differentiated in terms of current prices of similar items, based on quality, fashion and other consumer qualities.

In accordance with the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, the prices of many varieties of industrial commodities were reduced between April 1983 and December 1984 and as of 10 January 1985. Along with seasonal sales and the elimination of temporary prices of many "N"-indexed commodities, this provides total benefits to the population of 9.5 billion rubles.

Practical experience confirms the accuracy of the methods developed for perfecting retail prices. On the one hand, this means maintaining their stability on the basis of comestible and durable goods and rates for housing-communal and transport services and establishing price supports for commodities for children.

On the other, price dynamics must be secured: the prices of individual commodities must be reduced as conditions to this effect are created; we must continue the practice of seasonal sales at reduced prices and the setting of contractual and provisional prices for new commodities and services of improved quality, streamlining seasonal and regional disparities in the prices of vegetables, potatoes and fruits, price differentiations for delicatessen items and fashionable and prestige consumer goods, based on quality and population demand.

The price-setting authorities should also be given the right to provide state control and regulate prices on the kolkhoz market.

In conclusion, we must emphasize that having entered the period of active preparations by the CPSU and the entire Soviet people for the 27th Party Congress, we are directing our efforts, as Comrade K. U. Chernenko points out, above toward completing the intensification of the country's economy on the basis of the considerable acceleration of scientific and technical progress and all-round improvement in the means and methods of socialist economic management. It is precisely thus that the most progressive material and technical base, consistent with the strict standards of developed socialism,

could be created and a qualitatively new level of prosperity of the Soviet people secured.

Such programmatic requirements of the CPSU concerning the strategy of economic development in the area of planned price setting mean that under the conditions of the planned increase in the efficiency of public production, the main principle in ensuring further improvements in the entire economic system of prices and rates should be their stabilization and lowering of their current level on the basis of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, the growth of labor productivity, resource conservation and reduced production cost.

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SUPERIORITY OF THE SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE AND SOVIET MILITARY ART AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS OF VICTORY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy minister of defense--capitalized passages published in italics]

[Text] The historical event of the 40th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War is approaching. Already for 4 decades now, the Soviet people have lived and worked under peaceful conditions and their armed forces have continued to perform their military service in safeguarding the country's security. Time is inexorably moving further and further away from us the memorable date of 9 May 1945 when we all celebrated the long-awaited victory. Fascist Germany capitulated unconditionally. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union ended in complete triumph.

Those harsh and unforgettable years are slipping back into the depth of history but the worldwide historical significance of our victory as well as its sources and lessons appear in an even more complete and brighter light and the conclusions based on the results of the past war for the contemporary period are becoming more and more obvious. They are revealed in the CPSU Central Committee Resolution "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

The supreme service rendered by the Soviet people and their armed forces to mankind, the resolution states, is in the fact that they made the decisive contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany and its allies, the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery and the salvation of world civilization. Our victory was a triumph of the new social and state system born in the October Revolution, of the socialist economy, of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, of the moral-political unity of the Soviet society and of the indestructible friendship of the USSR peoples.

The Great Patriotic War was the most difficult test and a severe verification of all material, spiritual and military forces of the Soviet Union and of the combat might of our armed forces. The victory in that war was forged by our people. Its organizer and inspirer was the communist party that, in an

extraordinarily difficult situation, knew how to mobilize and organize Soviet people for the struggle against the German fascist invaders and to bring the struggle to a victorious conclusion.

The most important factors that ensured the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War were the superiority of the Soviet military science and military art over the military theory and practice of the German Wehrmacht--the mightiest military machine of the imperialist world at that time--and the high level of the strategic and operational leadership and of the military skill of our military cadres.

I

The Great Patriotic War especially graphically confirmed a most important Leninist tenet, namely that wars are now waged by peoples. They do not represent only an armed struggle but also include other forms of struggle, that is, the economic, ideological and diplomatic struggles. Therefore, war as a complex social phenomenon is studied by many sciences and, as far as science is concerned, the Soviet state's defense capability is ensured by the entire system of knowledge on war and army.

Its world outlook and methodological basis is provided by the MARXIST-LENINIST TEACHING ON WAR AND ARMY that includes within itself the problems of all three component parts of Marxism-Leninism, that is, philosophy, political economy and scientific communism. It is within the framework of the latter that the Leninist theory of defense of the socialist fatherland is developed and perfected. It is the MILITARY SCIENCE that occupies one of the most important places in the strengthening of the combat might of the armed forces because this science plays a leading role in the theoretical elaboration of the methods of achieving political goals by armed means. Consequently, armed struggle is its main subject. Contemporary military science includes a SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE ON THE POSSIBLE NATURE AND LAWS OF WAR AND ON THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE COUNTRY FOR IT, as well as on the methods of waging war. And in this connection, when we speak about the country's preparation for war within the framework of the science of war, we have in mind only the military aspects of this question. The science of war includes: the general foundations and theories of the art of war (strategy, operational art and tactics), or organizational development [stroitelstvo], of military economy and rear support of the armed forces and of their management, and of military training and education, as well as the history of military art and of the armed forces.

Military science has a party and class character, something that is predetermined by the existence of two different military sciences, that is, the socialist and the bourgeois. Socialist military science is based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology and policy of the communist party and therefore it has an objectively scientific character, something that in the past war served and now serves as the main source of its superiority over bourgeois military science and military art.

The CPSU Central Committee has always approached the solving of the problems of organizational development in the armed forces and of using them in war

from strictly scientific positions, being guided by the Leninist precept that a "modern army cannot be built without science..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 183).

In the prewar years, our military science correctly determined the characteristic features of the coming war. It was objectively assessed that the war between the Soviet state and the coalition of imperialist countries would be a class war and would undoubtedly be very bitter, and that the goals of war on both sides would be decisive and uncompromising. It was recognized that the main form of military actions would be the strategic offensive and that the main method of actions would be deep frontal strikes in decisive directions to cut or split the enemy strategic front and to destroy in detail the separated enemy groups. Defense was also considered as legitimate, as a necessary aspect of combat operations but it was mainly considered only in relation to the operational and tactical units (division, army, front).

As is known, this latter tenet was not confirmed by the course of the war. It was correctly determined that a future war would be a "war of motors." It was clear that an utmost exertion of all material and spiritual forces of our state would be required to wage the war and to achieve victory over a powerful and perfidious enemy. Combat aircraft, tanks and other armor equipment would be employed in massive quantities in the war. It was concluded that enormous reserves of ammunition, fuel and other material means would be needed.

All this was appropriately reflected also in the military doctrine as a system of officially adopted tenets and views on the nature of war, the methods of waging it and the preparation of the country and the armed forces for it. It was precisely for this reason that, in the 1920s and 1930s, the communist party oriented the forces of the people and state to developing the heavy and the defense industries. It was within a short period that new branches of these industries were built and that new models of various types of weapons and military equipment were developed or continued to be developed. Organizational measures were implemented in the army and navy.

At the time of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army and the navy, educated and led by the communist party, were closely united around the party and the level of their political-moral state and their readiness to stand in defense of the motherland was exceptionally high. A great deal was accomplished to ensure that the organizational structure and training of our armed forces would meet the demands of modern warfare.

However, it was not possible to fully complete the preparation of the entire national economy for war and the reorganization of the armed forces, as had been planned. History granted us too little time for that. In the prewar years, there was a certain separation between the military theorizing and the practical preparation of troops and naval forces. Whereas Soviet military science correctly assessed the potential character of a future war and the changes and trends taking place in military affairs, everything was not well in the preparation and training of troops and of the higher and senior command personnel, in the organizational structure of the forces, in the organization of administration and in the mobilization preparedness. The basic principle that requires teaching the troops what is needed in war was not applied always

and everywhere. Consequently a number of shortcomings had to be corrected even after the war had already started.

The sudden attack by fascist Germany, forestalling the deployment of our strike groups, and the fact that the aggressor achieved an overwhelming superiority in forces and weapons in the directions chosen by him while the Soviet forces were deployed relatively evenly made it possible for the Hitlerite Wehrmacht to inflict heavy initial blows, cut the defense of the forces of our border military districts and temporarily capture the strategic initiative. Under these conditions, to halt the enemy and gain time in order to change the correlation of forces, the Soviet armed forces were forced to engage in severe defense battles and, while suffering losses, retreat deep into the country. It was necessary in the course of the war to reevaluate the established theoretical tenets and views on the forms and methods of conducting combat operations and to work out new forms and methods and to master them in battles against the enemy.

THE SOVIET STATE FACED THE EXTREMELY URGENT AND ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF CONDUCTING DEFENSE ON A STRATEGIC SCALE. The situation developed in such a way that the Soviet forces were forced within a short time to retreat 850 to 1,200 kilometers. They left the Baltic region, Belorussia, Moldavia, nearly all the Ukraine, several oblasts of the Russian Federation and part of the Karelian-Finnish republic. The Hitlerite forces were in dangerous proximity to Moscow. Leningrad was blockaded. Under extraordinarily difficult conditions and while repulsing the powerful blows of the numerically superior enemy along all strategic lines of the Soviet-German front, it was necessary to find such methods of conduct of military operations which would bleed the enemy to exhaustion, exhaust the forces of its strike groups and create the conditions for a radical turn in the armed struggle. This task was solved even though it was solved at a heavy price. The fascist forces suffered irreplaceable losses in bloody battles and fighting and, at the beginning of December 1941, they were halted.

Regardless of the fact that the war went so unfavorably for us, Soviet military thought persistently continued to work. New theoretical tenets, aimed at organizing active defense on a strategic scale and at ensuring that aggression would be repulsed, were worked out on the basis of combat experience, analysis of the situation and the nature of the enemy combat operations. They were promptly transmitted to the forces through the directives of headquarters and were implemented in practice.

The biggest strategic defensive operations of the first period of the Great Patriotic War were the Smolensk, Kiev, Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad and Northern Caucasus operations. The defense of Odessa, Sevastopol, and other strategic targets had an important place within the system of these operations. The defense operations along the most important lines were carried out by large forces and, as a rule, with the groups of fronts and with the participation of formations and units of long-range air force and air defense forces and, in coastal sectors, also with the participation of the naval forces. Partisan detachments and formations provided great assistance to the forces.

Strategic defense was of an exceptionally aggressive nature and was waged tenaciously with unprecedented bitterness. It was set up as antitank defense which was also able to withstand air strikes and artillery fire. Its activeness [aktivnost] was expressed in the conduct of counterattacks and counterstrikes involving large maneuvers of troops along the frontline and in depth, in strikes against artillery and air force and erecting artificial obstacles on a large scale. As a result of this, the scope and the intensity of the offensive of the Hitlerite army were gradually reduced and extinguished.

Thus, in 1941, the Soviet forces were engaged in severe defensive battles along the entire Soviet-German front stretching over a distance of 4,000 kilometers. In the course of these battles the enemy advanced more than 1,000 kilometers. However, in the summer of 1942, the enemy--still holding the initiative--was able to advance only in one sector, the southern sector of the front. The Soviet forces held the defense line along an 800-kilometer front that increased to 2,400 kilometers toward the end of 1942, and retreated to the depth of 650 to 1,000 kilometers. In 1943 when the Soviet armed forces fully captured the strategic initiative, the operational-strategic tasks in defensive operations were fulfilled at a considerably smaller cost and within shorter periods of time.

In that period, the Supreme High Command Headquarters chose a type of strategic action such as premeditated defense. For example, in the Kursk region it was possible to solve the task of crushing an enemy group by launching an offensive. Sufficient forces and weapons were available for that purpose. However, in order to successfully carry out the offensive tasks and defeat the enemy along this line with the smallest possible losses of human life and equipment, it was decided to first exhaust the enemy in defensive fighting and only the move into a decisive offensive.

As a result of this, the enemy attack groups advanced only 12 to 35 kilometers in some individual sectors in the Kursk region. The enemy's attempt at capturing the strategic initiative ended in complete failure. At the same time as the scope of the offensive of the Hitlerite army was diminishing, the forces engaged in carrying out the offensive were also continuously reduced in number.

Thus, whereas the Wehrmacht employed 190 divisions in its offensive in 1941, this number was reduced to 90 already in 1942, and to only 50 in 1943. The momentum of their offensive also declined. In 1941, the enemy advanced an average of 20 to 30 kilometers and, by Kursk, only 2 to 3 kilometers every 24 hours. In the final analysis, the successful fulfillment of the defense task set before our armed forces represented a great achievement of Soviet military art.

Such a difficult task as the restoration of the broken strategic defense front was successfully solved by using and skillfully maneuvering the strategic reserves and by redeploying operational military formations from some sectors to others.

Thus, for instance, in the summer of 1942, the Supreme High Command headquarters formed the Voronezh and Stalingrad fronts in order to successfully solve this task along the southwestern line of operations. A new Southwestern Front was formed when the operations shifted into a counteroffensive.

The buildup of forces in threatened sectors exhausted the offensive capabilities of the enemy, which created favorable conditions for our forces to actively employ such combat operations as counteroffensive. The increased maturity of the Soviet top military leadership and front commands and the progressive nature of the Soviet military art and its superiority over the Wehrmacht's hackneyed military theory and practice were demonstrated with special force by the Moscow and Stalingrad counteroffensives. In these operations the ensuing crisis of the strike capabilities of the Hitlerite army were revealed in good time, the counterstrike groups of our forces were formed secretly, the timing was skillfully chosen and the surprise effect of transition from defense to a resolute counteroffensive was ensured and all this ensured a great strategic success. The defeat of the Hitlerites at Moscow was of great historical significance. It finally and definitely dispersed the myth of invincibility of the German fascist army and strengthened the Soviet Union's foreign political positions and international authority. The Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk brought about a radical turn in the war and decisively determined its further course and outcome in favor of the USSR.

The experience of the first period of the Great Patriotic War once again convincingly confirmed the correctness of the important tenets of military art, namely the tenet that victory in the struggle against a powerful adversary can only be won with the joint efforts of all arms of the armed forces and with their close interaction.

Constituting the main groups of our frontline forces and strategic reserves, the ground forces initiated and carried through all tactical, operational and strategic tasks. The air force skillfully supported the ground forces by inflicting heavy blows to enemy frontline and rear targets. As early as during the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, our air force captured operational and, in the summer of 1943, finally and definitely also strategic air supremacy.

As a result of the retreat of our forces and the loss of the main forward maritime base positions during the initial war period the navy was unable to engage in independent maritime operations. But the Baltic and Black Sea fleets actively assisted ground forces in their operational-strategic tasks.

In the early period of the Great Patriotic War when combat actions were carried out under the conditions of enemy air superiority, it was necessary to revise the theory and practice of operational deployment of the air defense forces. In particular, during the preparations for and the conduct of the defense of Moscow and Leningrad, the basic concepts were developed about air defense forces and weapons with the participation of air force units and groups.

Appropriate corrections were constantly introduced both in strategy and in operational art and tactics as a result of combat experience. The defense of groups and formations was layered and was conducted in greater and greater depth, the engineering equipment continued to be improved, and the resistance became firmer as a result of a greater density of deployment of antitank weapons along the probable lines of enemy strikes and as a result of bold maneuvers with forces and weapons.

The war also turned out to be a severe school of improving the style and methods of work of the command cadres in organizing, preparing and conducting combat actions, operations and battles, a school of combat skills of the entire army and navy personnel.

In other words, it was necessary to learn everything that had been left incomplete or omitted in the prewar years both in theory and in practice. The war compelled everyone to soberly interpret the events that were taking place and to make conclusions and learn from them. They were all learning: the Supreme High Command and the General Staff, the commanders of the frontline forces and armies and commanders, staffs and political organs at all levels. The generalization and introduction of combat experience into the practical actions of the army and navy were carried out by the General Staff under Headquarters [Stavka] leadership. The pertinent instructions and most important directives were discussed under the direct leadership of the supreme commander in chief and with the participation of representatives of the fronts, combined formations, groups and even individual units before the newly rewritten field manuals were put into effect.

Thus, it was in the severe fighting against the fascist war machine during the initial period of the war that Soviet military science and military art were constantly being made more precise and, in many respects, the most effective methods of counteractions against the offensive strategy of fascist Germany were also reworked anew. And in this connection the questions of the art of war were solved in close interdependence with the country's economic potential and the foreign political activities of the party and government. The resulting achievements made it possible to create solid prerequisites and lay good foundations for solving the tasks of strategic offensive operations during the second and third periods that determined the outcome of the war.

II

Proceeding from the combat experience gained in the initial period of the war, the theory and practice of Soviet military art was consequently advanced to a new and higher level. The creation of the necessary material conditions and the immense changes that had taken place in the armed forces' technical equipment decisively contributed to this process. These achievements were made possible as a result of the selfless work of all Soviet people, that is, the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia. Toward the end of 1942, the Soviet Union gained noticeable superiority over Germany both in the quantity and quality of output of weapons and military equipment and in the development of the basic and applied sciences and in raising the level of the military-technical training of armed forces personnel.

Theoretical interpretations of the changes that had taken place in the situation and in military affairs and in the reequipping of troops and forces, the elaboration of new and more effective methods of combat operations under the conditions of a changed correlation of forces and the practical preparation for and conduct of offensive battles and operations ranging from the tactical to strategic levels were the main content of military science and military art during the second and third periods of the war.

Soviet military strategy was also further developed. During the war years, the USSR armed forces carried out more than 50 operations of groups of fronts. Seven of the nine major campaigns were offensive and most of the 250 frontal operations were also offensive. To solve important military-political tasks, a form of military operations such as the strategic offensive, which included a system of simultaneously and consecutively conducted strategic and frontal operations, was conceived, was then subsequently developed in its final and definite form and was implemented in practice. The strategic offensive was worked out under a unified plan for the Supreme High Command Headquarters and was usually carried out by a group of fronts together with formations of the air force and air defense forces and, in coastal areas, with naval forces.

The strategic offensive was notable for its increasing scope, a skillful massing of forces and arms and a high effectiveness. Thus, whereas, in 1942 and 1943, the strategic offensive extended over approximately half of the total length of the Soviet-German front, the offensive was waged consecutively or simultaneously along the entire length of the front in the 1944 and 1945 campaigns. And in this connection the sectors of main attacks were determined and the attacks were carried out by taking into account the total aggregate of all political, economic and especially military factors and they were carried out as a rule wherever it was possible to achieve the most important military-political results.

Thus, the 1943 summer and fall campaign and the 1944 winter and spring campaign carried out the main attack in the southwestern direction and resulted in the defeat of the largest enemy groups and in the liberation of most important economic regions and, at the same time, created the necessary prerequisites for the subsequent withdrawal of Romania and Bulgaria from the war. The main thrust in the western strategic direction in the summer of 1944 and the winter of 1945 opened up the shortest route to the vitally important centers and the capital of Germany. The destruction of the large group of the Wehrmacht in the western direction created favorable conditions for a quicker defeat of the enemy and a victorious conclusion of the war as a whole.

Soviet military strategy also successfully solved such a difficult problem as that of ensuring the secrecy and the surprise effect of actions. It has to be admitted that, at that time, the Hitlerite Wehrmacht had a strong and widely spread intelligence network headed by experienced leaders. Therefore, it was not an easy task to conceal from the enemy the measures taken in the course of preparation for a strategic offensive (intensive and large regrouping along the front, moving forward large reserves from the depth of the rear, the deployment of troops in the starting regions for the offensive and other measures). However, under these difficult conditions methods of camouflage and of giving disinformation to the enemy were found which made it possible to

conceal the lines of main attacks by our forces, the scale of the offensive and the timing of its beginning. Thus, in the summer of 1944 the fascist command thought that the Soviet forces would carry out the main attack in the southwestern direction but the offensive in fact began in Belorussia; in the Yass-Kishinev operation the enemy expected the main attack in the direction of Kishinev but the main attack was actually made along the flanks of the German-Romanian group in two sectors far removed from each other, that is, northwest of Yass and south of Tiraspol.

Supreme High Command Headquarters and the commanders of the frontline forces very skillfully formed strong groups of forces and arms in the directions of the main thrusts. For example, more than half of the total manpower and up to 60 percent of all various military equipment were concentrated in the strategic offensive of the Soviet armed forces in the summer of 1944 along the frontline that covered more than one-third of the total front length. The high degree of massing of forces made it possible to inflict heavy blows, break deeply echeloned enemy defenses within a short time, and developed the offensive at a fast pace. The effectiveness and the results of the operations were also determined by the ability to exploit the achieved success in good time by successively increasing the force of the attacks. Strong second echelons, mobile groups and reserves of various types were formed by the fronts and armies for this purpose.

In planning the front and army operations, special attention was devoted to the organizational aspects of committing mobile groups to battle usually within the framework of tank and motorized corps and tank armies. Following a break through the enemy defenses, they were directed to deep operations, they assisted the forces advancing from the front in surrounding the main enemy forces and they ensured the rapid development of the general offensive.

Their actions were coordinated in detail and linked with the artillery fire, the air force strikes and the actions of the forward detachments of the combined-arms and tank groups and formations. They broke and destroyed the integrity of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht's strategic defenses. The distinguishing features of their commitment to battle were boldness, resoluteness, flexible and swift maneuvers to carry out surprise attacks on the banks and rear of the enemy groups and the destruction of the enemy's most important rear installations in order to disorganize and destroy the control and stability of the enemy defense.

The war experience showed that it is very difficult to solve the strategic tasks in large theaters of military actions with the forces of a single front. For this reason a new form of strategic actions--the operation by a group of fronts which represented an essential achievement of Soviet military--was worked out and successfully applied in the course of the war. Operations of this kind were planned and carried out in the most important strategic directions and were characterized by the resoluteness of goals, large scope in area and the achievement of important strategic and military-political results.

Thus, three fronts participated in the Moscow and Stalingrad counteroffensives. The operations of groups of fronts were developed in 1943

and 1944, the years that entered history as the years of decisive victories, as the years of crushing blows against the enemy and of the liberation of Soviet territory from the fascist evil. Ten large consecutive strategic operations were carried out in 1944. Some of them were conducted simultaneously. And in this connection each consecutive operation differed from the preceding one by its concept and scale, its method of defeating the enemy and its form of maneuvering.

Some of them, including, for instance, the Belorussian ("Operation Bagration") developed along the front of more than 1,000 kilometers and were conducted to a depth of 500 or more kilometers. As a rule, 100 to 200 divisions, 20,000 to 40,000 artillery guns and mortars, up to 6,000 tanks and 2,000 to 7,500 aircraft were drawn into these operations. The goals of the operations were: the defeat of large enemy groups, the capture of important economic and political centers, the withdrawal of allies of fascist Germany from the war and the liberation of occupied territories and enslaved peoples. As a result of these operations in the summer and fall of 1944, the enemy armed forces suffered crushing defeats in Belorussia, the Baltic region, the territory of Western Ukraine and near Yass and Kishinev.

The consecutive and simultaneous operations carried out by groups of fronts at different, widely separated sectors of the strategic front fulfilled yet another important task, that is, they weakened and disorganized the enemy defenses because they forced the enemy to dissipate his forces, to move them hastily and at times to make unjustified maneuvers from one sector to another, as a result of which part of his reserves in the process of moving could not take part in combat operations, troops were exhausted and often joined decisive battles too late.

The conduct of operations aimed at surrounding and destroying large groups of German fascist troops represented a major achievement of Soviet military art during the war. The encirclement of a 330,000-strong enemy group near Stalingrad, including 22 enemy divisions and more than 160 individual units, which was planned boldly and in good time, represented striking evidence of the superiority of Soviet military theory and practice over the military doctrines of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht. A new step in organizing and carrying out such operations was made in the summer of 1944 when the encirclement and total annihilation of the enemy groups became the main form of the conduct of offensive operations of the Soviet forces.

Already then fewer forces and weapons were drawn into actions on the inside front during the encirclement and annihilation of German fascist groups (for instance, the Yass-Kishinev operation), and the main forces were directed forward, thereby creating a mobile outer front of encirclement. This made it possible in the course of development of the offensive to annihilate one by one the enemy reserves moving forward from the rear and arriving from other sectors and, at the same time, made it possible to ensure the blockade and liquidation of the encircled groups using smaller forces.

Another form of the armed struggle such as the partisan movement was also widely used in the Great Patriotic War. Preparing for war, Hitler calculated that, following Germany's attack, the multinational Soviet Union would

collapse like a house of cards. However, these hopes were destroyed in the first days of the war. All USSR peoples rallied even more closely around the communist party. They all rose as one in the sacred war. The armed struggle of the Soviet people developed on a large scale in the territories occupied by the enemy. This struggle was organized and waged under the communist party's leadership. Developing in organic union with military actions on the front and representing an inseparable part of them, the partisan struggle became an important factor in achieving victory over the Hitlerites. It represented, by its scope, scale and results, a new phenomenon in the Soviet military art.

One of the important features characterizing the Soviet military art in the years of the Great Patriotic War was the firm and creative control of strategic operations of the ground forces and the navy by headquarters and by Supreme Commander in Chief I. V. Stalin personally. The successful conduct of many major battles and battle engagements was possible thanks to the intensive work of the General Staff and the Main Political Directorate, the skill of military leaders, the military talent, organizational abilities and remarkable determination of the representatives of the Supreme High Command Headquarters at the fronts, G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilveskiy and S. K. Timoshenko, and of the leading personnel of the Soviet army and navy as a whole, the unwavering will of our military leaders and commanders to achieve victory and the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers. The most prominent victories in the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War are connected with such military leaders as I. Kh. Bagramyan, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, A. I. Yeremenko, I. S. Konev, N. G. Kuznetsov, R. Ya Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, A. A. Novikov, I. Ye. Petrov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, F. I. Tolbukhin, V. F. Tributs, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy and many others who grew and matured during bitter major battles and battle engagements. They surpassed the Hitlerite generals in all elements that make up strategy, operational art and tactics.

The operational art was continuously perfected in conformity with the demands of strategy. One of the important directions in the development of this art was the solution of the problem of inflicting a severe surprise blow on a defending enemy group along the entire depth of its deployment. The success of a break through the enemy defenses depended in many ways on the effectiveness of the defeat of the enemy troops by shelling and of the destruction of defense installations. Therefore, constant attention was devoted to the search for optimal methods of defeat by shelling. As early as 1942, headquarters demanded a shift from artillery preparation to the artillery offensive. The essence of this artillery offensive was to hit the enemy continuously with massive artillery fire during the entire offensive by the infantry and tanks. This made it possible to ensure not only a reliable neutralization of the enemy defense along its entire depth but also to widen the breakthrough from the flanks and ensure successful fulfillment of the offensive. Whereas in the first years of the war offensive operations were usually carried out to depths of 100 to 200 kilometers, in the subsequent period these operations were carried out to depths of 200 to 400 kilometers and more.

The task of mass concentration of forces and arms in the direction of the main attacks of fronts and armies was skillfully solved. Many commanding officers took justified risks and established decisive superiority by using secondary

sectors wherever it was necessary to achieve tangible results and wherever the fate of the operation involved was decided.

During the war years the Soviet operational art solved such a difficult task as that of turning a tactical success into an operational one. The formation of tank and motorized combined formations and groups made it possible to develop and carry out the front operations in a new way. The pace of advance of the mobile combined formations reached an average of 30 to 40 kilometers per 24 hours and the maximum distance of their separation from the all-arms, tank and air armies and corps made a great contribution to developing operational art and to the general cause of achieving victory.

By and large, Soviet military science and military art advanced to a new and higher stage during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Elaborating theoretical tenets from scientific positions and on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology and rich combat experience, they creatively revealed new phenomena and trends engendered in the development in all spheres of military affairs and closely linked theory directly with practice. In this connection the organization, preparation, course and results of combat operations and battles and combat experience represented the main criteria for the substantiation and correctness of the military-theoretical views. The latter were in turn used as the basis for further perfecting and elaborating new forms and methods of conducting military operations and of increasing their effectiveness, the forms and methods that were best suited to demands of the time. The course and outcome of the Great Patriotic War proved that the Soviet military science and military art surpassed Hitlerite military theory and practice both in the elaboration of the most important theoretical tenets of strategy, operational art and tactics and in their practical implementation in combat to situations and made a weighty contribution to the victory.

During the war combat cooperation between the USSR armed forces and the people's armies of the central and southeast European countries was born. The heroic Yugoslav people and their National Liberation Army made a considerable contribution to the joint struggle against the enemy. The Polish army and the Czechoslovak army fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Red Army on Soviet territory, and subsequently also in the battles for the liberation of their own countries and peoples. The Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian armies also joined the struggle against the Hitlerites during the final stage of the war. Their combat operations on the Soviet-German front were coordinated by the Supreme High Command Headquarters of the Soviet Union. Fighters of the European peoples' resistance movement, including the German people, waged the struggle against Hitlerite fascism. The communist parties represented the vanguard of this movement.

Our people value the true worth of the contribution of the peoples and armed forces of the United States, Britain, France and other countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to the victory in World War II. During the war, the military art of the allied armies was further developed. Significant useful experience was gained in the conduct of naval and amphibious operations in Europe and the Pacific Ocean. The biggest of these operations was the Normandy landing in 1944, which opened the second front in Europe.

Paying due tribute to the allied armies and remembering with deep respect all those who died for the sake of victory, we must once again state most definitely that the Soviet Union played the decisive role in the defeat of fascist Germany. The offensive operations of the British and American forces against the Hitlerite army were prepared over a long period and were carried out, as a rule, under the conditions of an absolute superiority over the enemy both in forces and weapons.

In going back again and again to the severe and formidable events of the Great Patriotic War, to its battles and engagements that were enormous in scale and unprecedentedly bitter, in comprehending ever more deeply the immortal feat performed by the Soviet people and their armed forces, and while evaluating the role, place, wisdom and concreteness of the leadership of the communist party in that war, we can assert with undisguised pride that the historic victory won by the Soviet Union over Hitlerite fascism was law-determined. It was a result of the practical implementation of Leninist teaching about the defense of the socialist homeland. We have drawn and continue to draw important lessons and conclusions from it.

First of all, the Great Victory has convincingly attested to the vitality and invincibility of the world's first socialist state, and manifested the objective potential possibilities inherent in the very nature of socialism, and its advantages over capitalism in the political, economic, ideological and other fields. It has clearly shown that the political and economic systems of the Soviet Union were effective not only in creating a new society, but also in its defense. Precisely these were the factors that ensured the concentration of forces and means on the most important directions of the struggle, the maximal utilization of socialist society's material and spiritual resources and the monolithic unity of the Soviet people in the interest of winning a victory over the aggressor.

The Patriotic War confirmed once again that there were no forces in the world capable of shattering socialism and reversing the stream of revolutionary, progressive changes initiated by Great October. Those who made attacks upon socialism, upon the freedom and independence of the Soviet people proved to be defeated and discarded on the scrap heap of history.

World War II has shown that international imperialism was and continues to be the source of war. As far as concrete culprits are concerned, the main responsibility for unleashing the war was borne primarily by Hitlerite Germany and its allies, fascist Italy and militarist Japan. However, when one goes deeper into this question and approaches it from the position of analyzing historical facts, one must reach the conclusion that World War II and the attack against the Soviet Union were prepared by the whole of international imperialism. It has been proved beyond any doubt that an ignoble role in unleashing the past war was directly or indirectly played by the imperialist circles of the United States and other capitalist countries who gave German fascism not only political support, but also wide economic and financial assistance, who pushed and directed the aggressors against the Soviet Union. This is now a fact well known all over the world.

It is sufficient to quote only one fact to prove that an important role in Germany's preparations for the war was played by American monopolies. It was none other than H. Schacht, in his time the Fuehrer's right hand in creating a military economy and a material basis for the Hitlerite military machine, who when he was in a cell during the Nuremberg trial and learned that German industrialists would be accused of preparations for the war told an American officer quite frankly: "If you want to put the industrialist who assisted in rearming Germany on trial then you will have to try your own industrialists. After all, the Opel works belonging to General Motors were operating only for the war." As they say, no comments are needed.

However, notwithstanding their hatred for the Soviet Union as a socialist state, the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain, bearing in mind the emerging situation and the vital interests of their countries, were compelled to join forces with the USSR in the struggle against the threat of fascist enslavement. As a result of this, during World War II an anti-Hitlerite coalition was formed with the Soviet Union as the decisive force. The creation of such a coalition was an objective necessity for the U.S. and British ruling circles. This turn of events completely upset the calculations of the fascist leaders that they would isolate their opponents and defeat them one by one. The combined might of many countries and people with various social systems rose in the path of the aggressor. This historical experience is also of lasting importance in our times.

Under the conditions of the intensified aggressiveness of imperialism, particularly American imperialism, the main lesson of the past war consisting, as the CPSU Central Committee decision on the 40th anniversary of the victory has noted, "in the fact we must fight against war before it begins," has now become more topical than ever. The collective efforts of all countries and peoples are the only way to prevent a war. While estrangement among peace-loving forces in the West enabled the Hitlerites in their time to unleash World War II, the present situation is radically different. Although the source of outbreak of wars, imperialism, continues to exist, the CPSU believes that war can and must be prevented. Today, to curb the new aspirants to world domination mankind has at its disposal far greater forces and capabilities than in the period before World War II. These forces and possibilities are represented by the Soviet Union and the socialist community, together with an overwhelming majority of peace-loving states of the world and the progressive community of the earth that act in a united front for easing the international tension, for disarmament and for peace on earth. These forces and potentials are also represented by the objective possibility and urgent need for cooperation between states with different social systems in the cause of preventing nuclear war.

This need is also predetermined from the military viewpoint. What is involved in this connection is the fact that the opposing sides have now accumulated such a quantity of nuclear weapons that their use can lead to catastrophic and irremediable consequences. If the imperialists succeeded in unleashing a world war, such a war would be of global proportions for mankind, would extend over the entire territory of the world and would be an exterminating war (large cities and many economic installations could be destroyed and

annihilated in a short time and the population and groups of armed forces would suffer massive losses).

But, at the same time, the aggressor is no longer able to inflict a disarming strike and act with impunity, something about which those on the other side of the ocean have entertained illusions until now. Nothing will save an aggressor if he commits a crime before the whole of mankind and unleashes a war. He cannot protect himself with a fence against the danger of retaliation, cover himself with a "space umbrella" or an established shield of a "comprehensive antimissile defense system." The USSR will not allow the United States to attain military superiority over it. No one should have any doubts on this question. It is therefore completely obvious that a further nuclear arms race does not guarantee at all the security of a potential aggressor but, on the contrary, increases this danger. Retribution will be inevitable and immediate in all cases. The attempt at building a "comprehensive antimissile defense system." The USSR will not allow the United States to attain military superiority over it. No one should have any doubts on this question. It is therefore completely obvious that a further nuclear arms race does not guarantee at all the security of a potential aggressor but, on the contrary, increases this danger. Retribution will be inevitable and immediate in all cases. The attempt at building a "comprehensive antimissile defense system" will provoke the corresponding counteractions of the other side. Then no limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons will be possible. On the contrary, the sides will continue to improve and deploy them. This is the reality. The sooner this reality is understood, soberly weighed and appraised by the U.S. military-political leadership, the quicker accords on the limitation and reduction and, subsequently, on the banning of nuclear weapons will be achieved. This is not only in the interest of the Soviet and American peoples but also in the interest of all mankind.

However, as long as the aggressiveness of imperialism is growing, the danger of a new world war breaking out is also increasing. Therefore, following the Leninist peace-loving foreign policy course and persistently struggling to curb the forces of war, our party and the Soviet government continue to devote unremitting attention to strengthening the country's defense capability in every way possible. The lessons of history teach us this. "...As long as there is military and political tension," Comrade K. U. Chernenko said at the meeting with workers of the Moscow Serp i Molot Metallurgical Plant, "and as long as the nuclear missile danger from the United States and the NATO states hangs over our country, it is necessary to keep our powder dry and always be on guard to ensure that the correlation of forces will not change to the advantage of imperialism and we will not turn out to be the weaker ones."

The USSR armed forces have a most important role in maintaining the country's defense capability at a high level. The USSR armed forces have been transformed during the postwar years thanks to the constant care and attention of the communist party, the Soviet government and all Soviet people. It is on the basis of our country's great economic potential and the achievements of scientific-technical progress that the army and navy have been equipped with modern weapons systems and military equipment; the combat potential of all

services of the armed forces and all arms of the forces has increased. Great qualitative changes have taken place in all spheres of military affairs.

Military theorizing, Soviet military science and the theory and practice of Soviet military art, as interconnected aspects of military affairs, have developed successfully during the postwar years and are successfully developing now. By creatively using the combat experience of the past war, thoroughly analyzing and taking into account the real contemporary military-political situations and scientifically revealing and substantiating the potential future prospects in the development of military affairs, they are making a worthy contribution to increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces and strengthening our fatherland's defense capability.

Along what lines are Soviet military science and Soviet military art now working to multiply the combat might of the army and navy?

FIRST, there is the further improvement of the combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces to be able to ensure the prevention of possible aggression by the adversary at any time and under any conditions and, should the adversary nevertheless start a war, to inflict a crushing retaliatory blow. By taking into account the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the military-theoretical views and tenets that have now been worked out are being verified more operatively in practice. We strive to work out and master them in the course of the operational, combat and political training of the armed forces. The level and state of the army's and navy's combat readiness are maintained at a level that is necessary to prevent aggression.

SECOND, continuing to maintain the approximate military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO bloc at the achieved level currently represents one of the main conditions for ensuring the security of states of the socialist community. For this reason, military-theoretical and military-technical thought is intensively engaged in the task of preventing the adversary from attaining superiority and ensuring for the armed forces weapons and equipment that fully correspond to the nature of modern armed struggle.

THIRD, correctly foreseeing the development of a potential military-strategic situation as well as the methods of waging war, should the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, continues to be one of the most important problems.

Realizing the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear strike and its catastrophic consequences, our probable adversaries have devoted special attention in recent years to developing the systems of conventional weapons with higher effective power, range and precision characteristics. At the same time, they are also improving the methods of unleashing military actions by using conventional strike weapons and, first and foremost, new types of automatically controlled high-precision weapons. Soviet military science does not neglect all these actions of the adversary in its own work. We take these trends into account both in the training of our troops (forces) and in their management.

FOURTH, the demands placed on the training of the armed forces and directly on the training and education of their personnel are now higher than ever before. The demand to teach the troops what is necessary in war is not new; it is universally known. However, history provides many examples of how the armies of a number of countries prepared for future war by relying only on past experience and without taking into account the changes taking place in military affairs. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, our army was basically on the right road in this respect. However, the war also revealed many weak spots in preparation which were then already eliminated in the course of engagement in bloody combat actions and battles. There will be considerably fewer opportunities for new and additional learning under contemporary conditions. Therefore, military science and military art now constantly and purposefully search for the most perfected forms and methods of military training and education of personnel, of their moral-political and ideological preparation and their physical tempering.

The requirements in training command and leadership personnel are especially high. The officers' level of education is now incomparably higher than in the past. Today 70 percent of officers, generals and admirals of our armed forces have a higher military and specialized education and they cultivate in themselves high organizational abilities, will and practical habits in directing the troops under the conditions that are close to combat conditions precisely in the way that V. I. Lenin taught us: "...No school and no university is worth anything if practical ability is lacking" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 77). The harsh experience of the last war also teaches us this. Military theory is transformed into a material force and is organically combined with the practice of the art of war only if all these are mastered by the basic mass of the officers.

It is quite obvious that only a thorough analysis of the interrelation of past and present events can enable one to find dialectical continuity in military affairs and on this basis to improve and to raise it to a new, qualitatively higher level. For this reason, the combination of profound theoretical knowledge. With firm practical habits, a keen feeling for everything that is new and the aspiration to accomplish the set tasks on time and with the smallest outlays of forces and means remain today an indispensable principle in the training of cadres for the army and navy and an important condition for raising the combat preparedness of the Soviet armed forces.

Party political and military-patriotic work are called upon to educate Soviet soldiers and the younger generation in the spirit of devotion to the communist party and the Soviet government, in the spirit of lofty principle, good organization and discipline, and the willingness to carry out one's military duty even under the most complex conditions, continues to be a powerful means in the training of the armed forces.

The communist party regards this task as one of the most important ones. To accomplish it, it is necessary to mobilize as many people as possible with rich combat and labor experience and well tempered in life, above all armed forces and labor veterans. As Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted, "It is necessary to be even more persistent in cultivating among youths the feeling of love for

the homeland and hatred for its enemies, a high political and class vigilance and a constant readiness for "an exploit."

Four decades have passed since the events of the last war. The Soviet Union triumphed over Hitlerite Germany at the price of great efforts, of the lives of our many people who died in battles against fascism. The Soviet people have defended the freedom and independence of their homeland and have brought European peoples deliverance from Hitlerite tyranny and the immense joy of peace. It is impossible to consign this to oblivion.

But the memory of mankind is not only the reminiscences of the past. The memory of history is primarily the profound analysis of experiences and awareness of the lessons and conclusions drawn from these experiences, lessons and conclusions of lasting importance to both present and future generations. Soviet military doctrine, which has a purely defensive bent, is developing on the basis of the rich experience of the war, of the lessons and conclusions drawn from it. The Soviet Union does not threaten anyone, has never intended to and does not intend to attack anyone. To confirm this, the Soviet Union has unilaterally adopted the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The only objective of our military doctrine is to ensure reliable security for the Soviet state and for our friends, the countries of the socialist community. However, the defensive character of the military doctrine also imposes high demands for maintaining the armed forces in due readiness for active and resolute operations against the aggressor if he tries to attack our country and its allies.

In preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress and the 40th anniversary of the victory won in the Great Patriotic War, all armed forces personnel are always ready to carry out their constitutional duty to the homeland. The Soviet people can be confident that our country's defense potential is being kept at a level necessary to protect their creative labor. "The dangerous test of strength which is being imposed on us by the most reactionary imperialist circles, and primarily those of the United States," Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted, "is not of our choice, is not our policy, but we will be able to stand up for ourselves. No one must doubt that."

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FRONTLINE WATCH OF THE MAGNITKA

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85) pp 64-80

[Text] The biography of Magnitogorsk is short yet maximally saturated with events. During its lifetime it is as though the city had combined within itself everything necessary to be ready to meet honorably any kind of trial.

Industrial Ural is justifiably considered the forge of victory in the Great Patriotic War waged by the Soviet people against Hitlerite fascism. During those terrible years the technical and economic power of the Soviet state, the firmness and courage of the Soviet person and his profound loyalty to communist ideals were asserted yet once again.

The homeland demanded a great deal of the people of Magnitogorsk.

In numbered days the economy had to be converted to a military footing; the front had to be supplied with armor metal, ammunition and weapons. The people of Magnitogorsk did this, as always, outstripping the already tight schedules, on an excellent quality level.

The smelting of armor steel had to be mastered on Martin furnaces, which were not suited for such purposes. The people of Magnitogorsk organized this production.

Rolled pieces made of special steel brands had to be produced for the manufacturing of tanks. The people of Magnitogorsk dealt with this too.

The production of war industry goods had to be increased while, at the same time, building and attaining the production capacity of two blast and five Martin furnaces, four coke batteries and a group of machine shops. The people of Magnitogorsk built and mastered the new capacities.

Forty-two enterprises evacuated to Magnitogorsk had to be accepted, positioned and put to work. The city made the new plants part of its family.

The country called upon its best sons and daughters to defend the socialist gains and Magnitogorsk sent 34,064 people to the front. Thousands of them failed to return home.

The enterprises in the city had to replace the workers who went to war. Magnitka put artisans, women and children by the machine tools.

During the war the armor plating of every second tank and one out of every three shells were made of Magnitka metal.

The homeland highly rated the labor exploit of the Magnitogorsk people. The Order of Lenin was awarded to the famous collectives of the metallurgical combine and the Magnitostroy Trust; the Order of the Labor Red Banner was awarded to Vocational School No 13. More than 2,000 Magnitogorsk residents were awarded orders and metals.

The metal smelted today in the Magnita Martin and other furnaces is for peacetime use. Like all Soviet people, the working people of Magnitogorsk are preparing to welcome properly the 27th CPSU Congress. The socialist competition in honor of the 40th anniversary of the victory of our people over Hitlerite fascism is a major step in these preparations. The baton of the shock labor watch is being passed on from enterprise to enterprise. The right to keep the Red Banner of the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Labor Red Banner of the city of Magnitogorsk for a week is being awarded to the best collectives. The most important and substantial accomplishments of workers, foremen, engineers and technicians are recorded in the Labor Accomplishments Book.

The harsh years of the Great Patriotic War are now history. Living eyewitnesses and participants in those events are becoming fewer and fewer. However, we have forgotten nothing of what filled 1,418 long days and nights of the past war. We are reminded of this today by a monument to the labor and combat glory of the people of Magnitogorsk during the Great Patriotic War: the bronze-cast figures of a worker and a soldier, who is accepting the sword of revenge, which became the sword of victory, stand against the background of the fire-breathing Metallurgical Combine imeni V. I. Lenin.

Magnita began its frontline watch from the very first hours of the war.

The documents which follow describe the way the people of Magnitogorsk worked and lived in the deep rear and the way they helped the front.

These documents are kept at the Party Archive of the Chelyabinsk CPSU Obkom (PACHO), the Magnitogorsk Branch of the State Archive of Chelyabinsk Oblast (MFGACHO) and other archives of enterprises, establishments and organizations in Magnitogorsk. Most of them are being published for the first time. They were prepared for publication by V. Kucher, editor of the newspaper MAGNITOGORSKIY RABOCHIY.

Document No 1

On the Tasks of Party Members in Connection With the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War

From the Decree of the Party Meeting Held at the Blast Furnace Shop
of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine

23 June 1941

1. In connection with the difficult time experienced by our homeland, above all true bolshevik discipline in the ranks of the party organization is demanded of all party members.

All violations of discipline by individual party members must be immediately stopped and the culprits held liable.

2. The events require that the party members engage on a daily basis in mass agitation work among the workers, explaining to them the course of military operations and the international situation and mobilizing the shop collectives for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the cast iron plan.

3. Every party member must consider himself mobilized and be ready to respond to the summon and put himself at the disposal of the party organization.

4. The meeting makes it incumbent upon party group organizers and foremen-party members to discuss at shift-group party meetings the question of replacing workers in leading skills and to undertake preparations to replace workers mobilized in the armed forces.

....7. The meeting makes it incumbent upon all party members and candidate members to subordinate their entire work, behavior and life to the single objective of the destruction of fascism.

Party organization secretary Chuprakov

Copy

Party Archive of the Chelyabinsk CPSU Obkom (PACHO), f. [File] 779, op. [List] 3, d. [Case] 19, ll. [sheets] 56-57

Document No 2

On Housing-Evacuated Families

From the Minutes of the Session of the Executive Committee of the
Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

2 July 1941

Ispolkom Resolution:

1. The premises of the medical workers club at Domenniy Gorodok will be closed down temporarily and the building will be used to house evacuated families....

Copy

Magnitogorsk Branch of the State Archive of Chelyabinsk Oblast (MFGACHO), f. 10, op. 1, d. 377, l. 164

Document No 3

On Placing Evacuated Children

From the Resolution of the Reduced Ispolkom of the Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

20 July 1941

1. The Annenskiye sanitorium camps shall be closed down as of 20 July 1941.
2. The premises of the Annenskiye sanitorium camps and all their property should be used to place 300 evacuated children. Leftover funds for camp maintenance shall be used for the maintenance of the evacuated children....

Original

MFGACHO, f. 10, op. 1, d. 371, l. 193

Document No 4

On Installing the Equipment of the Steel Cable Shop of the Leningrad Metal Goods Plant at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine

From the Decree of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau

26 July 1941

In accordance with the 14 July 1941 decree of the Chelyabinsk VKP(b) obkom bureau, the VKP(b) city party committee decrees:

1. To adopt the suggestion submitted by Comrade Nosov on installing the equipment of the steel cable shop of the Plant imeni Molotov in shop "B" currently under construction, and in the premises of the garage of the MMK [Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine] Motor Vehicle Base; the equipment of the bolt-riveting shop to be installed in the premises of the garage of the Magnitogorsk City Soviet.

....4. To ask Comrade Ivanov, chief of the OKS [Capital Construction Department] and Comrade Dymshits, manager of the Magnitostroy Trust, to draft by 1 August 1941 a production schedule for construction and installation work for the steel cable and bolt-riveting shops with 1 September 1941 as a startup date.

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, l. 325

Document No 5

On the Movement of Patriotic Women for Mastering Industrial Professions

From the Decree of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau

16 August 1941

In response to the appeal of the progressive women of the Soviet Union on replacing husbands and brothers who have joined the Red Army, the women of Magnitogorsk as well launched an outstanding initiative. Since the start of the war, 994 women have gone to work at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine and the Magnitostroy Trust. Many women employees are currently mastering industrial skills.

The VKP(b) City Committee Bureau decrees:

1. To approve the initiative of women employees and housewives of Magnitogorsk who are mastering industrial skills...

...3. To suggest to directors of enterprises and chiefs of establishments to expand the network of short courses and circles for technical training for women newly hired in industry.

4. To make it incumbent upon Comrades Nosov, Dymshits, Sukharev, head of the city health department, and Alferov, head of the City Public Education Department, immediately to expand the network of children's institutions, thus fully ensuring the enrollment of children of women entering production work.

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, ll. 358-359

Document No 6

On the Construction of New Huts and Adobe Cottages and Making Basements,
Attics and Abandoned Premises Suitable for Housing

From the Decree of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau

19-20 August 1941

With a view to creating in the city a certain reserve of housing area, the VKP(b) city party committee bureau decrees:

1. Asks the city soviet executive committee (Comrade Zhemerikin, chairman) to locate within a 3-day period all abandoned buildings in the city, to be made suitable for housing, and to combine some establishments such as, for example, the worker faculty of the Ore-Mining Metallurgical Institute, the office of the Betonite Combine, and others.

2. Makes it incumbent upon Comrades Nosov and Dymshits:

a. By 1 November 1941 to have repaired (adapted for housing) basements, attics and other abandoned buildings.

b. To petition the People's Commissariats of Ferrous Metallurgy and Construction to grant funds and additional construction materials needed for repair and construction of new huts and adobe housing totaling 140,000 square meters.

3. To ask Comrade Stepanov, the city architect, to earmark and lay out by 28 August 1941 plots for the construction of huts and adobe housing; by 25 August 1941 Comrade Ivanov, the combine's OKS chief, must develop a standard blueprint for such housing, subject to the subsequent approval by the city executive committee in session.

4. To make it incumbent upon the economic organizations in the city which are not within the combine's system to make suitable for housing available unused premises and to build new huts and adobe houses by 1 November 1941.

To instruct Comrade Zhemerikin, chairman of the city soviet executive committee, to request the Sovnarkom to grant funds for the construction and repair of huts and adobe houses in the city.

5. To make it incumbent upon VKP(b) rayon committee secretaries and chairmen of executive committees of rayon soviets to provide economic assistance to managers in building huts and adobe housing by involving the population in the repair and construction of huts and adobe housing.

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, ll. 372-373

Document No 7

On the Work of the Music School and Music Course

Letter to the Chairman of the Magnitogorsk City Executive Committee
and City Party Committee Secretary

23 August 1941

The military events experienced by the country and the extremely grave danger threatening the fatherland as a result of the impudent fascist raid on a peaceful country building socialism require exceptional economy of state funds. Naturally, this situation has affected above all the system of cultural institutions, which received substantial state subsidies in the past. By order of the Committee on the Arts, dated 11 August, the music school and course in Magnitogorsk were closed down. The final item in the order, however, stipulates that such training institutions may remain open, as state institutions, on a cost-accounting basis, should the objective situation make this possible: availability of students, and existence of a well-united

educational staff. The collective of the Magnitogorsk Music Institution perfectly realizes the entire gravity of the situation in the country, created by the war, and the forced need temporarily to suspend state funds for the arts; despite the heavy burden imposed on Soviet schools, it deems itself called upon to prevent the destruction of musical culture, which was created with great effort under the conditions of a new city by people dedicated to the cultural construction of the homeland--party and nonparty bolsheviks--with the full support of the leading organizations.

...We have done the following to convert the course and school to total cost accounting:

1. We held individual talks with parents at home and considered their pledges to pay for the training of their children in the 1941/42 school year.
2. Essentially all school students have been placed in jobs and guarantee in their declarations that they will pursue their training and pay for it without leaving their jobs.

We are fully confident that the great, social activeness and discipline of our entire collective will be on the level of the tasks which face us....

Polyakov, director of the Music School and Course

Eydinov, in charge of training

Original

From the files of the Magnitogorsk Music School imeni M. I. Glinka, f. 6, inventory No 26/2

Document No 8

On the Construction of Temporary Huts and Adobe Houses

From the Minutes of the Session of the Executive Committee of the
Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

3 September 1941

Taking into consideration the exceptional difficulties in resettling evacuees, the executive committee of the Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People resolves:

1. Makes it incumbent upon economic organizations and enterprises (Magnitostroy Trust, OKKh MK, City Communal Farm, Magnitgortorg, Cafeteria Trust, etc.), based on the availability of local construction materials, immediately to undertake the construction of temporary huts-adobe houses. The number of such premises shall be 100 for the MMK and 50 for the Magnitostroy Trust....

Copy

MFGACHO, f. 10, op. 1, d. 378, l. 2

Document No 9

On Measures To Develop Speed Steel Smelting at the Metallurgical Combine

From the Report Submitted by the Secretary of the Stalinskiy Rayon
Party Committee in Magnitogorsk to the VKP(b) Obkom

10 September 1941

Many steel smelters in our plant are systematically acting as labor Stakhanovites. In their struggle for speed smelting, overfulfilling their norms, the steel smelters are helping the Red Army to defeat the enemy. The collective of Martin Furnace No 5 is systematically overfulfilling its plan.

...The steel smelters have set themselves the assignment of developing speed smelting into a system. In order to disseminate the experience of the best steel smelters in speed smelting, party-technical conferences were held at the Martin shops on 29 August last. Party meetings were held to prepare for the conferences. The comrades discussed the work of speed steel smelters and earmarked measures for the further development of speed steel smelting.

...In accordance with the resolutions of the party-technical conferences, the Martin shop personnel are promoting speed smelting. The day following the conference speed smelts were practiced by smelters Comrades Sokolov and Lukovskiy, who took 9 hours and 20 minutes; Comrades Ignatenko and Kuzin took 9 hours and 30 minutes.

The steel smelters of Martin Shop No 1 improved their work in September. In the first 9 days of the month the Martin shop personnel completed 13 speed smelts.

L. Svetlov, secretary of the Stalinskiy Rayon VKP(b) Committee

Copy

PACHO, f. 776, op. 6, d. 4, l. 118

Document No 10

On Building the "Magnitogorskiy Metallurg" Aviation Squadron

Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau Decree

7 October 1941

1. The initiative of the collective of workers, engineering and technical personnel and employees of the coke shop of building the "Magnitogorskiy Metallurg" Aviation Squadron is hereby approved.

2. It is suggested to the VKP(b) raykoms, secretaries of primary party organizations and trade union managers to discuss the letter of the shop's collective on building the "Magnitogorskiy Metallurg" Aviation Squadron, at meetings of workers, engineering and technical personnel and employees at the combine, construction projects and other enterprises and establishments in the city and to support this outstanding patriotic initiative.

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, l. 434

Document No 11

On Welcoming and Housing the Moscow Theater of the Revolution

Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau Decree

21 October 1941

1. The city soviet executive committee and, personally, Comrade Zhemerikin, will be responsible for the entire organization, reception and housing of the Moscow Theater of the Revolution, which is transferred to Magnitogorsk by decree of the government and resolution of the VKP(b) Obkom Bureau.

2. For work purposes, to assign to the Theater of the Revolution the premises of the Magnitogorsk Drama Theater, the personnel of which, by decision of the VKP(b) Obkom Bureau, shall be transferred to the city of Troitsk.

3. It is made incumbent upon the city soviet executive committee:

a. To secure housing for the creative collective of the Theater of the Revolution;

b. To assign transportation and manpower for the moving of theater property and the collective of theater workers.

4. Makes it incumbent upon Comrade M. B. Giterman, director of the Cafeteria Trust, to organize the feeding of the personnel of the Theater of the Revolution.

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, ll. 467

Document No 12

On Food Product Norms

Order No 155 of the Trade Department of the Magnitogorsk
City Trade Administration

5 November 1941

In accordance with city trade department Order No 37, dated 1 November 1941, I hereby order:

As of 6 November 1941, meat, fish, fats, cereals and spaghetti products will be sold on the basis of rationing cards in all stores and stalls. Said products may be sold exclusively on the basis of the following stipulated monthly rations:

(in grams)

	Meat and Fish, Combined	Fats, Combined	Cereals and Spaghetti, Combined
Workers, engineering and technical personnel	1,800	400	1,200
Employees	1,200	300	800
Children under 12	400	300	800
Dependents	500	200	600

Within the limits of the rations for commodities such as meat, fish and fats, other substitute products may be sold, based on the following coefficient:

Canned meat and fish goods may be sold instead of meat and fish in the same amounts, gram for gram;

Meat with canned vegetables: 400 grams of canned goods for 100 grams of meat or cans weighing 400 grams for 150 grams of meat;

Fats: 100 grams of fats will be the equivalent of 1,500 grams of milk, kafir or yoghurt, 350 grams of cream, 500 grams of cottage cheese or cheese mix or 250 grams of cheese.

The following substitutes are allowed:

a. Sausages and other meat products, canned meat and fish, fish products and herring for meat and fish;

b. Cheese and milk and dairy products for fats.

Eggs may be sold only for children and individuals on dietetic food as prescribed with a physician's certificate and proper coupons.

The procedure to be followed in slicing, labeling and recording will be the same as for bread.

Konstantinovskiy, trade department chief

Copy

MFGACHO, f. 49, op. 9, d. 44, l. 78

Document No 13

On the Establishment of a Scientist's Committee for Aid to the Front

From the Decree of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau

14 December 1941

1. A "Committee of Scientists for Aid to the Front" shall be created with a view to organizing the city's scientific and technical forces to resolve problems of helping the front, coordinating scientific inventions and developing inventions....
2. Comrade Mikhailovich, MMK chief engineer, shall be committee chairman....

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, l. 561

Document No 14

On Organizing the Production of Consumer Goods

From the Decree of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau

23 December 1941

....No 2

1. Comrade Petryakov, combine deputy director, and Comrade Kroleus, chief of the consumer goods shop, are asked to organize as of 24 December, the daily production of 300 chrome-plated spoons and to undertake the production of knives and forks as of 10 January.

...5. It is made incumbent upon Comrade Shapiro, chairman of the Energiya Cooperative, to organize the production of the following items:

- a. Earthenware plates, no less than 1,200 monthly, as of 25 December; wooden spoons, 150 pieces daily, as of 26 December; earthenware mugs, 750 monthly, as of 1 January 1942.

...7. To make it incumbent upon Comrade Alferov, deputy chairman, city executive committee:

...c. To ensure supplies to the city industrial combine of the necessary quantity of raw materials for the production of combs made of horn.

...11. It is made incumbent upon Comrade Yeremin, VKP(b) city committee secretary in charge of cadres, to select and assign to the city industrial combine by 1 January, one potter and three specialists for the production of wooden spoons and two specialists for the production of horn combs.

No 3

1. To make it incumbent upon Comrade Borodavkin, meat combine director, to manufacture 3 tons of soap from waste by 1 January and, starting with January 1942, to increase such output to no less than 5 tons monthly.

...5. To make it incumbent upon combine director Comrade Nosov, through the central plant laboratory:

a. To develop from coke chemical shop waste a product which will maximally reduce the use of fats for the production of soap at the combine and at other city enterprises....

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 15, d. 6, ll. 586-588

Document No 15

On Sponsorship Aid to the Front

Certificate

February 1942

Comrade Yegor Ivanovich Smertin, the bearer of the present certificate, a concrete worker at Construction Sector No 1 in Magnitogorsk, is hereby assigned member of the brigade to present gifts to troops and commanders of the Red Army in the field on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the RKKA [Worker and Peasant Red Army] at the Northwestern Front in the city of Valday.

Patolichev, Chelyabinsk VKP(b) Obkom secretary

Original

Magnitogorsk Kray Museum (MKM)

Chelyabinsk Oblast

Inventory No 1722/8

Document No 16

Certificate of Dedicated Labor

Stalin Prize Diploma Laureate 2nd Class

April 1942

By decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, dated 10 April 1942, the Stalin Prize 2nd Class is hereby awarded to Nosov, Grigoriy Ivanovich,

director of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, Ryzhenko, Nikolay Andreyevich and Smirnov, Vasiliy Alekseyevich, workers at the same combine, Sakhin, Semen Izrailevich and Levin, Yevgeniy Yefimovich, associates at Scientific Research Institute No 48, Pirskiy, Fedor Nikolayevich, technical department worker, People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy, Badyagin, Dmitriy Yakovlevich, chief metallurgist at the Izhorsk Order of Lenin Plant, and Polikarpov, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, engineer at the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry, for developing a new brand of armored steel and the process for its production.

The present diploma is hereby issued to:

Nosov
Grigoriy Ivanovich

J. Stalin, chairman, Council of People's Commissars, USSR

Ya. Chadayev

In charge of affairs, USSR Sovnarkom

Original

MKM, Inventory No 1561/17

Document No 17

Mines for the Front

From Order No 95 of the Magnitogorsk Crafts School No 1

26 April 1942

The collective of workshop foremen and students, who joined the May Day socialist competition, pledged to the homeland to master in full the manufacturing of M-82, a new type of defense item, by 25 April.

From the very first days of April foremen and students enthusiastically took up the project; having found out that the collective of the Chelyabinsk RU [Craft School] No 2 was preparing to deliver the first shipment of mines ready for use by 18 April, the foreman's collective doubled its efforts; a number of foremen converted on their own initiative to a barracks condition and are working dedicatedly without leaving the school for 5 to 7 days or more at a time. As a result, the collective of RU No 1, competing against RU No 2, emerged the winner. An experimental shipment of 50 mines was manufactured and sent to the oblast labor reserve administration on 18 April. The mines were tested with good results....

Kozlov, school principal

Copy

Document No 18

On Outstanding Production Records Set by Concrete Makers Comrades Rakhimov
and Galiullin in the Construction of the Fifth Coke Battery

From the Decree of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee Bureau

26 May 1942

The VKP(b) City Committee Bureau notes that as a result of the increasing socialist competition, which developed in connection with the May Day order issued by Comrade Stalin, people's commissar of defense, Comrade Rakhimov, concrete worker at Construction Administration No 5, Magnitostroy Trust, taking up the "Everything for the Front" Watch, achieved outstanding production successes on 20 and 22 May by fulfilling his shift assignment 983 and 1,087 percent.

A Stakhanovite watch was assumed on 24 May last by his teacher, the noted concrete worker in Magnitka Comrade Galiullin, who substantially outstripped Comrade Rakhimov's record by fulfilling 18 norms per shift and earning 420 rubles. This confirms the inexhaustible reserves contributing to the implementation of the trust's production plan.

The VKP(b) city committee bureau decrees:

1. Suggests to the managers of economic, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations of the Magnitostroy Trust widely to popularize the outstanding records set by Comrades Rakhimov and Galiullin....

Copy

PACHO, f. 288, op. 5, d. 824, l. 304

Document No 19

On the Thousand Percent Movement

From Order No 130 of the Magnitogorsk Crafts School No 1

12 June 1942

Komsomol Member Boris Volkov, student, Turners' Group No 3, has mastered his skill perfectly working at the workshop of Martin Furnace Shop No 3, manufacturing rods for pouring buckets stops. He is fulfilling his production norm 1,000-1,100 percent.

By compressing his work day and using every single minute and second sensibly and productively, and by properly organizing his work place and making full

use of his machine tool, Comrade Volkov was the first in the school and the combine to earn the honorary title of Thousand Percent Rear Guardsman.

In the example of Boris Volkov, his fellow student and comrade Aleksandr Dema, who has mastered his skill perfectly as well, and using Comrade Volkov's work method, reached a 1,000 percent labor productivity level.

Komsomol members Boris Volkov and Aleksandr Dema, loyal sons of our beloved homeland, have increased the glory of the Komsomol tribe through their excellent studies and dedicated work. These young patriots are militantly struggling for the implementation of Comrade Stalin's May Day order: the full defeat of German forces and the liberation of all Soviet land from the fascist blackguards in 1942.

All students and workers at Craft School No 1 must follow the example set by Comrades Volkov and Dema.

It is our sacred duty immediately to improve production, theoretical and military training, to upgrade labor productivity and strengthen discipline. Every one of us must study and work at his sector like Boris Volkov and Aleksandr Dema.

For their excellent studies and dedicated work for the good of the fatherland I proclaim thanks to Komsomol members Boris Volkov and Aleksandr Dema, students, Turners' Group No 3, and award them the following:

Comrade Volkov: an inscribed watch;

Comrade Dema: a cut of fabric for a suit....

Kozlov, school principal

Original

SPTU Archive No 19, f. 194, op. 1, d. 2, p 154

Document No 20

From Reports Submitted by Magnitogorsk Schools for the 1941/42 School Year

School No 9

...In aid to the front, the school collected cash totaling 1,230 rubles and purchased bonds worth 2,050 rubles. A collection of bottles was made, two shipments were sent to the troops at the front; warm clothing was collected by teachers and 171 people among the unorganized population were trained in antiaircraft defense....

School No 41

...Five Timur detachments worked well at the school. Seven evening performances were organized by the students for hospital patients.

...The school sent gifts to the front.

Cash totaling 1,992 rubles was collected for the "Magnitogorskiy Metallurg" Squadron. A total of 1,669 rubles was collected for the tank column. Defense bonds for 9,975 rubles were purchased and 1,484 rubles were collected in cash. A clothing lottery earned 2,630 rubles. Shipments to the soldiers totaled 1,960 rubles. Forty-three pieces of warm clothing were sent.... Gifts to the hospitals included 18 kilograms of apples, 5 kilograms of currants and napkins.

Original

MFGACHO, f. 12, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 8, 186

Document No 21

On Organizing a Dietetic Food Cafeteria

From the Minutes of the Session of the Executive Committee of the
Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

23 July 1942

...Taking into consideration sick people who urgently need dietetic food, entitled to services provided by the urban trade public catering system, the executive committee resolves:

1. To make it incumbent upon Magnitgortorg to set aside at the Atach Restaurant, as of 19 July 1942, separate tables to accommodate 50 people needing special diets, as assigned by the city health department....

Copy

MFGACHO, f. 10, op. 1, d. 385, l. 222

Document No 22

From the Letter of Steel Smelter Andrey Kaminskiy to His Brother
in the Front Artillery

August 1942

Dear Vanya! The front needs metal, a great deal of metal. We, in Magnitogorsk, are supplying it in ever-increasing amounts. This month, for example, in 20 front watches, I smelted 372 tons of steel above the plan. This will suffice for the production of 18,000 shells for your guns. Use them, Vanya, unsparingly. We shall smelt more....

T. A. Nikiforova. "Magnitogorsk Vchera, Segodnya, Zavtra" [Magnitogorsk Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow]. Yuzh.-Ural. Book Publishing House, Chelyabinsk, 1978, p 29.

Document No 23

From the Report by Comrade F. A. Petrusha, Party Committee Secretary,
to the Second Plant Party Conference at the Metallurgical Combine

22 August 1942

...Under wartime conditions, party-political work means first and foremost work with people. We must recall that it is living people who make the metal and the shells. The extent to which we are able successfully to explain to these people their tasks in the war and the extent to which we can make every worker realize the full extent of the danger threatening our homeland and our ability to develop within every worker a feeling of Soviet patriotism, the desire to work with dedication and intensively, and our ability to create the necessary conditions for heroic work for the front will determine the success of their work as well.

The party members of the plant have done a great deal of work to resolve these problems. More than 500 people at the plant have become permanent agitators. For the duration of the war, readings and talks on current events have been organized in most brigades in the shops. Many shops have organized newspaper displays. For the past 4 months the plan has regularly sponsored politics days at which current topics are discussed, etc.; every year 30 to 40 skilled lecturers submit reports and lectures in the shops.

In 29 shops Red corners are increasingly turning into shop agitation centers; a considerably larger number of wall newspapers and combat leaflets for the individual shifts are being published, etc.

As a result of the increased attention paid to agitation and mass work, the most important political campaigns were carried out at the plant with a high spirit and on a high level. Let us particularly note the successful covering of the loan, the cash and object lottery, the collection of gifts for the front and the collection of funds for the construction of the "Magnitogorskiy Metallurg" Aviation Squadron, the collection of warm clothing in 1941, the harvesting subbotniks held, and others.

Unquestionably, all of this must be noted as a very positive fact in the work of the plant party committee and party organization.

Copy

PACHO, f. 779, op. 4, d. 1, ll. 45-50

Document No 24

Telegram of Greetings From J. V. Stalin, State Defense Committee Chairman

To the Managers of the Magnitostroy Trust and
Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine

5 December 1942

I warmly greet and congratulate you on the occasion of the commissioning of the most powerful blast furnace in the USSR. With your successful work you proved in action the firmness of the Soviet rear and its ability not only to meet the needs of the great Red Army for all types of armaments and ammunition but also to create new production capacities within an exceptionally short time. This is the guarantee of our victory over the German-fascist aggressors. I wish you, Magnitogorsk comrades, new successes in your work.

J. Stalin

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 16, d. 47, l. 1

Document No 25

Magnitogorsk Craft School No 13 Order No 216

10 December 1942

Having summed up the results of the socialist competition among the hostel rooms for October 1942, the jury awarded first prize to Room No 5 of Foreman Brezhnev and Room No 13 of Foreman Chizhko, to whom the Red Challenge Banner was presented.

For keeping their rooms in model order and maintaining proper standards, I order that the students in said groups be given the following bonuses: 17 handkerchiefs, 18 pairs of socks and 20 bars of toilet soap.

Kuleshov, school principal

Original

SPTU Archive No 13, op. 1, l. 1

Document No 26

On Stockpiling Products for the Better Nutrition of Evacuated Leningraders

From the Minutes of the Session of the Executive Committee of the
Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

4 March 1943

...Considering the impossibility of setting up a separate cafeteria for the increased nutrition of Leningraders and the fact that in the existing cafeterias the feeding of the people of Leningrad does not enable us to supervise the proper use of produce allocated for such purposes, the executive committee resolves:

1. Deems it expedient to issue supplies from the appropriated food stock for the intensified feeding of evacuated Leningraders, who came to Magnitogorsk as of June 1942, on the basis of USSR Sovnarkom norms....

Copy

MFGACHO, f. 10, op. 1, d. 390, l. 3

Document No 27

On the Recruitment of Volunteers for the Ural Tank Corps

From the Petition of Komsomol Member P. F. Shevtsov, Worker at Domenstroy, to the Ordzhonikidzevskiy Party Raykom in Magnitogorsk

5 March 1943

...I request to be enrolled in the ranks of the avengers and accepted in the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps.

I pledge to become master of this terrible weapon within the shortest possible time--to become an excellent tank man, so that the bones of the fascist scoundrels may crack under the terrible treads of the tank entrusted to me, made by a Ural worker, hammered out of strong Ural armor.

I beg you to honor my request.

Shevtsov

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 17, d. 72, l. 13 reverse

Document No 28

Ural Tank Corps Contribution

Receipt No 826898, State Labor Savings Bank No 1693, Magnitogorsk

15 March 1943

Received from Bannykh, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich for deposit to the State Bank, Ural Tank Corps Fund.

Debited from Account 117, R600 (six hundred rubles).

Original

MKM, Inventory No 2356/11.

Document No 29

Contribution to the Front by Pioneers and School Students

Moscow, the Kremlin

To Comrade Stalin, J. V.

April 1943

Like all the Soviet people, the young patriots--Pioneers and school students of Stalin's Magnitka--fired with the desire to help the Red Army in its definitive routing of Hitlerite killers of children--collected 150,000 rubles for the building of the "Magnitogorskiy Pioneer" tank. The collection of funds is continuing.

Buyvid, secretary, Magnitogorsk Komsomol Gorkom

Copy

MKM, Scientific-Auxiliary Stock No 1269/3

Document No 30

On the Plan for the Procurement of Sorrel, Nettle and Wild Garlic

From the Minutes of the Session of the Executive Committee of the Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

3 June 1943

1. To approve a plan for the procurement of sorrel and nettle, 56 and 55 tons respectively, and wild garlic, 16.8 tons, during the 1943 season, by the assigned organizations, in accordance with the addendum to the present resolution.

2. The consumption ration to be as follows: 100 grams sorrel per dish and 5 grams of garlic per dish....

Copy

MFGACHO, f. 10, op. 1, d. 391, l. 91

Document No 31

Awards to Stakhanovites

Order No 307 of the Director of the Magnitogorsk Order of Lenin Metallurgical Combine

23 October 1943

No 1

Gratitude is being proclaimed, to be entered in the labor record, and bonuses to be awarded to the best young Stakhanovites and heads of Komsomol-youth brigades and shifts, in recognition for the Stakhanovite work of the young metallurgical workers in implementing the combine's assignments of the State Defense Committee, in honor of the 25th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol:

- a. Cloth for woolen suits (16 people);
- b. Cloth for semiwoolen suits (20 people):
- c. A warm suit of clothes (padded trousers, jerseys) (35 people);
- d. Woolen trousers (14 people);
- e. Felt boots (49 people);
- f. Semiwoolen trousers (19 people);
- g. Silk cloth (30 people).

No 2

For concern expressed for the production and technical growth of young Stakhanovites and the organization and management of Komsomol-youth brigades, shifts and machine units, gratitude is proclaimed, to be recorded in the labor record (31 people). (The names of the distinguished workers are not mentioned. All that is mentioned is the number of metallurgical workers (in parentheses) who were presented with a bonus and to whom gratitude was declared).

G. Nosov

Copy

Museum of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, Inventory No 4037

Document No 32

On the Cultural Construction Front

Certificate

5 November 1943

The Executive Committee of the Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People and the city VKP(b) committee award this certificate to Comrade N. I. Zagatin, as the best participant in the construction of the Magnit movie theater in the city, which was built by the construction workers of the 10th Construction Administration under difficult wartime conditions within a short time.

N. Petryakov, chairman, Executive Committee of the Magnitogorsk City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

T. Fokin, secretary, city VKP(b) committee

Original

MKM, Inventory No 2102/7

Document No 33

Contribution to Victory

Deposit Order No 77745

15 December 1943

Received from Nosov, G. I., combine director, for the "Chelyabinskiye Kolkhozniki" Tank Column, R6,000 (six thousand rubles).

Original

MKM, No 245/31

Document No 34

Excellent Construction Quality

From the Official Document of the Governmental Commission

December 1943

Following the study of the project and the documents of the plant and worker commissions, with the participation of the commission chairmen and having personally reviewed all machine units of the blast furnace complex prior to and after loading and during the first days of the furnace's work, the commission notes the following:

1. The good quality of the design.
2. Excellent availability of technical documentation for the construction of the project.
3. The record short time of construction of the blast furnace.

In construction practice there has been no other case of building a blast furnace within such a short time as blast furnace No 6, with a 1,300-cubic-meter capacity.

4. All related work for the set of blast furnace No 6 was carried out in full.

5. The construction quality of the entire set of blast furnace No 6 was excellent.

6. Blast furnace No 6 of the Magnitogorsk Order of Lenin Metallurgical Combine imeni Stalin, 1,300-cubic-meter capacity, is hereby considered accepted and commissioned on 24 December 1943.

I. P. Bardin, commission chairman and deputy people's commissar for ferrous metallurgy

Commission members: P. F. Natarov, GKO [State Defense Committee] deputy member; G. I. Nosov, director of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine; V. B. Khlebnikov, chief of the Main Capital Construction Administration, NKChM [People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy]; G. F. Mikhalevich, blast furnace shop chief, Magnitogorsk Combine; A. M. Bannykh, deputy chief, machine department, Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine; M. Ye. Gurevich, chief engineer, Magnitostroy Trust.

Copy

Magnitostroy History Museum, Vol 3 of the Scientific-Auxiliary Stock No 658/6, p 145

Document No 35

On the Development of the Socialist Competition

From Order No 122 of the Director of the Magnitogorsk Order
of Lenin Metallurgical Combine

24 March 1944

With a view to the further development of the socialist competition among Komsomol-youth machine units, I hereby order:

1. Shop chiefs comrades Mikhalevich, Voronov, Dikshteyn, Garchenko, Laura and Stupar' to fill the vacancies at blast furnace No 6, Martin shops Nos 6, 13 and 16, Mill 300-3 and Martin furnace No 2 FVSL [Finishing-Rolled Steel Casting] shop with young workers, graduates of craft schools and courses for factory and plant training, as per Appendix No 1 (unpublished--the Editor).

2. To fill vacancies in Komsomol-youth machine units with graduates of craft schools and to open positions for understudies.

3. A bonus to be paid for training understudies within the stipulated time to the amount of 50 percent of the monthly wage (salary) and, for students rated "excellent" in their test, 100 percent of the monthly salary....

G. Nosov

Copy

MFGACHO, f. 99, op. 10, d. 1,136, l. 56

Document No 36

Sponsorship Assistance to the Countryside

From Order No 186 of the Director of the Magnitogorsk Industrial Technicum

July 1944

...No 7

With a view to encouraging the workers, I announce the awarding of bonuses to all students who have fulfilled and overfulfilled their weeding norms by 12 July, to be presented on 13 July:

- a. For 100 percent norm fulfillment: two general-purpose exercise books;
- b. For overfulfilling norms in excess of 100 percent: coupons for durable goods of different values (6-meter cuts of cloth, underwear, socks, stockings, kerchiefs), based on the percentage of norm overfulfillment....

Trofimov

Original

MFGACHO, f. 8, op. 1, d. 9, l. 35

Document No 37

Bonuses to Students

From Order No 3 of the Magnitogorsk Pedagogical School

9 January 1945

No 1

First "B" Grade Student L. Petrov is awarded five notebooks, two pencils and five pens for suitable preparations for the evening and proper attitude toward music education....

Document No 38

On the Work of Rationalizers and Inventors

From the Report of the Management of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine to the Party Gorkom

11 August 1945

The Great Patriotic War which the Soviet people waged against Hitlerite German ended with the full victory of the Soviet people, thanks to the unparalleled heroism of the troops at the front and the dedicated work of the working people in the rear. The enterprise's entire production life was subordinated to the task of helping the front and defeating the hated enemy.

Magnitka--the arsenal of our country--assumed a place of honor in ensuring the full victory won by our people over the fascist aggressors.... Tremendous work was done to develop and increase output, upgrade labor productivity, conserve materials and improve labor conditions in order to be able to implement the rationalization and invention suggestions submitted by the combine's workers and engineering and technical personnel. During the war the flow of rationalization suggestions increased steadily. During the 4 war years (1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944) 7,867 suggestions were received, 4,463 of which were used, with overall annual savings of 37,567,000 rubles....

Copy

PACHO, f. 234, op. 19, d. 53, l. 144

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ARTIST'S RESPONSIBLE MISSION

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85) pp 81-90

[Article by B. Ugarov, USSR Academy of Fine Arts president]

[Text] "To shape and elevate the spiritual needs of the person and actively to influence the ideological-political and moral aspect of the individual," was the way Comrade K. U. Chernenko formulated meaningfully, profoundly and principle-mindedly the main task of socialist culture, addressing the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The workers in the Soviet arts have always been and remain loyal assistants of the party in the communist upbringing of the working people. Their best works convincingly prove that our painters are training to remain on the leading edge of socialist construction and are actively contributing with their creative work to the assertion of the lofty humanistic ideals in life.

We can be legitimately proud of achievements in all types and genres of Soviet graphic arts and architecture. Works are being created in each one of our republics, which are worthy contributions to socialist artistic culture as a whole. Many of them, having earned wide popular recognition, have been rated highly by the party and the government.

Over the past 10 years alone, the Lenin Prize has been awarded for graphic art and architecture works, such as the residential Lazdinay Rayon in Vilnyus, the children's zone of the resort town in Adler, the "Monument in Honor of the Heroic Defense of Leningrad in 1941-1943 and the Defeat of the German Fascist Troops at Leningrad in 1944," the monument on "Fighters for the Revolution" in Frunze, the Olympic Sports Complex in Moscow, the Ukrainian State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 Memorial Complex in Kiev, the "To the Heroes of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" memorial complex in Novorossiysk, the cycle of paintings "Battle Years" by Ye. Ye. Moiseyenko, the paintings "Spring of 1945," "Going to War (for the Soviet System)," "Harvest Song" and "Portrait of Teodor Zal'kaln, USSR People's Painter," painted by I. A. Zarin, the cycle of landscapes by N. M. Romadin, D. A. Shmarinov's illustrations to books by A. S. Pushkin and L. N. Tolstoy, the series of V. I. Lenin paintings by V. A. Nalbandyan and "Spanish Triptych" by A. A. Myl'nikov.

The blossoming of national schools of graphic art and architecture has been accompanied by their active reciprocal enrichment and rapprochement. The method of socialist realism opens broad scope for a variety of individual styles, genres and manners in art and for the innovative search for impressive artistic models.

The present-day achievements of the painters prove that everything that is truly beautiful is based on the deep knowledge of life and the creative mastery of traditions embodied in Soviet classics and on the basis of continuity in the historical development of art.

The urgent need to strengthen the role of artistic culture in the life of society forces us to think seriously of whether or not we, the artists, are always in step with the time and whether we always worthily reflect in our works the broad activities of the people and their growing aesthetic needs. One should not fear to ask this question, for it is not asked out of weakness in the least. Constant dissatisfaction with oneself, the desire to do better today than yesterday, and the emulation of the best models help us to surmount even the most terrible enemies of art (yes, of essentially any creative undertaking)--indifference and impassiveness.

"The new party congress will come soon and we must be preparing ourselves for it as of now. To us, party members, preparations for the congress are a period of interpreting and summing up our achievements, a period of active consolidation of everything positive we have achieved," Comrade K. U. Chernenko said at the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Preparing for the congress also means drawing lessons from errors, a self-critical analysis of shortcomings and defining ways to surmount them and, above all, finding ways of resolving new major problems.

We, the painters, clearly see that along with our achievements a number of unresolved and sometimes even alarming problems remain in artistic practice and art studies.

The condition of easel types of creative works, which are the ideological and aesthetic nucleus of the entire art, is one of our vital concerns. The basic aesthetic principles are shaped, the link between content and form and between tradition and innovation is established or, in a word, the entire set of ideological-character problems of creative graphic art, are found in easel painting, sculpture and graphic design. Easel art contributes to the progress of the other graphic arts.

The successful solution of the problem of developing a topic painting of great social significance largely depends on the condition of the graphic art as a whole and its ability to answer with specific accomplishments, above all with new highly ideological and artistically outstanding works, the stipulations of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums.

A socially significant work based on realism is the dominant feature of the contemporary artistic process. Unless art can reflect the most important trends of life itself and aesthetically to master major social topics, society will justifiably consider it a pleasant entertainment at best. That is why we

cannot fail to be concerned by the fact that serious topic painting has been an infrequent guest at our exhibits in recent years.

Possibly we may not always be able properly to assess the works of our contemporaries and fellow artists and a certain historical distance may be needed for true appreciation. Experience acquired in previous centuries, however, confirms that weakened positions of paintings on specific topics lower the social role of art as a whole.

Should we rely on the fact that time will judge and put everything in its proper place? The chief judge of the scale of any creative accomplishment, in the final account, is not time but people, the people who make history every day and every hour. Hence, it is inadmissible to look at good and evil with indifference and wait for the sentence of the future. Both viewers and painters are waiting for a professional, substantiated critical assessment. It is today that the aesthetic tastes and views of society are being shaped. When the voice of the professional critic remains silent or is quiet, when triteness raises its head, when excitement develops around false idols, the talented masters are pushed aside.

Externally effective phenomena which, however, have more subtext than text and more double meaning than meaning, begin to capture the attention of the public, frequently not without success.

Occasionally, seeking an answer to problems of interest and wishing to satisfy his aesthetic needs, the viewer prefers to turn to the masters of the past rather than the contemporary artist. In turn, the artists are not always able to properly appreciate the view of the general viewer, preferring to listen to the specialists. Obviously, a number of reasons exist for this situation.

It seems to me that one of them is lack of adequate information on the specific spiritual demands of the audience and about the audience at large.

Today the "painter-viewer" system operates essentially on the level of specific acts, such as encounters, competitions, etc. However, this is obviously insufficient. It is here that we find the vulnerable spot of our entire work: a certain attitude of neutrality toward public opinion and toward assessing those who, in the final account, are creating the works. Let us be honest: even the decisions of juries are largely shaped by the painters themselves. As a result, the rule of the opinion of the working people merely ratifies the existing deployment of forces.

This does not mean in the least that the view of the customer is always correct. However, it is necessary to be aware of and listen to it.

Our exhibition activities must be perfected as well. The large number of exhibits and the haste with which they are organized waste the valuable creative forces of the artists. Obviously, we must profoundly review plans for exhibits and take into consideration the time and funds needed for intensified efforts on major works.

Superficial exhibition activities and quantitative indicators could hardly act as basic criteria in assessing the works of one painter or another. Whereas a talented work becomes a national treasure, an untalented and weak work is an affliction of culture, which corrupts the minds of creators and audiences. The abundance of works lacking highly artistic and educational meanings worsens culture and deprives it of its party principle-mindedness.

Today, as during the first five-year plans, when V. I. Mukhina and I. D. Shadr created their sculptures, A. N. Samokhvalov, A. A. Deyneki and B. V. Yoganson painted their canvases, and during the war years, when I. M. Toidze, and Kukryniksy were fighting with their posters and S. V. Gerasimov, A. A. Plastov and M. S. Sar'yan painted their pictures, any type of art and any genre could and should carry a social charge and find their place in social life.

The question of party principle-mindedness and creative exigency in organizing exhibits, including those of young painters, must be raised most urgently. Participation in a serious exhibit is a great honor which should be earned by creating ideologically accurate works distinguished by their profound content and expressive realistic form.

Ideological blunders in education turn out, in the final account, to be quite costly. It is a puzzlement sometimes, in this connection, why our exhibits include items which are the result of a snobbish and arrogant alienation from real life and from the "efforts and days" of our people, which are not warmed by a feeling of love for the subject. Unfortunately, we also come across the openly nihilistic attitude displayed by individual painters toward the traditions of Soviet art. This cannot be tolerated. Furthermore, we should not forget that it is easiest of all to create unprincipled and indifferent art concealed behind the screen of fighting "pomposity." The so-called photographic vision, which became somewhat popular in youth art by the turn of the 1980s, does not help but rather hinders the beginning masters to acquire a sharp perception of their surroundings and the human world. To humanize a material environment is quite different from equating man with an object. The photographic, "photorealistic" approach, even if applied to the complex topical phenomena of our time, is frequently merely a method for speculating on topical subjects and proof that the author is unable plastically to master the material of life and to rise to the level of true artistic summation or, in a word, to recreate in art a fact of reality.

On some occasions, even in setting up exhibits abroad representing Soviet art and, consequently, our country, we do not display the necessary principle-mindedness: along with works worth of exhibiting we also send some which are definitely aimed at pleasing the host country's tastes. Why and for whose sake is such flirtatiousness necessary?

Art is a positive weapon in the ideological struggle waged in the world arena and unjustified compromises in the area of artistic policy can only weaken it. Contemporary artistic practices in the land of the soviets are so rich and varied that there is no need to prove their innovative nature with the help of unprincipled references to the weak shoots cultivated by imitators of various fashionable "isms" who stand on the side of the high road of Soviet culture. Examples of truly new graphic descriptions of our time and ourselves and

plastic, topic, composition and other ideological-artistic revelations should be sought and found not along the sides but in the creative accomplishments of leading masters of the present, such as T. N. Yablonskaya, A. A. Myl'nikov, G. M. Korzhev, Ye. Ye. Moiseyenko, M. A. Savitskiy, V. I. Ivanov, A. P. S. P. Tkachev, M. K. Anikushin, L. Ye. Kerbel', V. Ye. Tsigal', E. D. Amashukeli, I. N. Klychev, D. S. Bisti, T. T. Salakhov, I. A. Zarin', E. S. Kochergin, G. S. Khandzhyan and many other innovative painters.

Viewers, including foreign viewers, should see in our exhibits true people's art, in the entire wealth of its variety and genres, and become familiar with works which reflect the vital concerns and profound expectations of the people and embody the noble humanistic ideals and aspirations of our society, thus making their contribution to the struggle for the minds and hearts of the people, the more so since we have acquired extremely rich experience in organizing and having significant art exhibits.

Suffice it to recall the anniversary exhibit "225 Years of USSR Academy of Fine Arts," which turned into a most important event in the country's social and cultural life and which convincingly proved the unity of ideological and creative views held by the different generations of masters in our multinational art and the fruitful power of the method of socialist realism. That exhibit embodied in Soviet art in its highest accomplishments.

We must take into consideration the experience of the academic exhibit in our further work, particularly as we bear in mind that most important all-union exhibits are planned for the immediate future: for the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the 27th CPSU Congress and the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

An exhibit is an essential form of participation of masters of culture in social life. However, we can and must broaden the realm of influence of graphic arts by going beyond the walls of exhibition halls and applying art directly in life.

With the establishment of the Department of Architecture and Monumental Art, the USSR Academy of Fine Arts began to deal practically with problems of the aesthetic improvement of the appearance of our cities and villages and the synthesizing of architecture with the plastic arts in urban construction. Throughout its entire history it had been training architects, which it also considered artists and masters of the graphic art. The problem of combining architecture with the monumental types of art were very familiar and close to the academy.

We admire the works of medieval architects and the architectural ensembles of the Renaissance and the classical age. Essentially, anything which has been preserved from that time is to us of artistic and museum value. It is equally necessary for our descendants to value our legacy to them. The aggressive development of the socialist society and the growth of the well-being of the people have reached such a level today that we can already allow ourselves to live not only comfortably but beautifully. Naturally, I am not referring to petit bourgeois "beauty" but to true beauty in the loftiest meaning of the term. Our towns and villages, plants and sovkhoses, clothing and objects of

daily use, i.e., the entire object-space environment in which the Soviet person lives, works and relaxes must be beautiful.

The party ascribes exceptional importance to the shaping of a living environment which would be entirely consistent with the level of ideological-political and socioeconomic development reached by our society.

Soviet painters and architects have done a great deal in this respect in recent decades. Expressive architectural-artistic ensembles of memorial complexes have been created in Volgograd, Novorossiysk, Khatyn, Leningrad and Salaspils, and been awarded Lenin and state prizes. Outstanding public buildings have been erected, aptly combining architecture with monumental art, such as the memorial complex to Lenin in Ulyanovsk, the branches of the V. I. Lenin Central Museum in Tashkent and Kiev, the Olympic projects in Moscow and the theaters in Tula, Orel and elsewhere.

Good examples of artistically rich layouts may be found in the residential districts of Vilnius, Tashkent, Navoi, Togliatti, rural settlements and individual industrial installations. Extensive scientific-creative and organizational work to resolve the problem of combining graphic arts with architecture is being done by the USSR Ministry of Culture, USSR Academy of Fine Arts, USSR Union of Painters, USSR Union of Architects and USSR State Civil Construction Administration.

However, a number of unresolved problems and unused possibilities remain.

Architecture, painting, sculpture, decorative art and design must not only provide the best possible living conditions for the people but also resolve important ideological problems, the most important of which is the ideological-moral enhancement of the person. It is precisely the painter and the architect who, in each specific case, must jointly realize the purpose, and assume responsibility to society, for a given architectural work involving mosaics, murals or stained glass. For the synthesis of arts is not self-seeking but the artistic representation of our time and a powerful means of educating and raising the people.

Naturally, it would be difficult in a short article to even name the theoretical and practical aspects of the problem of synthesis. Let us merely point out that architecture--the "mother of all arts"--is occasionally excluded from the plastic arts and viewed as though its participation in such a synthesis is reduced essentially to providing materially organized space for monumental paintings, sculptures, works of a decorative-applied nature, etc. Such a viewpoint, which denies architecture the right to be an independent synthetic art, essentially equates it with construction and reduces all problems related to it to aspects of industrial-technical nature, such as industrial methods, standardization of materials, etc.

It is no accident that the architect has still not assumed a suitable place in construction as the responsible author of works and that architectural studios are sometimes turned into ordinary design offices in which no conditions for joint work with sculptors and painters are provided.

I do not wish to claim that the solution of a tremendous problem such as the comprehensive establishment of a comfortable and beautiful environment worthy of the Soviet person could be resolved solely by artists or architects, for instance, without the help of industrial construction or the participation of leading construction organizations and establishments. I am merely raising yet once again the old and sensitive question of the need for an unbreakable alliance between art and technology and of the close and permanent cooperation between construction workers, on the one hand, and architects, painters and masters of the decorative applied art and design, on the other.

To the best of my knowledge, the participation of architects in guiding the activities of construction organizations is virtually none. Such a strange situation, speaking frankly, inevitably affects the aesthetic appearance of our towns and villages. We rarely see architecturally designed systems, i.e., systems which clearly bear the imprint of the creative individuality and unique personality of a creative worker or collective, and which is the invariable characteristic of any truly artistic work. It has become the custom to criticize the construction of new urban and rural areas for their depressing monotony and, consequently, their anonymous authors, as well as customers, who, with rare exceptions, ignore the climatic conditions of a given area or the durable traditions of the national culture and way of life of one republic or another.

Such standardization extends not only to mass residential construction but to public buildings as well, which should by no means symbolize the triumph of utilitarian-rational standards to the detriment of humanistic spiritual values. Furthermore, even when working on one-of-a-kind artistic ensembles, the purpose of which is to perpetuate our time, some authors prefer the use of character stereotypes and time-tested solutions, refusing themselves the right to creative daring and the high dream of creating a monument to the epic, exceptional in terms of ideological-artistic perfection, a dream which would inspire the best works of today's Soviet architects.

Naturally, the solution of this problem does not lie in the use of expensive and precious materials or a return to gigantomania, for true beauty and aesthetic perfection are equally alien to a spiritless standardization as well as commercialized luxury or senseless waste of materials.

The implementation of tasks related to shaping the environment through the means and varieties of creative activities greatly depends on the successful solution of the topical problem of fruitfully and inseparably linking architecture with construction. The training of new artistic cadres, not only architects and monument makers, but painters, sculptors and masters of decorative applied art and design, must be perfected as well.

Our art VUZs must train not narrow professionals, whose creative range is restricted to the specifics of their chosen type of art, but masters capable of carrying out the new broad and difficult assignments set by the party and the people.

The USSR Academy of Fine Arts must not only sum up the creative practice of urban construction but also to work on the problems of the ideological-creative trends in the development of architecture and monumental and decorative-applied art. The world outlook of the Soviet people is the most important initial criterion in defining the ways to perfect our multinational architecture as well as, naturally, all other types of creative activities. World outlook and artistic practice are inseparable within the creative process. The party makes it incumbent upon us to consider problems of art not as isolated but as organically interrelated with ideological problems. Soviet art studies and criticism are not exclusively involved in specifically scientific problems; they are also regulators of the development of the arts, thus influencing the spiritual life of the entire society and the molding of its moral and aesthetic ideals and true human needs.

The party's Central Committee has passed essentially important decrees in recent years: "On Literary-Artistic Criticism," "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Education Work," "On Work With Creative Youth," and "On Creative Ties Between Literary and Artistic Journals and the Practice of Communist Construction." The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum on ideological problems was of great importance.

The USSR Academy of Fine Arts has a decisive responsibility for the development of the science of the arts and artistic criticism.

A considerable number of scientific works on the various arts, discussing specific problems of socialist realism at the present stage, came out after the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Literary-Artistic Criticism." Conferences were held in which, along with Soviet scientists, their colleagues from the fraternal countries participated. Special books and pamphlets were written on some general problems of the laws governing the development of literature and art of socialist realism. In a word, intensive collective theoretical work is under way and major conclusions are being drawn.

At the same time, there is urgent need to sum up the artistic phenomena of our time with their entire problem-topic and stylistic variety. A number of works provide an erroneous or theoretically confused interpretation of the problems of socialist realism. Yes, contemporary art is amazingly varied. However, the concept of "realism" should not be diluted endlessly, emasculating its ideological content. Now, when our art is in the front line of the extremely aggravated ideological struggle, more than ever before perhaps we need a clear definition of the "banks" and the mainstream of realistic art.

Last year we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the opening of the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, at which the major concepts of the method of socialist realism were formulated.

This method became the ideological-creative platform which rallied the multinational family of masters of Soviet art, and the foundation for the formulation of a system for artistic education.

The idea of the social and spiritual emancipation of man, the shaping of a communist world outlook and active efforts to reorganize the world on a truly humanistic basis determine the trend of socialist realism. Our creative method is a means of study and artistic-imagistic reflection of reality in its development.

Today as well, in the age of mature socialism, this method, which was established on the basis of the Leninist principles of party- and national-mindedness and was inspired by the enthusiasm of the Great October Revolution, the first five-year plans and the heroic exploits of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War, is a powerful ideological-creative weapon which enables the contemporary masters to create talented works which illuminate the past and the present of our people, raise important social problems which excite the people, and helps them to resolve the problems of building socialism.

That is why we must decisively oppose any attempt at using the concept of realism as a kind of unrestricted universal packaging of a variety of goods of doubtful artistic quality.

We hold as infinitely precious the truly revolutionary and innovative traditions of Soviet art, which developed and strengthened in the sharp struggle against the ideological enemy, and which we must creatively enrich under developed socialist conditions and carefully pass on to new generations of artists.

That is why, whenever we discuss the fundamental principles of our artistic policy, we must clearly realize its main objective: the enrichment and perfection of such principles or else the existence of one more attempt to replace them with some kind of home-grown theory which sometimes may be ideologically alien to us.

Artistic criticism is frequently short not only of a philosophical depth in its analysis of artistic phenomena and individual works but also of political sharpness and correlation with vital processes, and of a social position in its evaluations.

Our Marxist-Leninist critics must not merely accurately evaluate one work or another. We expect more of artistic criticism. The ability to find the true social meaning of problems discussed in the works, to support their authors whenever they formulate them accurately, and substantively to argue with them when they are mistaken was the way Comrade K. U. Chernenko defined the task of criticism in his speech at the anniversary plenum of the board of the USSR Union of Writers, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers.

Understandably, the new social processes also define the content of our art at the present stage as well as its development and the perfection of its creative method. The purpose of art studies is to study such processes in close unity with the other social sciences, identifying and supporting everything that is progressive and truly communist and exposing harmful trends which damage the common cause. The work of the curious research scientist and

militant artistic critic is that of ideological fighters, propagandists, and educators of the people, marching together, hand in hand. Making the propaganda of graphic art not only systematic but purposeful, including all past and present accomplishments of our art, is one of the vital tasks in the study and criticism of the arts. This would make our present tasks clearer as well.

In order to wage the struggle against bourgeois ideology, in the realm of the arts in particular, with all available weapons and proper arguments, we need profound knowledge, most extensive erudition and refined artistic taste as well as the ability to combine extensive knowledge of previous stages in the development of culture with the total range of phenomena in contemporary world artistic practices. It is only by using the most significant artistic material and turning to the masterpieces of culture, which blend together a profound content and perfect plastic form, that we can prove the inviolability of the principles of realism and their decisive and leading significance in the overall progress of world art. It is only by possessing accurate and firm criteria in assessing artistic phenomena that an inflexible and purposeful struggle can be waged against all forms of modernism, false doctrines and aesthetic forgeries.

Another problem of exceptional importance affects literally everyone, every family: the reform of general education and vocational schools. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum decree on the basic trends of the reform, adopted after nationwide discussions, emphasizes that the school must raise, train and educate the young generations, taking maximally into consideration the social conditions in which they will live and work. Henceforth, the direct involvement of young people in socially useful and productive labor will be an organic component of the training and education process. School students will become active citizens of the country today, in the course of their studies, rather than after their graduation. This changes the mentality of the growing generation, developing within it love for labor and understanding of its significance, and contributes to the firmer assertion of a communist world outlook.

A number of essential stipulations in the decree are most directly related to the process of educating the creative youth, from the primary to the highest levels. The young will continue the work started by the great Russian and Soviet artists, justifiably considered by us the conscience of their time and spokesmen for the expectations of the people.

The artist has a great responsibility to this society which has created all the necessary conditions for his training and professional growth. Equally great is the responsibility of the schools which train the young people, tomorrow's masters of the arts. It seems to me that, while paying great attention to problems of professional skill (although this is not simply important but necessary), we occasionally forget that the main aspect which must be developed in the young artist is that of the builder of a communist society.

In this connection, I would particularly like to single out that part of Comrade K. U. Chernenko's speech at the anniversary plenum of the board of the

USSR Writers' Union in which he voiced the conviction that "today as much attention should be paid to the ideological-moral development of the growing generations and to promoting the culture of feelings as to teaching the foundations of science."

Educational work must proceed above all from the development of precisely the moral qualities, the qualities which distinguish the Soviet person, for the ability to draw does not make an artist. In the final account, nor does a diploma grant this high title or even the right to create.

The spiritual world of the artist has always been the organizing principle of anything truly new in art. One must love life, nature, man, and the homeland. One must love them passionately and with all of one's being wish to express this love through art. It is only with such a desire that a new artistic form may appear; it is only thus that one could acquire a creative personality. In my view, we must approach the task of molding the personality of the young on the basis of the same criteria and principles on which the senior generation was raised during the first five-year plans and the harsh period of the Great Patriotic War. Today as well, under the conditions of peace, it is important for the young master to develop within himself a clear civic stance and the professional ability to see and plastically to recreate the inexhaustible range of new topics, subjects and characters offered to us by our socialist reality and the grand accomplishments of the Soviet people and the communist construction projects of unparalleled scope.

Every institute graduate must be ready for selfless dedication, for creativity is nothing other than a daily labor exploit for the sake of multiplying the spiritual wealth of the homeland. The young artist must be treated to as an equal.

I believe that tutorship in creative work does not mean for some to teach and others to learn, but for the masters of the senior and junior generations to work and learn from life together, side by side, in the course of which the young gain experience while the experienced become charged with youthful energy. An art school must never isolated from reality around it with a stone wall. Contacts between life and school have always been reciprocal: the school influenced life but life, in turn, influenced the school most strongly. That is why educational work must be conducted not only in an art school or institute but outside as well, as an integral and systematically developing process of training the new cadres of masters of the arts in all union republics. It seems to me that in our creative associations young people are still kept somewhat separately and that we frequently contribute to this fact. The extensive and comprehensive program of the USSR Union of Painters and Academy of Fine Arts is aimed at creating favorable creative and material conditions for the young painters. Their main purpose has been and remains the more active involvement of the large contingent of talented young people in resolving the vital problems of contemporary artistic life and the spiritual construction of our society, and not at all the greenhouse nurturing of some kind of new elite distant from the concerns and excitements of the world around it.

Let me point out that some artists over 35 years of age continue to be oriented toward the "youth art" phenomenon, preferring the role of the eternally young hero to the responsible title of artist with a deserved social recognition, light-heartedly performing in experimental plays on the small youthful "stage" of great art. Yes, experiment and creative search are both needed and beneficial. However, where could an arbitrary attitude toward nature, a deformation, a coarsening and imitation of primitivism, "photorealism," various types of stylizing and, which is particularly sad, the emasculation of truthful vitality and the life-bringing principles, the deadening and schematization of images lead to? I repeat: experimentation is possible and necessary, but why offer to the broad judgment of the public one's doubts and irresponsible subjective creations?

What we must show to the people is the result of thoughtful and socially significant searches; other forms of discussion exist for all kinds of experimental "tries," within the creative union, in the workshop, etc.

Doubts regarding the human sincerity and professional substantiveness of the authors of such experiments are triggered not only by their characteristic wish to play at "avant-gardism" and "innovativeness" and, allegedly, contribute something new to art. What is alarming in the work of some rapidly changing legislators of youth fashion is the rejection of the ethical principle as the humanistic value base of any creative process and the loss of concept of the high social mission of art.

The outstanding achievements of Russian and Soviet multinational art provide us with priceless examples of truly dedicated service to society and greatest love for the people and firm belief in their strength and beautiful future. Mastering this arsenal and teaching the beginning artists to make creative use of the traditions of the great past and proving through personal example that art does not tolerate an indifferent attitude to life is our direct task.

Art has always been, is and will remain an effective weapon wielded by the communist party and the people in the ideological, moral and aesthetic upbringing of the people. The Soviet artists firmly stand on the positions of socialist realism. It is precisely this which triggers the hatred of our ideological foes, who are inventing all kinds of big and small theories aimed at leading art away from the noble path of serving humanistic ideals.

We must counter the lack of spirituality and pragmatism of Western art by developing in our young people an organic rejection of pseudo-innovativeness in creative work and by molding the artist-citizen. Our work with the creative youth must combine a careful attitude toward individualism with an uncompromising exigency toward essential ideological and aesthetic problems.

Today Vladimir Il'ich's statement in talking with K. Zetkin is sharp and relevant more than ever: "Any artist, anyone who considers himself as such, has the right to create freely, according to his ideal, and totally independently. Understandably, however, we are communists. We cannot stand by indifferently and allow chaos to develop as it wishes. We must guide this process entirely systematically and shape its results."

We, painters, architects and art experts, bear full civic and creative responsibility for the successful development of Soviet graphic art and all of its national schools and for the further advancement of the aesthetic appearance of Soviet towns and villages, for essential scientific studies in the field of the history and theory of past and contemporary art and for the militancy of artistic criticism and the scope and efficiency of the propaganda of spiritual values, educating a worthy creative replacement and expanding and intensifying cultural relations with the fraternal socialist countries and the progressive foreign artistic organizations and men of culture.

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REVOLUTIONARY CHORD OF THE EPOCH

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[Article by Mikis Theodorakis]

[Text] It is difficult to discuss music and it is most difficult of all to do so when one is a composer. Not even the most outstanding and inspired inscriptions can impart what we are trying to express through sounds. No words can trigger in the human soul those fine nuances of feelings and emotions which listening to music can originate.

Nevertheless, a great deal of sometimes fierce arguments break out on the subject of music. They are about what music means to us and the role it plays in our life.

To me the key question in arguments on modern music is its target. For the type of audience that a composer acquires, and the type of listeners he wants to hear his works are a reflection of his creative credo, social position, vision of the world around him and the way he would like to see it. An art open to the thoughts and expectations of millions of people, who share the same joys and sorrows is an art which is alive, developing and growing. An art which loses its ties with the world and man, which no longer shares his sorrows, which is locked within itself, deadens and degenerates.

We live in a tempestuous epoch, rich in events. We see the confrontation between the two worlds: the world of progress and fruitful construction, which is firmly marching in the present and creating the future, and the world of reaction, which is confused in the present and clings to the past. Reflections and echoes of this tremendous confrontation may be seen and heard even by those in our country who are indifferent to politics.

Nor could they be ignored or not heard by the men of arts, whatever their country, whatever their artistic credo may be or whatever political sympathies they may profess, for it is only reactionaries or extremely naive people who can believe that art stands either aside from or above history. No, art can live only alongside the people, for which reason it plays a leading role in the struggle for their hearts and minds.

This clash between the old and the new is developing today in the capitalist countries with unparalleled gravity and is clearly manifested in the realm of culture. The level of organization and consciousness of the masses, who are trying to express and defend their views on the most important problems of our time, is growing. A great deal of talent is created in the thick of popular life, who are trying to express through words, sounds, colors and motion the lofty ideals of beauty, goodness and justice. However, on our society the cultural activity of the masses clashes against major obstacles.

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin wrote that "each national culture has, although undeveloped, the elements of democratic and socialist culture.... However, each nation also has a bourgeois culture...consisting not only of 'elements' but of a dominant culture" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, pp 120-121). In pursuing its antipeople's cultural policy, the exploiting class throws on the historical balance the age-old experience of power, immeasurable wealth, created with the sweat and blood of millions of working people, and the achievements of scientific and technical progress, which it is using ever more extensively and refinedly to pacify and stultify the masses.

It is also relying on lowering the cultural standard of the masses. Let us remember that in the United States, the most powerful capitalist country, 23 million adult men and women can neither read nor write! A degradation of aesthetic and artistic values is taking place, accompanied by the blossoming of the so-called "kitsch" and tasteless forgeries fabricated by "mass culture." Those who respect the high spiritual values of human civilization, several millenia old, are cast aside of the social and cultural life. Efforts are being made to erect a wall of "pure art" between people and art, emasculated by avant-garde efforts and form "renovations."

History confirms that when the bourgeoisie ends its role in the historical arena and capitalist society enters the period of crisis, its art as well begins to experience a crisis. Let us look specifically at music. The 19th century became the time of blossoming of symphonic music which, as a whole, expressed the artistic world understanding of the period which followed the French bourgeois revolution. Haydn and Mozart, the Vienna classics, followed by Beethoven, assigned to symphonic music a truly exceptional significance among the other genres. Let us recall how Beethoven, initially a supporter of the classical school, took a sharp turn in his Third ("Eroica") Symphony and opened the way to romantic art. We see here a legitimate creative impulse which appeared in a number of men of the arts of that time: the glorification of the restless spirit and the constructive energy of the free man.

Nineteenth-century symphonic art was nurtured by the achievements of the national European schools; there was a reciprocal influence among cultures and a renovation of traditions. This fruitful and progressive movement was continued in the 20th century by Debussy, Stravinsky, Shostakovich, Bartok, Prokofiev and other great composers. Inspired, on the one hand, by national artistic traditions and, on the other, the ideas of the revolutionary transformation of the world, they made their contribution by providing new major works in the symphonic period of development of European music.

However, from the onset of the 20th century, one could see signs of the profound crisis which slowly spread over Western traditional music, above all its most monumental genre which expressed an overall perception of the world--the symphony. Composers--many of whom were truly talented--began to accept the idea that music should not be identified with the creation of a completed, an integral work. Theories which denied that music was the result of creative inspiration became fashionable.

One of the best-noted refuters of classical traditions, the Austrian Arnold Schoenberg, introduced the so-called dodecaphony, which can briefly be described as a 12-tone "series" of 12 nonrecurrent sounds. The principle of precise means and a formalistic system entered the field of music.

Schoenberg's followers paid great attention to the study of the works of the outstanding polyphonics of the past, Bach in particular. However, this could be hardly considered a sign of continuity, for the technique of the counterpoint, like any other, was to back no more than an artistic instrument, whereas to the "dodecaphonists" it became a self-seeking aim.

Dodecaphony, which enriched musical culture with a number of discoveries in form, also expressed the increasing tendency of Western art to become locked within itself. Form began to exist for the sake of form and a permanent "form revolution" broke out in music. I would rather describe it as a counterrevolutionary form. However, even Schoenberg can be accepted today as an extreme conservative against the background of aleatoric, sonoristic, pointillistic, stochastic, collage, electronic, computerized and concrete music, which followed dodecaphony, along with other fashionable avant-garde schools which are trying to achieve a new quality in art only by rejecting historically developed rules and standards.

All such "musics" are the embodiment of the theory of "independent art," which is alienated from objective reality and opposes it, considering itself something truer than life itself. The avant-garde composer enters his petty, narrow world of individual musical characters, abandoning the traditions of popular art, the life of his society and the difficulties and expectations of the people.

I think that it would be entirely erroneous to consider the growing gap between "serious" music and the audience only a manifestation of spontaneous crisis processes. This is a mark of degeneracy, which pursues Western culture and which has a real social underlining.

The great social ideas expressed through the means of art greatly increase their revolutionary power. The bourgeoisie was able to see this through its own historical experience. That is why, while encouraging and fostering the creators of "pure art," who are alienated from life, and all sorts of "revolutionary forms," the ruling class is not only trying to turn art into the consolation and entertainment of a few elect. It is also isolating the true talents from the people and the ideas which inspire to revolutionary struggle.

The oligarchy proclaims that the people must realize that high art is not for them, for they are low, undeveloped and will remain such forever. This precisely is the justification of the exploitation of man by man and the condemnation of the democratic struggle waged by the masses in a class society. For what right, it is said, do workers and, in general, working people, have to demand access to power, when their cultural standards are low and their spiritual demands are coarse and primitive?!

Elitist art is a kind of "gilded cage," created by the bourgeoisie for the gifted creative intelligentsia. Within it one can do anything one pleases, with all possible "clashes," "revolutions" and "daring experiments," which will be cheered by the bourgeois public. There "freedom of creativity" is absolute. But woe to those who would try to come out of this petty world in the search for true values! For those who create a work of music entirely depend on the means which will be used to take it to the listeners. Orchestra and vocal collectives, concert halls, studios, sound recording facilities and the radio, television and advertising are the most powerful levers with which to influence the composer by those who "commission music" in bourgeois society. And if you consider yourself a "free creator," you can follow only one of two possible paths: either assimilation and subordination to the dominant taste and standard or isolation and obscurity and creative and human loneliness.

Since most ancient times art has been and remains a most profound human need. The people are attracted to songs, dances and depictions of beauty. The bourgeoisie tries to fill the spiritual vacuum which has formed in our society with a flood of "mass culture," thus erecting yet another barrier separating true culture from the masses.

What "mass culture" does essentially is not educate the people but stupefy them through entertainment. Not spiritual searching but consumption. This disorients the people, simplifies their spiritual demands and debases cultural values. This is both a cultural surrogate and a tool for spiritual suppression, as well as a method for shaping a thoughtless, primitive and, consequently, obedient crowd.

As a musician, I actually pay particular attention to rock as a variety of "mass culture." I follow with interest its development, the more so since the authors of rock music include many talented people. However, despite their occasional creative findings, I consider rock essentially as "leg music," distinguished by a simplistic musical content and intensified emotional pitch.

The rock motifs, which appeared as an expression of a spontaneous protest on the part of the young generation against the bourgeois way of life, quite soon became themselves a commercial object and, therefore, an indivisible structural component of this way of life. The neutralizing of the rebels in music require no particular efforts, for essentially no substantial differences exist between the standards of "mass culture" and the "rockers" rejection of roots, thoughts and intelligence, in favor of spontaneous ecstasy and subconscious impulses.

Today rock music is being actively used to propagandize the ideas of the ruling class, as a kind of "ideological platform for the youth."

However arguable the progressive merits of rock music may be, what is unquestionable is that in the way in which it is blossoming in Western countries, in Greece in particular, it instills in the minds of the audiences an entirely definite--a precisely bourgeois--way of life. Present here are the cult of "idols," indifference to social problems, individualism and spiritual alienation. The false meaning of "absolute freedom," unaccountability to anyone and independence of social relations and obligations are developed in the adolescents.

"In the final account, music is escape from reality. It separates itself from everything else. Our music acts like a drug. Both go hand in hand," I was told by a noted American rock guitarists in his time. Social injustice and the antihumane nature of capitalist relations, based on profit and violence, lead the people toward escaping from the harsh realities of life and into a spiritual world, which is also the escape of the real drug addicts. Escape from reality easily turns into mystical Zen Buddhism, Christianity or other currents.

Rock music is addressed to the person who has lost faith and is indifferent. "Applaud or meditate!" It is thus with the support of the huge machinery of mass information media, publishing houses, sound recording companies, television and radio companies and the motion picture industry that the feelings of dissatisfaction and social protest of youth in bourgeois society are dampened or channeled into a "safe" bed.

With increasing frequency those who are concerned with the growing influence of rock music are expressing their fear of the growing "Americanization" of our culture. Such views are not manifestations of national exclusivity or the desire to block foreign cultural influences. The "Americanization" of culture, which is opposed by the progressive circles of Greece and other Western countries today, has nothing in common with the universally significant accomplishments which have been the contribution of the American people to world art. Those who worthily continued and developed world musical tradition, along with the great Europeans, include New World composers such as Bernstein, Gershwin, Ives, Copland and many known and unknown authors of American folk songs and motifs. Here we are speaking of something else.

"Americanization" means substituting commercial for musical values. It blossoms wherever spiritual consumption replaces spiritual searching. We are dealing with a music market rather than a world of music. We have a stupefied consumer rather than an involved listener. Such is the threat which "Americanization" presents to all of us and that is what the progressive men of culture in the West oppose.

Our objective is to awaken the people from the philistine petit bourgeois slumber to which the bourgeoisie and bourgeois art try to lead them with the help of their special "soporifics for the soul!"

The workers in the art have a true and tested road they can follow in this struggle. It is the road to the people's consciousness, which contains the life-bringing sources of democracy, truth and purity. It is the road to the foundations of the people's culture and national self-awareness. The universal inner law of any art, music in particular, is to be with the people and for the people.

As we know, folk songs are the root of the musical culture of humankind. They cross all stages in the development of music, and are reflected in its superior symphonic form. Folk motifs may be traced in Bach, Beethoven, Verdi, Stravinskiy, Tchaikovskiy and other outstanding past and present composers.

The need to turn to the roots, to the spiritual experience of past generations in order better to interpret our present, defines the position which folk music holds in contemporary culture. The variety of our world and the headlong changes which are taking place in it motivate humankind to seek guidelines in the spiritual experience of the peoples, which took ages to develop. Our forefathers passed on to us their concepts of good and evil, truth and falsehood and beauty and ugliness in the form of songs, dances, legends, myths and applied art. When for any given reason art becomes separated from such roots, it dries out. It becomes lifeless and sterile. Such art becomes the easy prey to bourgeois pseudoculture, as was the case with rock music.

In my homeland, Greece, turning to folk traditions becomes particularly important also because by virtue of specific historical conditions progressive ideas and feelings in our country have been expressed usually not through science or philosophical-literary works, as was the case, for example, with France during the Renaissance or in Germany in the 18th-19th centuries, but through poetry, folk music and songs. This feature has been preserved in Greek culture to this day.

In Greece popular cultural traditions, with their wealth of genres and forms, may be traced to profound antiquity. Modern Greek dances, songs, artistic crafts, popular architecture and language benefitted from the legacy of what we describe today as Hellenic-Byzantine culture. That was a sea which left us its salt. Ancient culture is part of the past but was not lost. It did not disappear. It was not forgotten.

The elements of ancient culture, which the people preserved carefully, helped them in their struggle against foreign military power and imposed cultural models, and enabled them to defend the ideals of independence and free development. They have been preserved in folk music as well. This motivates the truly searching professional musicians of today to study the expressive means of folk singers and composers, their melodies, their techniques and their vision of the world, which took centuries to develop and have been transmitted from one generation to another. Byzantine and Greek folk melodies, reworked to suit contemporary rhythms, have largely influenced my works as well.

I consider exceptionally significant the fact that the special interest which the Greek public showed in folk musical traditions was manifested in the 1940s

and 1950s, following the period of the struggle waged by the Greek patriots against the Hitlerite occupation forces. Many talented composers stood out by turning to the musical legacy of Greece in the pre-Ottoman period. Orchestras which included folk instruments and choirs with which composers worked directly became widely popular.

This firm time continuity serves the renovation and development of art. Until recently, Greece had no tradition in creating symphonic works. The composers of my generation, followed by younger ones, as well as the audience, came to the symphony through songs, oratoria and the traditions of Greek tragedy, one of whose main dramatis personae were the people. Today there is a Greek symphony, among the other national symphony schools, with its own features, addressing itself to a strict audience.

I am confident that is precisely thanks to the profound expression of national originality and deep roots sunk in folk creativity that Greek music became quite popular in various parts of the world. I am happy that my own music went beyond Greece and touched the hearts of simple people, regardless of age, language, nationality or race. It is a music which serves the Greek people and, outside Greece, the common struggle waged by all honest people against tyranny, violence and exploitation and for freedom, democracy and social progress.

However, as I speak of all this, I also always think of the fact that love for the people, their culture and folklore should not convert into touching admiration deprived of a general historical perspective. To us, communists, this perspective involves the revolutionary reorganization of bourgeois society.

We know that not only the truly national and democratic art addresses itself to the broad masses. All sorts of entertainment genres claim to be accessible, democratic and international. This circumstance is used in an effort to rehabilitate "mass culture," by pitting it against folk art, which is proclaimed obsolete and inconsistent with the way of life of contemporary mankind.

In the course of debates on popularity and nationality, it is important to realize the essential distinction between entertainment music in the context of bourgeois culture and truly national melodies and motifs. I would describe this distinction as follows: in its petty commercial models, entertainment music forces us to forget. It pacifies and lulls our minds. Folk songs make us remember. They are a compass which shows us the direction followed by our predecessors, our roots and our future.

Folk songs have a much higher purpose than simply satisfying the need for emotional pleasure. They are aimed above all at the people who have developed their personality. This constitutes their profound connection with "serious" instrumental and vocal music.

We must also bear in mind that thoughtless and light-handed attitudes toward so-called "nonserious" genres is fraught with dangerous ideological errors. The element of "mass" music "output," which dominates the West, could capture

a bridgehead in the struggle for the minds of the people. The task of the communists and the democratic intelligentsia in the arts is always to keep in sight that the aesthetic and purely political aspects of the contemporary class struggle are closely intertwined.

Actually, I have never distinguished between "serious" and "light" music whenever they meet high aesthetic and moral criteria. To me any music is serious. Whatever the genre, I try to interpret the true thoughts and expectations of the people and, by this token, to be understood by the broad masses. To be understood and accepted by the broadest possible audience has always been most important to me, whether I wrote music for a ballet, an oratorio, a cycle of songs, music for a motion picture or a symphony. As in any type of art, the only criterion of success in music is the love and recognition of exacting and progressive listeners.

Let me also particularly emphasize the importance of the musical education of the masses and their steady spiritual development and training for understanding the most complex types of art, music in particular, where images which depict the world reach their highest level of abstraction. For art serves the people, and the higher the cultural standard of the working people becomes the more strongly they will gravitate toward music and culture as a whole, which belong to them alone.

In this case the Greek oligarchy, which is trying to monopolize high art and keep the masses on the lean ration of "mass culture," was and remains the main obstacle. It is thus that the struggle waged by the creative intelligentsia for true art blends with the political struggle waged by the people's masses for social justice and progress. Therefore, the artists must be together with the people not only through their works but their lives as well, always remaining on their side, in happiness and sadness, when the children of the people are struggling, when they bleed, when they waste away in jails and when they win. The artist must not separate himself from the life of the toiling people, the life of those who fight for the people's cause, democracy and socialism. This position gives strength both to the people and to the artist. It renovates art!

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LEGACY OF YALTA AND OUR TIME

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[Article by V. Nekrasov]

[Text] Whatever its foes and detractors may say or write about it, the Yalta (Crimean) Conference of the heads of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain--the three countries which headed the great coalition of freedom-loving people and inflicted a crushing defeat on Hitlerite fascism and thus rescued global civilization in World War II, justifiably holds an outstanding position in current foreign policy history. The attacks on the decisions made at the conference, which have been consistently mounted in the West throughout the postwar period, have failed to diminish their significance and strike out the determining role which they were called upon to play and did play in the postwar structure of the world. Currently, the 40th anniversary of the Yalta meeting has triggered once again a literally volcanic outpouring of attacks in the mass information media against the Yalta agreements and a malicious and slanderous campaign with a view to misrepresenting and totally misinterpreting them. Efforts are being made to depict the results of the conference as being the foundation for many of the troubles experienced by the contemporary world and even as one of the main sources of the present dangerous tension in world affairs. Such people seem to ignore that the very abundance of such attacks and the fierceness of their authors merely confirm the vital strength of the Yalta decisions and the permanent value of the principles on which they rest, in terms of the difficult struggle waged between the forces of peace and war and progress and reaction, currently taking place in the international arena.

The entire point is that the Yalta Conference, as the passage of time makes increasingly clear, while resolving the specific problems related to the territorial-political settlement and the creation of conditions for a firm universal peace, also laid the cornerstone of the general foundations of postwar development and the policy of peaceful coexistence among countries belonging to opposite systems, without which no normal course of international life would be conceivable today. It is precisely this which does not suit the current fighters for social revenge in the imperialist camp, who are trying to undermine the foundations of this policy, the only realistic one in the nuclear century.

The campaign against Yalta and its legacy is being mounted within the general stream of the efforts of many bourgeois propagandists, whose purpose it is to revise the concepts of the nature and the true course of the war in order to misrepresent it in the eyes of the new generations which did not experience it and are unfamiliar with the truth from personal experience. In accordance with the social order issued by the reactionary political circles of monopoly capital, the picture of the significance of battles at one front or another is unrecognizably distorted and the basic political and diplomatic events of those years are depicted entirely unrealistically. All of this is done for the sake of substantiating the current claims of the imperialist leadership for a new division of the world by defeating of real socialism and dealing with all forces of social and national liberation.

Thus, all kinds of efforts are being made if not entirely to conceal at least maximally to belittle the role of socialism, as represented by Soviet Union, in the defeat of fascism and the winning of World War II. The contribution which the peoples fighting for democracy and freedom made to the common victory is being persistently and systematically deleted. The fact notwithstanding, their revolutionary social creativity during the war is depicted as "Soviet model of social system" imposed by force from the outside. The liberating mission of the Soviet army is presented as the "export of revolution." Correspondingly, the international activities of the USSR at that time, aimed at ensuring the fastest possible defeat of the enemy and the creation of a world order consistent with the basic interests and aspirations of the people, are ascribed as "great power" motivations and aspirations radically alien to socialism.

Such is, generally speaking, the simple design with the help of which the contemporary Western interpreters would like to imprint in the collective memory of mankind a misrepresented concept of the war and of international relations during the war years. However, in the same way that the truth about the war neither exists nor could exist without understanding the decisive contribution of the Soviet people and their valorous armed forces to the Great Victory and the liberation of Europe from the brown plague, no true understanding can be achieved of the postwar peaceful development of Europe, and not at Europe alone, without the proper appreciation of the tireless struggle waged by the Soviet Union during the war years to ensure a stable and just peace and the right of the peoples to build their lives in accordance with their own wishes. In other words, one cannot be realistic in judging the current state of affairs in the world and the possibilities and prospects of the future without assessing in their true light the initial decisions which were made by the Allies on a number of basic problems of the postwar world, with the most active participation of the USSR, and without an accurate understanding of the results of their implementation.

The Yalta agreements and the concept of the structure of the world on which they are based remain the essential nucleus of these resolutions, which has proved its durable vitality precisely by virtue of its consistency with the laws of social development; it remains a valuable legacy and, one could say, a most useful practical guide in contemporary international relations.

"Yalta retains its significance because the freedom of Europe remains an unfinished affair," U.S. President Reagan proclaimed in a special declaration on the 40th anniversary of the conference. What is this: an acknowledgment of the significance of the Yalta decisions in terms of our time? Not in the least. It is merely a new attempt to substantiate calls for a "crusade" against socialism by distorting historical truth. Today's Bonn leaders anathemize the Yalta agreements. This is understandable, for to the political patrons of the revanchists the decisions which were made 40 years ago by the victorious powers are an insurmountable barrier on the way to the implementation of warmongering plans. But why is it that the TIMES, a newspaper which considers itself respectable and linked to the British political leadership, labels Yalta a "symbol of treason?" Who or what, in the opinion of that newspaper, did the British leadership betray during the war by signing the Yalta resolutions? Was it the behests of their predecessors--"the people of Munich"--who actively helped the Hitlerites to unleash World War II?

The stir currently raised in the West on the significance of the Yalta Conference demands a detailed answer.

Let us turn to documentary proof. The Yalta Conference took place from 4 to 11 February 1945, i.e., at a time when the struggle against fascist Germany had entered its concluding stage, although a great deal of effort remained to be made before total victory could be achieved.

In 8 days of work the leaders of the three countries meeting in Yalta coordinated their plans for the definitive routing of the common enemy and ratified the agreement on the occupation and control of Germany. The agreement on establishing an international organization to maintain peace and security (the future United Nations) was given final approval; the "Declaration on the Liberation of Europe" and on "Unity in the Organization of Peace as in War" were adopted. An agreement was initialed on problems of the Far East, according to which the Soviet Union pledged to enter the war against Japan 2-3 months after the end of military operations in Europe. In the expression of an American observer, this exhaustive content of the Yalta decisions "gave flesh to the skeleton of the postwar world."

Any attempt at seeking in the Yalta documents even a hint of any kind of agreement on the division of Europe into "spheres of influence"--the favorite topic of the foes of Yalta ever since that time--are futile. No such agreement existed any more than was there a question of anything resembling it in the course of the Yalta discussions, as convincingly confirmed by the record of the entire talks, which has now been made public. Nor can claims relative to some kind of Soviet "hegemonistic claims" in Yalta withstand criticism. Former U.S. secretary of state Stettinius notes in the book "Roosevelt and the Russians," which came out 5 years after the conference, that "all attacks notwithstanding, the Yalta minutes prove that the Soviet Union made greater concessions to the United States and Great Britain than either of those two countries made to the Soviet Union." In considering the successful reaching of agreements an event of exceptional importance and a positive precedent for the future, President Roosevelt, in his address to the

U.S. Congress after the conference, said: "The United States will not always get 100 percent of all it wants, any more than will Russia or Great Britain. We shall not be always able to find ideal solutions for difficult international problems, although we are fully resolved tirelessly to aspire to such an ideal. I am confident, however, that in accordance with the agreements reached in Yalta, Europe will acquire greater political stability than ever before."

Therefore, the deceased U.S. President cannot be denied perspicacity. However, it is precisely such stability on the European political scene which does not suit today those who oppose the Yalta agreements, and demand their abrogation. In the final account, it is obvious to all that now it is a question not of the letter of such agreements but of the sociopolitical processes of the postwar period in Europe, brought to life or given an impetus for their faster development by the fact that World War II became a war of liberation.

References to the recent tragic past of the continent are used not as an argument in favor of strengthening the security of the nations which inhabit it but to promote hostility between countries with different social systems. Talks of "surmounting Yalta" are actually a euphemism, a convenient code, for a policy of exporting counterrevolution, and nothing else. Those who use this slogan today are interested only in worsening a certain psychological atmosphere surrounding the results of the victorious battle waged by the peoples against fascism and instilling in the mass consciousness a stereotype of thinking according to which the territorial and political results of the war were not a legitimate consequence of historical processes but of a certain conspiracy, or else an error made by the Anglo-American leaders at the Yalta Conference, for which reason they should be "corrected."

The only purpose of such a widescale propaganda operation could be to prepare for a revision of the very results of the war, forgiving the sins of the reactionary forces which unleashed it and attempting to rehabilitate the Munich conspiracy between the Western powers and Hitlerite Germany, again for the sake of that same universal "crusade against bolshevism." The present U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has gone so far as to claim that World War II was "unnecessary," for, allegedly, the "axis powers" could have been persuaded to act differently. That is why the West German revanchists and the political circles linked with them are once again daring to describe today's territorial and political realities in Europe as a "temporary condition."

The fierceness of attacks mounted against the Yalta Conference may be explained less in terms of what rests on the surface of the agreements than their common ground, which allowed the three leading powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, despite all frictions and differences among them, to bring, in the final account, their wartime cooperation to a victorious completion and to formulate a viable program for stable postwar peaceful development.

The existence of such grounds and the fact that the agreements were not the result of starry-eyed dreams but of a profound penetration by all participants

in the conference into the essence of the developing circumstances are supported by numerous facts. In the final account, one should not imagine that Roosevelt and Churchill were the type of simpletons who did not realize the consequences of their decisions, but serious state leaders, who had headed their countries at a time of mortal danger, one could say, and who entered history as leaders, who defended their vitally important national interests.

What are these grounds?

II

As confirmed by the minutes of the conference and the nature of the decisions which were made, the participants in the meeting themselves considered as grounds, above all, the assertion of a mutual understanding of the importance and need to extend to times of peace as well and to develop the cooperation among the three great powers, which had developed and strengthened during the period of military trials. The vast formula of "unity in the organization of peace," applied to define the nature of one of the adopted documents, reflected the main feature for the sake of which the leaders of the anti-Hitlerite coalition strove to ensure the further strengthening of their cooperation, precisely for the sake of a stable and durable peace.

Unquestionably, the participants in the conference were fully aware of the profound class contradictions separating them. They all knew that their partners in the talks were governed by the aspiration to obtain maximal advantages for their own countries. Yes, sharp arguments broke out at the conference sessions, clearly revealing the differences concealed only by diplomatic restraint shown in the course of the discussions. Essentially, persistent maneuvering, the purpose of which was to prove to one's interlocutors the grounds for and attractiveness of one suggestion or another did not cease even for a single hour.

At the same time, however, the participants did not forget to point out that they were taking into consideration sensible arguments and the legitimate interests both of the other participants as well as the those of other nations not represented at the conference, and that they were guided by the principle of equal safety for all. The aspiration to find a common platform, which would make it possible to take reciprocal interests into consideration, prevailed at the meetings. There was a search for compromise which would strengthen previously reached reciprocal understanding among the Allies, based on the equality of the sides and serving the cause of establishing a durable peace, for which the nations tortured by the war thirsted so greatly.

The Soviet Union acted as the principle-minded supporter of strengthening comprehensive cooperation among the great powers. At the same time, it deemed it necessary to emphasize that their unity and cooperation should in no case turn into a diktat regarding the rest of the world. Moscow also cautioned against any effort to use in relations among the three powers the methods of pressure and threats. As J. V. Stalin remarked in his message to Churchill, dated 23 March 1944, "the method of threats is not only improper in relations among allies but also harmful, for it could yield the opposite results. There were proper reasons for such a warning. For example, the demand made by

influential U.S. circles to exert pressure on the Soviet Union to make concessions to Washington on essential postwar development problems was no secret. The preservation of future peace and stability, as Churchill tried to convince the members of the American delegation going to Yalta, should depend on the United States and Britain alone.

This makes the spirit of cooperation which was established at the conference even more noteworthy. This characteristic feature was noted by its participants themselves in their informal talks. Equally noteworthy is the fact that the exchange of remarks in the course of a meeting proved that neither one of the powers, individually or jointly, tried to establish their world domination. Also noteworthy was the exchange of views on the need to preserve the cooperation among the three powers even after their present rulers would step down from the political stage.

Looking decades into the future, the participants in the conference recorded in the final document that "it is only with the continuing and growing cooperation and reciprocal understanding among our three countries and among all peace-loving nations that the high aspiration of mankind--a durable and lengthy peace--can be achieved...." This binding statement reflects the responsible statesmanlike approach taken by the leaders of the three countries to the fundamental problems they had to resolve; it expressed their understanding of the inevitability of strengthening relations of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among great powers with different social systems in our age, based on the realities of global developments. In this connection, Roosevelt's message to Churchill, written literally an hour before the president's death, is a political testament of sorts. Roosevelt wrote that he intended "to reduce to a minimum, to the extent possible, the problems which arose in relations with the USSR, for apparently, in one form or another such problems would appear with every passing day and most of them could be resolved with compromises."

The spirit of wartime cooperation--the legacy of the Yalta conference to peacetime--was, however, lost quite soon afterwards. The unity among the three powers was violated by the will of the U.S. ruling circles, who hoped to control the entire world with the help of the atom bomb, and Great Britain, which nurtured the illusory hopes of restoring the prewar positions of British imperialism. The notorious "containment" doctrine, followed by that of "throwing back" communism made their appearance, the purpose of which was to limit the influence of socialism and ensure its subsequent collapse--"the routing of the forces of global communism led by the Soviets," as read Memorandum No 7 of the U.S. National Security Council, passed as early as 1948.

The period of the "cold war" and the intense confrontation on the world scene clearly proved the futility of such hopes. Meanwhile, the course of international developments increasingly revealed the importance of relations between the two great powers of our time--the Soviet Union and the United States--in terms of the overall global situation and the definition of the ways along which the entire community of nations was to develop. The peoples remember not only the example of their cooperation during the war but also the beneficial impact the period of detente in the 1970s had on the climate of

international relations and the turn taken by Soviet-American relations toward trust and mutually profitable cooperation.

Can Washington draw proper conclusions today from a not so very distant past? In any case, the facts show that there are realistic circles in the United States, who are seriously considering this matter. "...We should also start looking for ways to refresh, if not to restore, in our memory the atmosphere of American-Soviet cooperation..." Republican Senator Charles Mathias wrote in THE WASHINGTON POST. "We are not dealing with history only. To a certain extent, our future depends on our sincerity toward the past."

Such sincerity, considered seriously, precisely requires not eradicating from the memory of the peoples the valuable legacy of Yalta, or the denial of its spirit and its decisions, but a recognition of the entire importance of its lessons to our time. One of them is the real possibility of sincere and equal cooperation among great powers under peacetime conditions, cooperation for the sake of the very future of the peoples and possibility of finding reciprocally acceptable solutions for the complex problems, given a political desire to achieve this, and on the basis of the equality and security of all sides.

III

The legacy of Yalta means, above all, the inflexible resolve of the participants in the conference to restrain militarism, Nazi or any other, and to uproot it. It also means the firm intention to set up guarantees to block new attempts against universal peace. The legacy of Yalta means not only the real possibility it established for asserting a climate of international cooperation but also of a viable and active international structure for the sake of ensuring universal peace, represented by the United Nations, which was created through the efforts of the participants in the conference.

Let us point out that ensuring the unity of views among the leading members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition relative to the organizational foundations on which peace should rest after the victory was one of the most important trends in Soviet wartime foreign policy. Stalin's 8 November 1941 message to Churchill had already expressed the wish that a certain agreement be reached "regarding the objectives of the war and the plans for organizing peace after the war." Gradually, in the course of diplomatic contacts and talks among the Allies, the view developed of the expediency of setting up a global security organization, which could ensure peace and cooperation among nations and thus void the possibility of the outbreak of a new war.

The Western Allies of the USSR were led to this conclusion by life itself. We know, for example, that in the initial stage of the war Washington's plans did not include the creation of such an organization. It was only after the Soviet Union had entered the war the President Roosevelt told Churchill of his ideas of setting up Anglo-American "police forces" to ensure the type of order throughout the world, which would suit Washington and London. However, the turn taken by the war as a result of the victories of the Soviet armed forces in 1942 and 1943 forced them to abandon these plans. Views on setting up some kind of federations of small and medium-sized countries under the protection of the great powers were voiced but were rejected by the Soviet Union, who

justifiably saw them as an intention to recreate the notorious "cordon sanitaire," aimed against it. Churchill also raised the idea of creating a multileveled international organization, which would be based on regional associations of countries, thus giving Washington and London dominating positions in the new organization. This was not discussed at Yalta: the Soviet suggestion of creating a single universal international organization prevailed. As the Soviet Union pointed out, such an organization would be an efficient instrument for maintaining a durable peace and would be based on the principles of sovereign equality of all members and the peaceful coexistence among countries with different socioeconomic systems.

The Yalta discussions focused precisely on the effectiveness of the future organization and its actual ability to ensure universal peace. Agreement was reached in the final account on the controversial question of the voting procedure in the Security Council of the organization, based on the recognition of the equal responsibility shared by the permanent Security Council members belonging to opposite social systems to preserve peace. The USSR firmly opposed the U.S. idea of the inexpediency of offering small countries the opportunity to express their views on all problems of international relations, as well as Churchill's aspiration to limit the role of such countries to participation in debates but not in decision-making. As the Soviet side emphasized, "it is not merely a question of ensuring the possibility of voicing one's opinion but of something far more important." The strict observance of the rule of unanimity of the permanent Security Council members in decision-making, relative to maintaining peace and international security, and maximal consideration of the viewpoints and interests of all interested countries were the guiding principles approved in Yalta, which became the foundations of the future United Nations and which played a major fruitful role in its subsequent activities.

Therefore, the stipulation of respecting the principles of equality and identical security of the parties as a most important prerequisite for universal peace, demonstrated by its participants and codified in their agreements, is an unquestionable accomplishment of the Yalta meeting. Such was also the assessment of the results of the work done in this area by the participants in the meeting themselves. "We have undertaken the establishment of global peace," Roosevelt pointed out on his return from Yalta.

His White House successors, however, chose a different way. From the very first days of the establishment of the United Nations, they did everything possible to turn it into an instrument of their imperialistic and hegemonistic policy. In the final account, these attempts proved to be sterile as a result of the radical changes which had taken place in the world situation in the postwar decades. Throughout its existence, the United Nations organization has made a substantial useful contribution to the implementation of the objectives codified in its charter, including the settling of a number of international crises. The United Nations, which today rallies 159 states on earth, big and small, whether belonging to military and political alliances or neutral and nonaligned, enjoys the highest possible reputation in the global community of nations. It continues to inspire its members with the appeal of "protecting future generations from the calamities of war," which is the opening statement in its charter.

Such is yet another component of the true legacy of Yalta, which has become an important inseparable part of contemporary international reality. The requirement of "surmounting" this legacy, even though this applies to no more than some of the decisions made at the conference, can only weaken its common platform and cast the shadow of doubt on the entire system of principles which guided the participants in the Yalta meeting in laying, among others, the foundations for UN activities.

Unquestionably, the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" plays an outstanding role among the documents of the Yalta Conference. It is no accident that the foes of Yalta are mounting their propaganda battles primarily on the subject of this document. Officially, they present themselves as its defenders, slanderously accusing the Soviet Union of allegedly having violated through its actions the obligations assumed. Yalta, President Reagan proclaims, reminds us of "unfulfilled Soviet promises." Resorting to terminology typical of yellow journalism, the London TIMES dares to claim that the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were sold "into slavery" at the Crimean Conference.

Actually, those who are declaring war on the Yalta agreements today act against the essence of the Declaration, the letter and spirit of which our country has invariably honored. By distorting the content of the Declaration and ascribing to it something it does not contain, they are trying to depict the USSR as an aggressive and treacherous force which has unhesitatingly violated the agreements for the sake of its expansionistic objectives and the "export of revolution."

What did the Declaration contain? It confirmed the support of democratic principles by the three countries, and their intention to coordinate their policies in helping the peoples liberated from Nazi Germany's rule in political and economic matters. The Declaration emphasized that establishing order on the continent and restructuring national economic life were to be achieved in a manner which would enable the peoples "to create democratic institutions of their own choice." The participants in the conference asserted their resolve "to create, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations, an international order based on the principles of law, dedicated to the peace, security, freedom and universal well-being of all mankind." Therefore, it was actually a question of the right of the peoples of the European countries to choose their own way of economic and social development and structure relations with other nations, which had selected a different path, on the basis of good neighborly relations, i.e., of the principles of peaceful coexistence. It was precisely this acknowledgment not only of the possibility but of the legality of the coexistence and cooperation among countries with different social systems that triggers to this day fits of rage in the camp of imperialist reaction.

The fact that a number of European countries dropped out of the capitalist system as a result of World War II and the victory of socialist revolutions in them was a legitimate consequence of the liberation struggle waged by the peoples against Hitlerite tyranny. The horrors of the war and the atrocities committed by the occupation forces created in the people's masses of the countries victimized by the war deep hatred of reaction, whatever its hues and

shades. Along with political liberation tasks, most of the countries in Central and Southeastern Europe had also developed the inner need for radical socioeconomic changes and for eliminating the backwardness to which their prewar regimes had condemned them.

The accession to power of representatives of democratic circles in these countries was the direct consequence of the liberation struggle waged by the working people against the German-fascist occupation and its accomplices among the local bourgeoisie, which had proved its antinational nature. The communist parties, which had given the patriots a clear perspective and an inspiring program for both national and social liberation, were in the vanguard of this struggle. With their thousands of casualties, heroism and unbreakable loyalty to the people's interests, and not in words but in deeds, the communists had proved to the masses the true patriotism of their convictions. At the same time, the viability of the Soviet state, and its proven ability to defeat the most powerful military machine of imperialist reaction made the people's masses realize that socialism alone was an alternative to capitalism, whatever its garb. All of this led to the fact that the victorious advance of the Soviet forces blended with the struggle waged by the peoples of Europe for radical socioeconomic and political change.

This was also an acute political and ideological struggle waged between the democratic and bourgeois factions within the antifascist camp. The prewar ruling classes fiercely resisted the implementation of progressive measures, relying, as was the case with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, on the emigre bourgeois governments, which hoped to return to power and enjoyed the support of London and Washington ruling circles. Under these circumstances, the very fact that the Soviet armed forces, which were strictly pursuing a line of nonintervention in domestic affairs on the territory of a number of countries, had a paralyzing influence on domestic and foreign counterrevolution.

The battle waged by the people's masses against Hitlerism throughout liberated Europe organically blended with the struggle for democracy and social progress. However, unlike the Soviet Union, its Western allies, pretexting defense requirements and establishment of parliamentary rule, resorted to open interference in the affairs of the peoples in the western and southern parts of the continent. For example, London's interference in Greek affairs assumed an openly interventionist nature. Here, concealed behind talks of "preventing lawlessness," military operations were mounted in December 1944 with a view to imposing upon the Greek people a political regime suitable to the West. The appearance of Anglo-American troops in some European countries was invariably accompanied by the restoration of the order which had existed in them before the Hitlerite occupation.

In an effort to recreate a hostile encirclement along the Western borders of the USSR and, occasionally not shying at attempts at diplomatic blackmail, the Western Allies, London above all, with Washington's support, were also seeking possibilities of somehow weakening the growing influence of the Soviet Union in international affairs. In particular, the idea was concocted of establishing "spheres of influence" by the great powers in Europe. Thus, as early as the summer of 1944, Churchill sounded out Moscow's attitude toward

the following deal: giving the USSR a "controlling interest" in Romania and Bulgaria in exchange for giving Great Britain a free hand in Yugoslavia and Greece. Such plans were firmly rejected by the Soviet side, for such ideas radically clashed with the foreign policy principles of the Soviet state.

Therefore, the prerequisites of the problems of liberated Europe, discussed at the Yalta Conference, were by no means simple and straightforward. It was precisely in this matter that the views of the participants differed most of all, and it was precisely here that their class confrontation was the gravest. Nevertheless, such most experienced political leaders as Roosevelt and Churchill, were fully aware of the realities of the international situation as it was developing on the threshold of the year of victory, and did not deem it expedient to show all their trumps. Furthermore, the principles proclaimed in the "Declaration on Liberated Europe," separated from the practice of their implementation, appeared to them as well to be politically advantageous.

At the conference, the United States decided not to insist on its initial proposal of establishing some kind of allied security council for Europe or supreme commission which, in its view, would have contributed to the restoration in the liberated countries of the pre-World War II order. Washington limited itself merely to the idea of setting up some kind of mechanism "for the assumption of joint responsibility." The Soviet Union, which rejected the idea for in order to prevent direct interference in the domestic affairs of the liberated countries, suggested that consultations among the Allies take place if necessary. In the final account, this suggestion was adopted.

As a whole, the "Declaration on Liberated Europe," which was approved at the conference, was consistent with the antifascist and liberating objectives of the war, and the Western countries which, incidentally, had initiated it themselves, were forced to take this into consideration. As the course of events proved, the Declaration was a document which suitably reflected the conditions which had developed in the countries on the continent cleared from the Hitlerite filth.

Such is the truth of the results of the future of Europe as discussed at Yalta. All the efforts made by today's opponents of the Crimea agreements to slander Soviet foreign policy, which has been guided by the basic interests of the people's masses always and in everything, and has daringly stood up in their defense, are futile. The historical accomplishments in building a new life achieved by the fraternal socialist countries in Europe are the best refutation of the entire groundlessness of propaganda fabrications about an "alien Soviet system," allegedly imposed by force on the peoples of these countries.

By actually accusing the Western participants in the conference of being more concerned with uprooting militarism and Nazism and establishing a durable peace rather than dividing a bleeding Europe and reinstating everywhere the capitalist order, today's opponents of Yalta are, one could say, clearly proving the extent of the degradation of political mores in the West, compared with the time when the U.S. and British leaders deemed it possible and necessary to cooperate with the land of the Soviets in the name of humane

objectives. But why speak of mores, if some people today are prepared even to threaten the use of force for "voiding" what they describe as the "division of Europe." The only description of claims currently made in Washington and London to the effect that they have nothing against any postwar territorial settlement but cannot reconcile themselves with the political realities which developed as a result of the war can be described only as a maneuver the purpose of which is to conceal the true aspirations of reactionary Western circles, who are dreaming of the restoration of capitalism in Eastern Europe. Sensible forces in the West are fully justified in warning such circles that efforts to put such claims through "would lead to war."

V

Since opposition to the principles included in the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" was impossible, in Yalta Roosevelt and Churchill preferred to limit their discussions of specific and very crucial problems of development of the situation on the continent to the question of the future of Poland or, more precisely, its borders and the composition of the Polish government. The sharp and largely uncompromising argument which broke out in Yalta on this matter clearly showed both the aspirations of the Western countries concerning all European nations and the limits of their possibilities.

Moscow, which firmly announced its interest in the creation of a strong, independent and democratic Poland, which would maintain with the USSR relations based on firm friendship, defended at the conference both the interests of the security of the land of the soviets and the interests of the Polish people, who were offered a new path of social development. Neither of those were considered desirable by the Western powers, despite their forced acknowledgment that as a result of the liberation of a significant part of Poland by the Soviet army and the establishment of a Polish provisional government in Warsaw, which enjoyed the ever-growing support of the people's masses, a "new situation had arisen in the country."

Although the United States and Great Britain refused to give their agreement to the final demarcation of the Polish border on the west, a decision in principle on the new Polish borders was approved at Yalta. Therefore, for the first time in centuries, the Polish people were given historically just and, as confirmed by the subsequent development of events, safe borders. For understandable reasons, Washington and London could no longer discuss in Yalta the return to Poland of the counterrevolutionary emigre government, which had equated in its propaganda the Soviet army of liberation with the Hitlerite occupation forces. However, they tried to make the Soviet Union agree to disbanding the Polish provisional government and replacing it with some sort of new government in which emigre personalities would predominate. It was only after a difficult and stubborn diplomatic struggle that an agreement was reached on the principles governing the reorganization of the provisional government, acceptable to the Western countries. As E. Stettinius justifiably pointed out, this was a truly reciprocal compromise and not a "sellout" in the least or a "betrayal" by the West as reactionary imperialist propaganda claims to this day.

While the Yalta conference was taking place, the Soviet forces were already 60 kilometers away from Berlin. The Allied plans of relations with defeated Germany had to be clarified once and for all. At Yalta, the leaders of the three countries agreed on the procedure for the mandatory observance of the conditions for unconditional surrender which they demanded of the heads of the "Third Reich." The final points were made in the decisions on the occupation of Germany by the victorious powers, which henceforth were to include France, and on the procedure for control by the Allied powers.

The common principles of a coordinated policy toward defeated Germany were discussed and approved. They were based on the principles of democracy and demilitarization and the guarantee that Germany "would never again be able to break world peace." In the view of the Soviet government, the main objective of this policy was to help the German people take the path of peace and social progress, to contribute to the national rebirth of the country and to the strengthening of its autonomy and independence. Noteworthy in this respect were the exchanges which took place the very first day of the Yalta meeting. The minutes read as follows: "...Churchill suggests a session to discuss political problems, specifically the future of Germany, assuming that it would have some kind of a future. Stalin answers that Germany will have a future."

The ideas of the Allies concerning such a future differed. The Anglo-American program on the German problem was directed above all toward the destruction of Germany as a rival on the world market and its conversion into an obedient tool of U.S. and British policy, including a policy already seriously considered in the West, in London above all, directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet government invariably opposed identifying Hitler's clique with the German people and rejected a policy of revenge, national humiliation of the Germans or their oppression. It was only thus, it believed, that real conditions could be secured for Germany's postwar development as a united, peaceable and democratic state.

As we know, starting with 1943 the Western powers repeatedly formulated a variety of proposals on the dismemberment of Germany into several states, motivating this with the need to prevent a rebirth of German militarism. Such were the plans they took to Yalta as well. President Roosevelt was categorical in his address. He stated that "he saw no solution other than dismemberment." Churchill vacillated. An exchange of views led to the decision to assign the question of dismemberment to a special commission set up by the three powers. The view held by the Soviet Union in the commission reasserted its basic opposition to the division of Germany. As Moscow reported in issuing its commission representative guidelines, "the British and the Americans, who were the first to raise the question of the division of Germany, would now like to make the USSR responsible for this division, with a view to blackening our state in the eyes of world public opinion." As a result of the firm position adopted by the Soviet Union, the question of the division of Germany was removed from the agenda of the interallied talks.

Such is the truth of the nature of the discussion of the German problem at the Yalta Conference, to the participants in which today's Western propaganda would like to ascribe, to the Soviet government above all, responsibility for the division of Germany. The truth, however, is that the division took place

after the war as a result of the purposeful activities of the Western powers and the active participation of the then-Bonn leadership, which was planning the remilitarization of West Germany and its participation in NATO's military-political structure. The fabrications of today's Western foes of Yalta, who rely on the short memory of the nations, cannot eradicate historical truth. The peoples of the world know and remember those who were able to crush fascist barbarism and at what cost, and bring Europe its freedom, and who today as well are firmly fighting for the elimination of nuclear weapon arsenals, including those on European soil, and for the restoration of the spirit of international detente and peaceful cooperation.

Now, when the territory of the FRG is being turned into a launching pad for American first-strike nuclear missiles targeted on the USSR and its allies, through the efforts of the American and NATO military, and when revanchist circles, de facto encouraged by the Bonn official authorities, have once again raised their heads, the threat of outbreak of a new major war from German soil is shifting, unless restrained, step by step from the hypothetical to the possible. This is one of the major threats to the entire world, which the participants in the Yalta Conference tried to prevent through their decisions. The obvious inclination of the Bonn promoters of a revision of the results of World War II and postwar developments, under the pretext of discussions regarding the "open German problem," relying, to use their expression, on their "American friends," indicates how far Washington has distanced itself from the spirit, from the true legacy of Yalta. The rapprochement between West German revanchism and the militaristic policy pursued by the United States in Western Europe is the most important component of this explosive mixture which is increasing the instability of the international situation. The nations must become fully aware of this.

The approaching great anniversary of the Victory reminds us anew of the high price which the nations had to pay to realize that under no circumstances should one ignore the activities of the forces in the West who are making tireless efforts to revise the results of World War II, codified, among others, in the interallied agreements concluded by the participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition on the postwar settlement, agreements imbued with concern for securing peace for future generations. The entire content of such agreements and accords is directed less to the past than to the future and to a just and reliable organization of the world. The decisions made in Yalta, as those reached at the Potsdam Conference, closely related to it in content, rank with the timeless international agreements, they are of lasting significance. Direct ties link them to accords and treaties concluded between the socialist and capitalist countries during the period of detente and the Final Act of the European Conference in Helsinki.

The frenzied ravings of the enemies of Yalta, so clearly displayed these days in the sight of the entire world, is unable to eliminate historical truth or the political realities of our time. Expatriations on freedom and democracy for Europe, which crowd their complaints on the subject of the Yalta agreements, are aimed at no more than concealing the plans of using Western Europe as an American bridgehead for preparations for a nuclear war. They will be unable to mislead the peace-loving and democratic forces in the world.

The Yalta legacy, which is being fought so fiercely today by Western militaristic circles, not only in terms of the specific content of the agreements which were reached, but their very spirit, has not lost any of its value. The core of this legacy is the proven possibility of effective cooperation among countries with different social systems in struggling for common objectives consistent with the interests of all nations, a cooperation which was not prevented during the war by differences in historical destinies, socioeconomic structures or ideological views. The current struggle waged against the nuclear threat hanging over mankind once again faces countries and nations with the task of being guided by their common and principal interest of doing everything possible to prevent a catastrophe and safeguard civilization on earth. This is the greatest value of the Yalta legacy today.

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IN A LAND OF FRIENDS

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[Article by B. Arkhipov and L. Golovanov. Most names transliterated from the Russian]

[Text] Korea.... This name, widely known throughout the world, comes from the name of "Kore," a medieval state which lasted from the 10th to the 14th centuries. The Koreans themselves prefer to trace it to a more ancient name, "Choson," which means "country of the morning freshness." This expression, remembered by us since childhood, unwittingly awakens the brightest and best thought associations, and it was through their lens that we looked through the portholes, as our plane began to land. Increasingly we saw the land about which we knew only from textbooks and press articles. A mountainous landscape, tree-covered slopes and carefully cultivated fields.... Finally, we could see suburban buildings and the thickening network of roads.... In our mind this "dot" on the map, named Pyongyang, had always sounded like an abstraction. Now it was turning into the living reality of a city of more than 1 million people. The feeling of this reality became particularly strong when a smiling Pioneer girl standing at the gangway presented us with a bouquet of flowers, and as of that point an enhanced, happy feeling remained with us throughout our stay.

The capital is not only the face of the state which, naturally, displays the best of its economy and culture. It is the heart of the country and its "nerve center. It is the concentrated manifestation of the most essential features which make a people great, what they live with and to what they aspire. As a first impression, Pyongyang immediately strikes one with its architecture, modern yet with nation elements, efficiently laid-out districts, beautiful boulevards and impeccable cleanliness. The most striking feature, however, is the people's warmth and well-wishingness. Our colleagues--the personnel of the journal KYLLODZHA, the theoretical and political organ of the Korean Labor Party Central Committee, surrounded us with their attention and concern. It was with their help that we were able to see and understand a great deal of this friendly country.

A monument expressing the heroic spirit and indomitable will of the emancipated people--the winged horse Chkhollima¹--aiming at the clouds rises

in the center of the city on Monsu Hill. Riding the horse is a young pair--a worker holding over his head the party's Red Letter, and a peasant girl holding a bundle of rice.

According to a folk legend, whoever succeeds in riding Chkhollima will be carried to the land of happiness. This character of the age-old dream of the people, now cast in bronze, seems to symbolize the striving with which the Korean people raised up their country from the ruins and built a new society. We heard this legendary name later as part of the names of different labor collectives, such as "Moving at the Chkhollima pace," "Chkhollima general march," "Chkhollima spirit," "Chkhollima brigade," "Chkhollima rider"....

"The patriotic thrust of the working people to eliminate the accursed legacy of the colonial past--extreme backwardness in all areas of material production and cultural life and the maximal acceleration of social progress is what these concepts express," we were told by Li San Sor, head of the journal's economic department. "In December 1956 our party's leadership raised the slogan 'Let Us Fulfill the Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule by increasing output and savings!'" The Chkhollima movement torch was lit at the steel-smelting plant in Kyongsong. It became the guideline in our socialist construction...."

It is thus that a national folklore character assumed a political significance, leading the masses to labor exploits, collective creativity and innovation, in contributing to an atmosphere of general constructive upsurge.

The country was in a difficult situation when the Chkhollima movement was started. The painful consequences of the 1950-1953 war, unleashed by the American imperialists and infamously concluded for its initiators, were still being felt. Pyongyang, let us point out, had to be raised literally from the ashes; it had been fiercely bombed 1,400 times and more than 420,000 bombs had been dropped on it (i.e., more than one bomb per resident). The enemies of People's Democratic Korea maliciously claimed that not even 100 years would suffice to rebuild it. However, people who are consciously creating their destiny can surmount any trials, the more so when they have reliable friends in the other socialist countries. Thus, in August 1953 the Soviet government granted the government of the KNDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic] aid of 1 billion rubles (old rate) to rebuild its national economy destroyed by the war; 3 years later, another 300 million rubles were allocated for the same purpose. With these funds and with the technical assistance of Soviet organizations and specialists, 20 industrial enterprises and other projects were rebuilt, restored or built anew. As part of this grant, the fraternal people were supplied with industrial raw and other materials, equipment for their transportation and other economic sectors, fishing vessels, agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers, purebred cattle, food and other commodities.... Subsequently, as we know, economic ties between both countries increased and strengthened. Based on accords on scientific and technical cooperation, toward the end of the 1970s the Soviet Union gave the KNDR some 2,800 sets of technical documentation, prototypes of industrial goods and agricultural commodities and more than 5,000 different standards, for the purpose of developing its national standardization service. In turn, Korea presented our country with technical documentation for the production of

iron coke, polyvinyl alcohol and other commodities, as well as documents on growing some crops and medicinal plants. It accepted a considerable number of Soviet specialists. KNDR scientists are participating in the work of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubna.

We were repeatedly told by the Korean comrades during our stay in their country that the material and scientific and technical aid granted by the Soviet Union and the comprehensive support of the entire socialist community helped to industrialize the republic and to reorganize and enhance industry and agriculture. They also recalled that until the liberation of the country from Japanese rule Korea's industry was one-sided and distorted, developing as an appendage to the economy of the ruling country.

In undertaking the creation of a new economy, the people's masses of North Korea had no national engineering-technical and management cadres. Such cadres had to be trained and developed on the run, as the saying goes. Thousands of Korean specialists received their education, underwent production training or studied the achievements of Soviet science and technology in the Soviet Union.

"We could not afford to be slow in building our young tortured republic," Li San Sor told us. "Unwittingly, with the advent of the workers' power, a great contradiction developed between the progressive political system and the extremely backward technical and economic base. As the experience of your country as well has convincingly proved, the elimination of this contradiction was possible only with the creation of a large-scale machine industry which could reorganize agriculture as well. The most important internal factors of success were the strength of the democratic system, its new moral potential, unknown to previous economic systems, and the creative forces of the people tempered in the hard struggle against imperialism...."

The practical successes strengthened the faith of the toiling people in their forces and increased their faith in the party.

Machine building is the core of the industry. The year before Korea's liberation from the colonial rule of Japanese imperialism, machine building accounted for no more than 1.6 percent of the gross volume of its industrial output and its technological level was totally insignificant. The country was unable to manufacture even simple farm tools. The implementation of the course of industrialization enabled it, as early as 1960, to meet more than 90 percent of its needs for machine equipment domestically; by 1977 machine building accounted for 33.7 percent of Korea's gross industrial output. Modern machine tool manufacturing plants were built in various parts of the country. This was done with the considerable assistance of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Today the KNDR is producing tens of thousands of modern metal-cutting machine tools per year. Automotive and tractor manufacturing, the production of electrical machinery, turbines, railroad transport facilities, shipbuilding and ore-mining machine building have been developed.

We visited the Tean Heavy Machine-Building Plant. Enterprise veterans clearly remember the small repair workshops which stood here. In 1947, responding to

the appeal of the TPK [Korean Labor Party] Central Committee, the workers undertook the production of electric motors. The first such motor, which developed 5 hp and a transformer capacity of 10 kv amperes, was produced several months later, despite incredible hardships.... However, even this small production facility was totally destroyed by an American air raid.

After the war, the plant was not simply rebuilt from the ruins but grew as a major base of power machine building.

Tson Khi Kuk, first deputy chief engineer, showed us around, demonstrating at the workplaces the manufacturing of the complex large parts of steam turbogenerators and hydraulic electric motors. Today the plant's output goes to all of the most important electric power plants in the republic. It manufactures electrical equipment for metallurgical, cement and ore-mining enterprises. Its current annual output is in the order of 1 million kilowatts.

Output is expanding systematically; technology is being updated, more difficult technical problems are being resolved and labor efficiency and quality are improving.

A specific production management system was developed here and subsequently became quite widespread: the so-called Team labor organization system. Essentially, as we were told, it consists of eliminating the one-man command by the director, making the party committee the highest leading body of the enterprise and thus strengthening the principle of collective management and the political approach. The plant party committee, which includes the director and the chief engineer, is the direct plant manager. It is responsible for all activities without assuming the management's administrative functions or the functions of the chief engineer. The party committee conducts daily political-organizational work with the people and the enterprise cadres; it tries to promote their creative activeness and to involve them in production management and other public affairs; it resolves the major problems together with the administration and verifies the execution of the administration's responsibilities.... According to the Team system, each plant has its staff headed by the chief engineer. In accordance with the party's stipulations, it plans production and provides technical management. All staff members have their practical jobs. The Korean comrades believe that this work system contributes to the maximal utilization of existing reserves.

At its latest, 6th Congress (October 1980), the Korean Labor Party formulated as a basic task in socialist economic construction for the current 10-year period the laying of a firm material and technical foundation, fully consistent with victorious socialism, and ensuring a sharp upsurge in the material and cultural living standards of the people. Since then, the gross volume of industrial output has increased by a factor of 3.1.

"What about comparing such indicators with 1946?" we asked.

"They are a thousand times higher! By the end of the 1980s, in 8 hours our industry will be producing as much as was produced during the entire 1946."

The further along the republic advances in its comprehensive progress, the less sense it makes to compare its indicators with the level which characterized its economy at the start. No comparison is possible between the dynamics of the current upsurge and the past. For example, during the first 25 years of people's regime, per capita steel production increased from 0.5 to 158 kilograms. The country smelted about 4 million tons of steel in 1976. By the end of last year the figure had doubled. The metallurgical industry is being intensively retooled. Its existing capacities are expanding and new ones are being created. It has been estimated that the metallurgical combine named after Kim Chak, the national hero, located in Ch'ongjin, a city in the northeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, alone will smelt 7 million tons of steel annually. By the end of the 1980s, the republic will be producing 15 million tons of steel per year. Nonferrous metal production will be increased by more than 50 percent compared with the current production level; approximately 1.5 million tons of nonferrous metals will be smelted by 1988.

Production cooperation in agriculture is one of the most important common laws of the establishment of socialism. We asked to be acquainted with the life of the Korean countryside and its socioeconomic changes on a collectivistic basis.

As we know, Korean agriculture, which was similar in content and objectives to the reorganization of the countryside in the other socialist countryside, had its own features based on specific historical conditions and economic and cultural traits. Naturally, this applied only to the means, methods and pace of cooperation. As a result of the land reform, which was carried out in 1946 on the initiative and guidance of the Korean Labor Party, feudal vestiges were eliminated and a major blow was dealt at the capitalist elements in the countryside. However, the petty commodity private peasant farm which became dominant could not develop on a planned basis and found the process of expanded reproduction difficult. It was unable to ensure the necessary growth of agricultural output in terms of volume and variety and to resolve the KNDR food problem. The division of Korea also affected the volume and difficulty of the problem. An agricultural base had to be essentially recreated in the northern part of the country, capable of compensating for the damage caused by the separation of the South, which was the former granary of the entire country. Furthermore, the subversive activities of South Korean reaction intensified, in its aspiration to aggravate the class struggle which accompanied the socialist changes. Finally, the 1950-1953 war, which caused tremendous harm to the entire national economy, created further, most severe, not to say catastrophic, difficulties.

One can only admire the tremendous efforts of the rural working people, who were not only able to withstand all the war and postwar difficulties but who, with the help and under the guidance of the working class, repaired the destruction within a short time and launched a mass movement for increasing yields and restoring an expanding arable and irrigated land, and, above all, who firmly took the path of agricultural production collectivization. By the end of August 1958 agricultural cooperativization had been completed. This path ensured the Korean peasants truly outstanding successes. The familiar Marxist stipulating according to which collective farming, even if based on a simple combination of labor tools and farmland, can lead to improvements

inaccessible to petty owners, was clearly confirmed yet once again in practical terms.

The victory of socialist production relations in the countryside and their steady strengthening and advancement contributed to the accelerated development of production forces in agriculture and the radical changes in its technological base and, at the same time, the definitive establishment of socialism in industry. The entire economy became unified and the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, monolithic. The possibility appeared of developing truly close ties between town and country and the subsequent elimination of major disparities between them.

"The appearance of villages and of the rural working people themselves changed. For the first time in millenia they were able to breathe freely and to be masters of their toil," we were told by Li San Sor during our visit to the Kochkhan Agricultural Cooperative. "In the course of the systematic, gradual and voluntary development of social ownership of the land the party nucleus in the countryside tempered and strengthened and the party's reputation among the peasant masses increased."

It turned out that the cooperative farm we visited had the name of Korean-Soviet Friendship. It was spread around the bend of the Taedong River, in a picturesque mountainous area of 3,000 hectares. It was a well-organized farm with an entire array of activities--it grew rice, vegetables and fruits and produced meat and milk.

Li Ok San, its chairman, welcomed us and acquainted us, naturally, within the time at our disposal, with the life of the cooperative farm. She has headed this labor collective since its founding in 1958. Before our arrival, we were told that Li Ok San had been awarded the title of Labor Hero. She was a deputy to the Supreme National Assembly. She had a splendid and heroic labor family. Her husband was a hero of the war of liberation against the American aggressors. He was severely wounded and lost his sight in air combat with American enemy aircraft at Pyongyang. However, although incapacitated by the war, he is actively participating in all affairs of the cooperative. He is particularly useful in the military-patriotic upbringing of young people.

Their son and daughter, after graduating from secondary school in their native village, are attending institutes. Their daughter is enrolled in the pedagogical and their son in the agricultural institute. Asked about her son, Li Ok San said: "He will become an agronomist, following his mother's footsteps!" Her smile revealed understandable maternal pride.

The mechanization shop is the main target of attention of the chairman of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Cooperative. The cooperative has 60 tractors cultivating 720 hectares of arable land. A number of agricultural machines have taken over the hard work done manually in the past.

"Do not wonder about the modest size of our arable land," Li Ok San said. "You will perhaps see for yourselves that land in our country is limited. Mountains account for 80 percent of its territory. Their slopes must be cultivated as well, for they account for a good third of the crops. That is

why we apply intensive agrotechnology. It is thanks to this that the republic is meeting its vital food requirements. This year our rice growers reached high yields in our main grain crop: 8.5 tons per hectare. This is higher than the average for the country, which is 7.2 tons."

"What about corn?"

"Our cooperative averages 9 tons per hectare in grain, compared with the national average of 6.3 tons."

Brigade leader-mechanizer Chzhan Chzhan Do and his young assistant Guak In Guon, demonstrated for us the work of the machinery which facilitates the peasants' labor. Each machine has a separate motor. Its small dimensions enables it to cultivate even minute plots of several square meters. One of them--a rice-planting and harvesting machine--pulls the crop from the soil and turns the blades into straw. Thanks to this machine labor productivity has increased by a factor of 30 compared to manual work. The rice-transplanting machine has intensified the labor process by a factor of 20 and the rice harvesting machine, by a factor of 80. All such equipment is produced domestically. We found out that each province has its own base for the production of agricultural machinery.

The Korean comrades told us that a record-setting crop was harvested in the country in 1984--10 million tons of grain. By the end of the present decade no less than 15 million tons will be produced annually.

The cooperative we visited had 95 hectares in fruits and berries and 95 in vegetables. It is successfully growing apples, pears, grapes, oranges, melons, watermelons, pumpkins, potatoes, yams, radishes, cabbages, tomatoes and cucumbers. In 1984 the cooperative harvested 1,000 tons of animal feed pumpkins alone. The way this was achieved was reported by Li Ok San at the Congress of the Republic's Cooperative Farmers. Pumpkins are planted along roadsides and are virtually ignored. Pegs are stuck over the roads, along which, being a crawling plant, the pumpkin plant reaches the "second floor" and yields abundant fruit high above the ground while cars and trucks run freely under it. That it how each bit of soil is used. The cooperative was awarded a government certificate of honor for high crop yields and intensive land use.

Animal husbandry is developing in combination with auxiliary farming. The cooperative has 3,000 hogs, 5,000 chickens, 300 cows and large numbers of sheep, goats and rabbits.

We were told that the state is concerned with raising the income of the rural workers. It is giving comprehensive aid to the countryside to facilitate the toil of the peasants and to improve their living conditions. The state pays for the construction of irrigation facilities (irrigated farming accounts for a high percentage of the land cultivated in the country); it streamlines riverbeds, installs threshing floors, drying facilities, warehouses, storage facilities and all other industrial projects and builds schools, kindergartens, nurseries and housing.

Electricity has entered rural life comprehensively and the electrification of agriculture is increasing. The peasants are granted free use of agricultural machinery. The cost of the use of irrigation systems has been reduced and agricultural procurement prices raised. Thanks to the active aid of the state the economic base of the countryside strengthened and agricultural production increased rapidly; the share of products distributed to the cooperative farmers has increased sharply and disparities between the living standards of workers and peasants are diminishing. Agricultural tax in kind has been abolished entirely.

We were grateful to our Korean friends for organizing our trip to the estuary of the Taedong River. An 8-kilometer-long dam will be built across the river, not far from the city of Nampo. This complex hydroengineering project, with its system of floodgates and power plants will block the river and raise its level significantly. Taedong will become navigable to seagoing vessels for more than 100 kilometers. The Nampo and Songnim ports will be able to handle ships displacing up to 50,000 tons. Senior Lt Li En Kuk, deputy chief of the construction project, showed us the plan of the project and acquainted us with its implementation (military personnel of the Korean People's Army are participating in the work alongside construction workers).

The weather was foul, a wind from the north was blowing and occasionally rain mixed with snow fell. However, this did not prevent us from communicating with the working people who had already reached the 5-kilometer mark in the construction of the dam. The construction is taking place simultaneously from both banks. A launch carried us to the other side where the construction of floodgates was in full swing.

This sector, several tens of meters deep and nearly 4 kilometers in circumference, was protected from the seawater by a dam. The dam had been completed the previous winter. It had been a true labor exploit. "Our boys simply made miracles," Li En Kuk told us. "Look at that hill: this is the former island Fi and the other one is Kytsalpur. Large concrete structures, higher than 10-story houses, were poured between them.... Applying new methods, the young divers and members of the shock brigade, completed the underwater concrete pouring in a few months instead of the usual 1-2 years. Despite the bitter cold, the construction workers installed several dozen suction pumps and pumped the water out in 2 months...."

Now, "fanning the flames of the fast combat," as they say here, these valorous workers are energetically speeding up the construction. In addition to resolving the problem we mentioned, the dam will reliably protect the adjacent areas from floods which have been causing substantial damage each summer downpour season. A rail and automotive road will be laid along the dam, linking Pyongyang with the provinces of North Hwanghae and South Hwanghae to the south.

This is the place to say a few words about the construction materials industry. Based on domestic raw materials and equipment, it is providing the republic's construction front with everything it needs. Under the people's regime cement production has developed extensively, both in quantity and quality. The Korean People's Democratic Republic is one of the leading

countries in the world in per capita cement production. It not only meets its own needs but exports considerable amounts. New methods are being applied in the technological processes and the technical and economic indicators of enterprises are improving. By the end of the decade, cement production will reach 20 million tons.

Let us add to this that the glassware industry is developing rapidly; the production of construction materials made of metal, timber and plastic and valuable construction quarry materials such as marble, granite, etc., is increasing.

Wherever we happened to be in the country, we could only admire the skill of the Korean construction workers. We saw the pleasing, beautiful districts of new multiple-story homes in Pyongyang, some of them 42 stories high.

The present appearance of a city in the republic is marked by well-built and aesthetically designed residential housing and cultural and sports establishments. The architects are concerned not only with improving the way of life of the working people but also with the entire material-spatial environment created by them to meet the requirements of the "laws of beauty" and be consistent with the new lifestyle.

In the course of our visit to the Pyongyang subway, we spoke to Comrade Kim Son Pho, chief of the Kwanbok station.

"Judge for yourselves," he said, "how everything accomplished here is organically related, national in form and socialist in content. At each step the people must feel that the person who is the master of his own fate and who creates this culture himself is the yardstick of everything accomplished around him." This is the leading principle. Man is the "measure of all things." The workers who created this most convenient type of transportation fulfilled the engineering-construction plan together with the artists. What matters most is not the fact that the Pyongyang subway is equal, from the architectural-technical and artistic viewpoints, to the best subways in the world but something far more important: the people, who broke the chains of slavery and were able to surmount so many difficulties, are asserting through the results of their dedicated constructive work the ineradicable truth of contemporary history and building a great future.

This applies even more so to the National Study Palace. It grandiosely stands out on Namsan hill, in the center of the capital. Its great architecture, external and internal, is pleasing to the eye. What is more essential, however, is the efficient organization of all of its functional aspects, the purpose of which is to expose the working people to the achievements of contemporary science, technology and culture. This true temple of learning has vast reading and lecture halls which can accommodate more than 10,000 people. Its library stores 30 million units. It has a number of premises equipped with the latest technical facilities for lectures and the study of works of art and scientific and technical publications and music, to obtain bibliographic or any other type of information, or to study a foreign language.... We requested from the main stock a Soviet book on non-machine means for metal processing. The book arrived in no more than a few minutes.

During the day most of the readers are students and scientific workers. Night school students come in the evening.

We experienced a pleasant surprise to see in one of the halls our compatriot G. V. Sapov, candidate of economic sciences, who was lecturing some 300 students on the economic experiment taking place in a number of Soviet industrial sectors. The Korean comrades show a great deal of interest in everything taking place in the Soviet Union.

Let us point out that the whole country's desire to learn is tremendous. Not so long ago, this people had been totally plundered in the cultural sense. During the period of Japanese rule no more than 35 percent of all Korean children of school age attended primary schools (1939 data); children of working people had no access whatever to secondary schools.

After the liberation, the people eagerly turned to spiritual values. The political, social and economic gains of the revolution were strengthened by the developing educational system. This is another manifestation of a general law of socialism. For about 10 years the KNDR has had free universal mandatory 11th-grade training (1 year preschool and 10 grade schools).

Higher education has been developed extensively as well. Whereas before the liberation North Korea had not even a single higher educational institution, today the republic has more than 170 VUZes and more than 500 technicums. Each province has developed its own reliable comprehensive base for cadre training. Currently, more than 1 million graduate specialists are employed in the national economy. Before the Japanese colonizers were expelled, the country had virtually no technical intelligentsia--Korean engineers and technicians could literally be numbered. Even skilled workers in leading industrial sectors and transport were primarily Japanese. For example, no more than some 50 Koreans were steam locomotive engineers.

The network of night and correspondence training is extensively developed in the KNDR. It is based on the territorial location of industrial and agricultural sectors. The number of its schools is continuing to grow. It is helped by televised programs. A variety of classes are taught on Saturdays, lectures are given on Wednesdays and monthly courses are sponsored.

The systematic enhancement of the cultural and educational standard of the entire population is one of the prerequisites for achieving universal social equality.

The system for retraining and upgrading the skills of leading cadres helps to accelerate scientific and technical progress and to perfect economic management. This is the job of the Institute of the National Economy. Ministers, directors of large enterprises and sovkhoses, chairmen of people's committees of provinces and districts and party leaders attend the 3- or 6-month courses offered by the institute. Here they master on a high level the solution of management problems in various economic and political areas.

"As in the army, our institute gives priority to training in action," we were told by Li Sok Ho, the institute's deputy director. "Training is quite intensive and strict. Essentially, it is based on classroom study with simulators which enable the students to master more efficiently contemporary scientific and technical achievements on the basis of which the building of socialism is systematically taking place on a national scale. The thoroughly organized and scientifically substantiated and purposeful activities of millions of people are a legitimate requirement for such construction. However, its full success can be ensured only if it is based on political leadership."

Incidentally, there is a political emphasis in all aspects of life in the country--not only in the fulfillment of labor obligations but also in all manifestations of social life, from waitressing in a worker cafeteria or serving at a city public bath to a variety of forms of amateur artistic performances. Extensive use is being made for this purpose of the means of monument propaganda and visual agitation. "Upgrading the political consciousness of the masses plays an important role in resolving all the problems of accelerating the completion of the three revolutions--ideological, technical and cultural," emphasized Kim En Hak, editor in chief of the journal KYLLODZHA. "Our party considers this a reliable guarantee for success in the energetic thrust forward in building socialism and in surmounting any difficulties."

...The sun was beginning to set as we followed Mayor Kan Men Su, climbing up the twisty communication trench to a nameless hill. A small, neat building, as though blending into the earth, stood on top. In front of it there was a small platform bordered on the outside by a grass-covered parapet.

Spread before us was a beautiful valley randomly dotted with hills. The faded autumn colors seemed particularly soft under the slanted rays of the setting sun.

This charming landscape was marred like a scar from end to end by a broken line--a reinforced concrete wall clearly visible to the naked eye.

We were on the 38th parallel. The military demarcation line lay in front of us. It has split the Korean Peninsula in two for nearly 40 years. It is a high political tension line. It is along this line that the American occupation forces and their South Korean puppets mount military provocations. Behind it stands a reinforced concrete fortification wall 5 meters high and more than 10 meters thick at the base and 2-3 meters wide at the top, built from sea to sea by the South Korean puppets on the incitement of the American militarists. The road is blocked even to wild animals and fish, for a reinforced concrete grid blocks the rivers. The illusory purpose is to "perpetuate" the splitting of the territory of a country and people with a 5000-year-old history and native culture.

"But Korea is one!" firmly said Mayor Kan Men Su, who is a member of the staff of the border regiment. "Sooner or later we shall reunite the homeland."

One of us asked if it would be possible to stand on the parapet to take a picture. The mayor shook his head: "It is dangerous. Anything may be expected from the other side...."

We looked through a stereoscopic telescope at this great barrier, this insulting challenge not only to the Korean people but to all humankind thirsting for peace. We saw fortified fire centers, observation points and deeply dug metal gates which could release deadly weapons. Two flags were waving in the wind on the American observation point, clearly visible on a hill on the other side of the valley: white with a yellow spot, the South Korean, and the blue, that of the United Nations. What hypocrisy! As early as November 1975 the 30th UN General Assembly passed a resolution on disbanding the "UN forces command" and the withdrawal from South Korea of all foreign armed forces. To this day, however, the American military are throwing their weight about, illegally hiding behind the flag of this international organization.

"Not so long ago," we were told by Kim Then En, docent at the Pyongyang Pedagogical Institute, who was our interpreter, "the southern areas suffered greatly from floods. There would have been no trouble had all forces and materials used to build this 200-kilometer-long wall been used to build hydroengineering systems.... When I look at this concrete I feel a lump in my throat--I am filled with anger and pain. During the war, at the start of the 1950s, the Yankees brutally murdered my parents, who were good and peaceful people. Many of my close friends died in the desperate battles.... I personally would have died if a fellow soldier had not pulled me out from under enemy fire, wounded and hurt as I was.... And yet it is behind that wall that the American imperialists and the puppet clique have imposed on an inseparable part of our land a military-fascist regime, turning it into a powder dump, a nuclear outpost behind which they conduct military exercises...."

On the eve of our trip we came across the testimony of French journalist Rene Beckman, in the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, who described his trip to the other side of the demarcation line. "American camps and Korean barracks stand pell-mell between Seoul and the border," Beckman writes, along with military equipment depots and camouflaged takeoff and landing strips. The country looks like a huge exercise area in a state of trench warfare. Every second car we came across on the roads leading north, among the rice fields, belonged to the military; soldiers in field uniforms, M-16 rifles on their shoulders, are vigilantly standing watch; there were at least half a dozen checkpoints along a 40-kilometer stretch. The South Korean capital itself is surrounded by formidable antitank obstacles. The road goes through these 10-meter-tall earth and concrete embankments crowded by recoilless guns, and narrow closely guarded passages...."

As we know, in November 1983, during his trip to South Korea, the American President Reagan visited the frontline positions of the occupation units close to the demarcation line. Photographers took pictures of him surrounded by military and civilians, his hand pointing north. One can easily guess what the U.S. president was thinking at that time.

A radical change in the situation on the Korean peninsula is possible only by resolving the major problem of the reunification of the country, which was divided by the fault of American imperialism. This viewpoint was emphasized by K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, during the friendly visit which Kim Il-Song, Korean Labor Party Central Committee general secretary and KNDR president, paid to the USSR: "The Soviet Union consistently calls for Korea to be reunited peacefully, on a democratic basis, following the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. Such is our firm and immutable position."

In slightly less than 4 decades, the government of the KNDR and the republic's political parties and public organizations have formulated a number of proposals on the reunification of the homeland. However, they have not been carried out by the fault of the American and South Korean authorities.

"We support," Comrade K. U. Chernenko said, "the important initiatives of the KNDR, which call for signing a peace treaty instead of the existing armistice, the adoption of a declaration of nonaggression between North and South, a reciprocal reduction in armed forces and making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone. The implementation of these suggestions would substantially improve the situation in Korea and create favorable conditions for a productive dialogue between North and South."

However, imperialism and reaction continue to erect ever-new obstacles on the path to a just solution of the Korean problem. The latest proof of this was the joint "Team Spirit '85" American-South Korean exercise. This was a demonstration of the unwillingness to cooperate in achieving a true detente in this explosive part of the world, a demonstration of deterrence.... However, the toiling people of the KNDR are on the alert.

On the eve of our departure we were received by Comrade Hwan Dian Ob, Korean Labor Party Central Committee secretary. He said that the visit which a KNDR party-state delegation, headed by Comrade Kim Il-Song, had paid to the Soviet Union, had contributed to enhancing relations of friendship between the Korean and Soviet people to a new height. This unity between fraternal parties is above all ideological. "In the present circumstances, our parties bear great responsibility: they must raise the working people in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, socialist patriotism and internationalism. The friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the KNDR, strengthened by the joint struggle and the jointly shed blood, is a very important historical gain which must be preserved. Following the visit of the KNDR party-government delegation to the USSR and the meetings and talks between Comrade Kim Il-Song and Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, a base was laid for our relations of friendship and business cooperation to strengthen and develop even further...."

This year will mark the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Korea and the founding of the Korean Labor Party. The Korean Labor Party Central Committee Politburo issued a decree on the extensive celebration of these anniversaries. The 40 years of practical experience of the KNDR proves that the only path to be followed by the peoples toward full and real political and economic independence and true social progress is that of socialism, national ownership

of means of production and the solution of all problems raised by contemporary history on the basis of the main interests of the working people and the strengthening of fraternal relations with the members of the socialist commonwealth.

The appeals of the Korean Labor Party Central Committee on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the country from the Japanese militarists and the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Labor Party state that the historical events of 1945 led to a radical turn in the life of the Korean people. Emphasizing the role of the USSR in the defeat of militaristic Japan, and recalling the numerous exploits of Soviet troops and commanders, who gave their lives in the battles for the freedom of Korea, the Korean Labor Party Central Committee called upon the KNDR working people to strengthen traditional Soviet-Korean friendship even further. Strengthening the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement, under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is a decisive factor in the victory of peace and socialism, the appeals state.

The same day we visited the monument to the Soviet soldiers who fell for the liberation of Korea in 1945, on Mount Moranbon. The memorial ensemble is being reconstructed, as resolved by the Korean Labor Party Central Committee Politburo. Nam In Bek, construction chief, and Chzhi Chkhi Khyp, secretary of the party organization of the construction enterprise, showed us the construction plan. The monument will be made of white granite. It will become even greater and more beautiful. "Our collective," the party organizer said, "is full of enthusiasm for completing the work ahead of schedule. May this gift of ours in honor of the 40th anniversary of the victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism be yet another contribution to strengthening friendship between our peoples!"

We were told that every day thousands of Pyongyang residents--mainly workers in ministries and departments, university and secondary school students and housewives--come here to help the construction workers in their noble project.

We said good-bye to this outstanding city and land, so ancient and yet so young, which had become very close to us in such a short time. There were so many other things to see and so many questions to ask but, alas, everything has a time limit. In addition to successes, we also saw understandable difficulties and unresolved problems in economic construction and in enhancing the people's living standard. The main thing about which we were clearly convinced was the power of the historically relatively short yet heavily saturated with events experience of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, an experience of lasting value. It was the strength of truth, fact and objective reality, consciously developed by the people's masses for the sake of a communist future.

...The plane gathered height. Buildings, roads and individual details of the now so familiar landscape became almost indistinguishable. We were leaving this area which continued to live within us with its rhythms and melodies and which concern us with its worries, problems and passions.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to the legend, this fabulous horse could run 1,000 li per day (a li is a Korean measure of distance, roughly equivalent to 500 meters).

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DESECRATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85) pp 122-123

[Article by V. Bushuyev]

[Text] The progressive and peace-loving people on earth are preparing to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite Germany, to honor the memory of more than 50 million victims of World War II and to express their greatest gratitude to the forces which fought for rescuing mankind from the "brown plague" and, above all, the exploit of the Soviet people and their armed forces, which made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism.

However, the preparations for the celebration of the anniversary of the Great Victory, already initiated in many countries throughout the world, are not to everyone's liking. A number of personalities would like to eradicate totally this event from the memory of mankind.

For example, the official circles in Bonn, the capital of the country which should have paid particular attention to the severe lessons taught by history and drawn proper conclusions from them, are categorically opposed. Nevertheless, as H. Kohl, FRG chancellor, stated in an interview, "the forthcoming date in May is, naturally, no occasion for celebration." Things have gone so far that, addressing a rally of East Prussian "landsmen," noted Bonn officials have permitted themselves to say that the purpose of their policy is "to keep the German problem open," and expressed support for the appeal of the revanchists to restore the "German Reich to its 1937 frontiers."

The British government has shown great inconsistency on the matter of celebrating the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism. At first, it refused to note this historical anniversary at all, above all because, allegedly, "the question of an interpretation of the role played by the Soviet Union" could arise. Later on, reacting to public pressure, the Tory government changed its position. Nevertheless, according to the British press, the most likely decision will be to limit the ceremonies to religious services in honor of the dead and other similar acts.

The approach of the present administration in Washington to the forthcoming celebrations is marked by its characteristic emphasis on doing everything

possible to belittle and criticize the role of the Soviet Union in World War II and in postwar international developments. Thus, in his public statements U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has tried to prove that the Anglo-American forces alone "restored freedom on the European continent." The White House is whipping up in a "historical foreshortening" the threadbare version of the "Soviet threat" and making categorical assertions that the Soviet liberating forces were received in the European countries as "uninvited and undesirable guests."

Such statements do not simply sound a note of discord against the background of the virtually unanimous acknowledgment by people of goodwill on all continents of the decisive role which the Soviet Union played in the defeat of fascism and the liberation of the peoples of Europe. They expose the nature of the political course of the most reactionary imperialist circles, which are clearly displaying their fear of the truth of history and the objective analysis of the profound reasons for the outbreak of World War II, as well as the desire to revise its political results.

Naturally, the problem goes far beyond the unwillingness of some Western governmental officials to carry out a certain number of ceremonies and evoke the past. Efforts to block the celebration of the 40th anniversary of victory betray the intention of reactionary imperialist forces to avoid a serious discussion on the sociopolitical nature of fascism, the responsibility of international monopoly capital for the outbreak of World War II and the fact that Hitlerism, from its very start, was urged on deliberately and purposefully by right-wing anticommunist circles in the capitalist world to carry out the longed-for "crusade" against the first socialist state in the world. Their purpose is to uproot from the mind of the people the memory of the fact that it was precisely the heroic struggle waged by the Soviet people and their armed forces which brought the people of Europe and, in the final account, the entire world, salvation from the mortal threat, and which inspired and strengthened the forces fighting for freedom, democracy and social progress.

Attempts to avoid a serious and objective analysis of the reasons for the war are essentially nothing other than a blasphemous justification of fascism and of the political forces which put it in power--the most aggressive and adventuristic imperialist circles. Actually, the purpose of such attempts is to whitewash the current admirers of Hitlerism and the secret and overt supporters of neofascism.

The efforts of international reaction to conceal the truth of the sacrifices made on the altar of freedom and democracy by the Soviet Union and to distort and blacken the role which the Red Army played in the liberation of the peoples can be characterized only as a desecration of the memory of the millions of Soviet soldiers who, at the cost of heroic efforts, without sparing their own life, crushed the military machine of Nazi Germany and fully or partially liberated the territories of 13 European and Asian countries.

The purpose of these efforts is to conceal from the peoples the historical fact that the Soviet armed forces alone were able not only to resist the pressure of a strong and treacherous opponent such as German fascism but also

to overcome it, acting alone during a long part of the war, without the active military support of its allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition and without the opening of a second front in Europe.

No one will be able to consign to oblivion the obvious facts that during the war the Soviet Union brilliantly proved to the entire world its ability to crush Nazi Germany with its own force, and that it was precisely the Soviet armed forces which, pulverizing the overwhelming majority of Wehrmacht divisions, captured Berlin--the center of German imperialism and hotbed of fascist aggression--and raised the flag of victory over the defeated Reichstag, thus forcing the Hitlerites to accept an unconditional surrender.

The efforts to avoid answering the question of how was the Soviet Union able to withstand and win mean to conceal from the peoples and the new postwar generations the true sources of strength which ensured the historical victory of the Soviet armed forces over the enemy. These sources included the infinite loyalty of the Soviet people to the ideals of communism and their firm belief in the correctness of the policy of the communist party and the Soviet state and their tremendous support of this policy. That is why, in the final account, the defeat of fascism was a victory for the Soviet social system, which proved to anyone who had not lost the ability to look truth in the eye not only the military and economic but the political and spiritual superiority of socialism.

The deliberate concealment of the truth of the last war is nothing but an outrage upon the humanity, the grateful memory of those who, fighting at the front, in partisan units and in the resistance, deep behind enemy lines, dedicated all their forces and life so that no one would ever be able to unleash a new war. It means the deliberate deletion from the memory of the people of any recollection of the principles and objectives which brought together the participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition and their joint aspiration to act in the postwar period as well in a spirit of unanimity and agreement, without which peace on earth cannot be ensured.

In the final account, it means the desire of the leaders of the capitalist West to avoid responsibility for their refusal to implement the joint decisions of the anti-Hitlerite coalition after the war--above all that of the demilitarization of Germany, the elimination of all Nazi influence and the punishing of war criminals, and for unleashing a cold war against their yesterday's ally, the Soviet Union.

The truth of the lessons of World War II, which the rulers of imperialist countries would so much like to eradicate from the memory of the peoples, remains alive. Scratching out the hopes of the imperialist strategists and ideologues, history is powerfully invading today's political life, reminding us on a daily basis of the harsh realities of war. It is no accident, for example, that in analyzing the reasons for the hitches in NATO's schedule for the deployment of cruise missiles on Dutch and Belgian territory, the commentator of the American ABC Television company was forced to acknowledge that "the memory of the war is an inevitable component of the current missile debate."

The desire of the people to know the truth and to master and use under contemporary conditions the lessons learned in the past war is entirely natural and legitimate. Naturally, it is not only a matter of natural curiosity. The peoples would like to know the truth concealed to them by the ruling Western classes, so that they may prevent a new bloody war and, through joint efforts, while there still is time, a thermonuclear catastrophe.

"May the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the Great Victory over the forces of fascism and capitalism," Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted in his address to the French readers, "make all of us think seriously about the destinies of the world. We must think of what governments, nations and individuals should do so that the tragedy of the past may not be repeated."

This could and should be the only proper approach to the historical experience on the part of every responsible political leader today. Naturally, the time has long come to abandon meaningless and unattainable dreams of the possibility of any kind of revenge and of turning back the clock of history in Europe. The results of the war and of postwar changes in the world are irreversible.

Our party and Soviet state are doing everything possible for common sense and realism in international life to finally triumph, for the people to avoid new casualties and sorrows and for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. This would be the best monument to those who won the Great Victory 40 years ago.

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IN THE VANGUARD OF THE TOILING PEOPLE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 85 (signed to press 12 Feb 85) pp 124-128

[Review by N. Kuz'min of the book "Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles] by I. V. Kapitonov. Politizdat, Moscow, 1985, 528 pp]

[Text] Our party and Soviet people have entered the period of immediate preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress. The congress will adopt a new draft of the party program and define the main trends in the socioeconomic and spiritual development of Soviet society for the next 5-year period and beyond it. Loyal to Lenin's behests, the CPSU considers as the purpose of all its activities concern for the good of the people and the prosperity of the homeland of the October Revolution, the preservation of peace on earth and the salvation of mankind from the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

Lenin's evaluation of the Bolshevik Party, expressed on the eve of the October Revolution, acquires an even deeper meaning: the party is the mind, honor and conscience of our epoch.

The collection under review contains the speeches and articles by I. V. Kapitonov, CPSU Central Committee secretary, reflecting his activities in leading positions from 1945 to 1984.

They include his report to the Moscow City Party Committee at the 10th City Party Conference in September 1952, his speech at the 20th CPSU Congress, the reports of the mandate commission to the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th party congresses, the coreport of the budget commission of the Soviet Union at the USSR Supreme Soviet session (December 1965) and report at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on the draft USSR law "On the Status of Deputies of Soviets of Deputies of the Working People in the USSR" (September 1972). Another set of materials in the collection consists of articles published in PRAVDA, KOMMUNIST, PARTIYNIYA ZHIZN', PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA and MOLODOY KOMMUNIST.

The book reflects the comprehensive and truly titanic efforts made by the Leninist party and its Central Committee in guiding the constructive activities of the Soviet people, related to building developed socialism and

its advancement and the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of peace the world over.

The materials in the book clearly prove the unbreakable unity between party and people and the boundless support given by the Soviet people to CPSU domestic and foreign policy. In all of its activities the party is guided by Lenin's behests on the need for organically combining loyalty to the principles of revolutionary doctrine with its creative development, and irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois ideology, revisionism and dogmatism. It systematically implements the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian and socialist internationalism.

The book concentrates on organizational-party work and analyzes problems of interparty relations, strengthening ideological and organizational unity within the CPSU and the activities of local party organs, upgrading the role of primary party organizations, party membership, developing the initiative of party members and their responsibility for the state of affairs in their organizations and the party as a whole, and problems of cadre policy.

The party structures its entire work on Marxist-Leninist theory and its creative development through a comprehensive study of real processes and by summing up the experience of revolutionary-constructive activities by the masses. The expanded preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress are a new vivid confirmation of this. Based on the concept of developed socialism and creatively developing it, the party realistically assessed the stage reached by our country in building socialism and refined its strategy and tactics accordingly. The speeches and addresses by Comrade K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, on topical problems of contemporary development and advancement of developed socialism are of outstanding theoretical and political significance. Comrade K. U. Chernenko's article "On the Level of the Requirements of Developed Socialism," which was published in KOMMUNIST, is of programmatic significance. As noted in the article, the main conclusion drawn by the party of late is that before resolving problems directly related to building communism, we must go through a historically lengthy stage of developed socialism. This conclusion is of basic significance from the theoretical and political viewpoints. To begin with, it enables us to provide a scientifically substantiated definition of the level of socioeconomic maturity reached by our society and the characteristics of the time; secondly, to refine concepts on the content and duration of the socialist phase and the necessary prerequisites for a transition to communism; third, creatively to renovate on this basis CPSU strategy and tactics, taking into consideration both the immediate and long-range communist future, to formulate specific assignments and to mobilize the masses for their implementation. This conclusion directs us toward a realistic assessment of our tremendous accomplishments and existing shortcomings, without exaggerating or belittling the significance of either. The force of Marxist-Leninist theory, which guides the party and helps it to develop creatively, lies in its truth and consistency with the objective nature of things. This enhances the party's prestige in the eyes of the broad masses even higher and offers them even greater scope in the creation of a new social system and ensuring conditions

for the fuller satisfaction of their needs and the comprehensive development of the person.

I. V. Kapitonov's collection of speeches and articles, articles published in KOMMUNIST and PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in 1977 and 1978 in particular, discuss the role of the CPSU as the nucleus of the political system of socialist society. The author emphasizes that the question of the place of the party in the socialist political system is one of the basic and essential problems in building socialism and communism. The role of the party is determined by objective laws discovered and theoretically substantiated by Lenin. It is codified in the USSR Constitution. It is precisely the party, headed by Lenin, which led the working class and the toiling masses to the victory of the October Revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of soviets. The political system of our society includes the soviets as a truly popular form of state power, the trade unions, the Komsomol, the cooperatives, other public organizations and the labor collectives. These organizations represent all classes and social groups in Soviet society. It is they which determine the truly national nature of the sociopolitical system, democracy and popular rule, with the leading role of the working class.

The author notes another main feature of our political system: the combination of profound democracy with high-level organization, discipline and responsibility. The political system of socialist society is a well-organized mechanism, all units of which work actively, reciprocally supplementing each other. This can be achieved through the systematic implementation of the principle of democratic centralism. It is precisely this principle which enables us to combine unified centralized management with the local initiative and creative activeness of the masses and the responsibility of each body and official for their assignments.

The idea of the growing role of the CPSU as an objective law of building socialism and communism runs throughout the collection of I. V. Kapitonov's works. This law, however, is not manifested by itself. It requires a scientifically substantiated policy and skillful implementation.

The elaboration of scientifically substantiated strategy and policy and their practical implementation are the main features of party activities. The congress is the party's supreme organ. It is precisely the congress which adopts a program and earmarks the party's policy and sums up the results of its implementation. The congress defines the basic trends and tasks in the development of the party itself and the norms and principles of party life codified in the CPSU bylaws.

The collection includes the reports of the mandate commission to the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU congresses, presented by I. V. Kapitonov. The data they contain prove that the CPSU is the party of the working class and, while remaining such, it has become today the party of the whole people. The party's social composition indicates that it rallies the best, the most progressive representatives of all classes and social groups in Soviet society, the working class above all. It is precisely the working class which is most organized, politically mature and largest class in the society of

developed socialism. Its political qualities, organization and leading position in society are determined by the objective circumstances of contemporary large-scale multisectorial industrial output.

The reports which the mandate commissions submitted to the CPSU congresses clearly indicate that the delegates to this high party forum are elected by the party members--the best representatives of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and Soviet intelligentsia. It is all of them collectively, on a truly democratic basis, who define at this high party forum the party's policy and the main trends of socioeconomic and spiritual development of Soviet society for the next 5-year period and beyond it. The congress also sums up the results of the implementation of the plans and resolves basic problems of domestic and foreign policy.

We know that the elections of delegates to the high party forum and to congresses of communist parties of union republics and party conferences of kray, oblast, city and rayon party organizations are conducted on a truly democratic basis, in accordance with the strict requirements which the candidates must meet.

The increased leading role of the party under developed socialist conditions has been comprehensively shown as an objective law in the party documents, the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the subsequent Central Committee plenums and Comrade K. U. Chernenko's speeches. The work notes that the bourgeois ideologues, and not only they, have made great efforts to present the increased role of the CPSU as allegedly a manifestation of the party's aspiration to increase, to use their expression, the rule of a part (the party) over the whole (society) and to increase its rights at the expense of the rights of the working people and their mass organizations. Life and practical experience have refuted and are simply refuting these and other malicious fabrications.

Hundreds of millions of Soviet people are building a new society and actively participating in managing the state and social and production affairs. The enhancement of such activeness is one of the most important functions in party work. No political organization other than the party could assume the job of uniting and mobilizing the efforts of the working people and all state and public organizations and all builders of the new society to resolve the problems stemming from the interests of the people and the broad masses. The enhancement of the party's leading role and the intensification of socialist democracy are a single, integral and natural process.

As an objective law, the growing role of the party formulates strict requirements concerning the style of party leadership. The party committees must use the means and methods inherent in their nature as political leadership bodies. Substituting for state and economic agencies or the petty supervision of the latter are inadmissible in this case. Briefly stated, it is a question of mastering the Leninist workstyle. This is essentially a creative style to which stereotype and bureaucratic administration are alien. It requires an approach to the solution of problems based on political positions and the ability to organize the people for the implementation of

assignments and trigger in them a creative upsurge combined with the strict observance of planning and technological discipline.

As extensively described in I. V. Kapitonov's book, a Leninist workstyle means steady reliance on scientific data, understanding the common tasks formulated by the party, combining collective leadership with personal responsibility, comprehensive consideration of the social consequences of plans and profound mastery of the experience not only of our party but also that of other countries and fraternal parties.

The primary party organizations are the foundations of the party and the direct executors of its political course. "The further strengthening and growth of the leading role of the communist party in socialist society are directly related to the growth of the combat capability of the primary party organizations" (p 389). It is through its widespread network of primary organizations that the CPSU extends its influence on labor collectives and all classes, social strata and population groups.

The activities of the primary party organizations must be directed toward comprehensively upgrading the role of labor collectives--the main nuclei of socialist society. It is precisely within the labor collective that the task of upgrading the labor and political activeness of Soviet people is being essentially implemented. It is here that the socialist features of the working people and relations of friendship and comradely mutual aid are shaped and it is also here that the people are educated in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

The duty of the primary party organization as the nucleus of the labor collective is to unite it and to develop within it labor and political activeness. This task assumes even greater importance under developed socialist conditions, for the successful implementation of the plans for the socioeconomic and spiritual development of society and the further advancement of developed socialism depend to a decisive extent on the labor collective. The Law on Labor Collectives, which was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet after nationwide discussions, is aimed at helping to upgrade the role of the labor collective at the present stage.

The implementation of the Leninist principles of party membership and the steady strengthening of party ranks has been and remains a matter of prime importance, the materials in the collection emphasize. The party has always approached the solution of this and all other problems on a specifically historical basis, taking into consideration the characteristics of the sociopolitical conditions of each individual period and seeing to it that the party's structure is consistent with its nature, objectives and tasks and ensures in the best possible way the implementation of the historical mission of the working class, the frontranking detachment and vanguard of which it is.

The social pace for the growth of CPSU ranks has been considerably increased under developed socialist conditions. The working class was and remains the main social support of the party and the source of its further development. It is the basic productive force in the developed socialist society. High pa

social activeness, discipline and collectivism determine its leading status in the socialist social relations system.

However, I. V. Kapitonov notes in his book that in terms of reinforcing the party ranks with workers, the nature of the categories of the working class constituting such reinforcement and the type of political and professional training and production experience of the workers joining the party are taken comprehensively into consideration. Data for the past several years indicate that three-quarters of the workers accepted as candidate party members come from industry, transportation, communications and construction. A high percentage of them are employed in heavy industry, i.e., in sectors which play a determining role in the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and the development and perfecting of the material and technical base of developed socialist society.

Workers who are party members are distinguished by their political maturity, high level of general education and professional training and practical experience. Guided by the Leninist party selection principles, the CPSU accepts in its ranks above all workers with experience in production and sociopolitical activities. At the same time, the party tries to enroll the best representatives of the kolkhoz peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia.

The CPSU has always shown concern for reinforcing its ranks with young people, above all members of its frontranking detachment--the Komsomol. This is a manifestation of the continuity and unity of generations, the party's revolutionary spirit and the continuation of its combat and labor traditions.

Great attention has always been paid to the recruitment of women and their promotion to leading positions in party committees and state and ideological bodies.

The CPSU is the embodiment of the unbreakable friendship and cohesion of the peoples of the USSR and socialist internationalism. It is noteworthy that the party organizations are becoming increasingly multinational in membership. At the same time, the number of indigenous party members is steadily increasing in the party organizations of union and autonomous republics. Such trends, as the author points out, are dialectically interrelated and interdependent. They reflect the development of the economy and culture of all nations and nationalities in the USSR, their blossoming and reciprocal rapprochement and the growth of the political consciousness of the working people.

The steady reinforcement of party ranks is a natural and objectively necessary yet deliberately regulated process. The ability of the party to regulate its composition, the author notes, was considered by Lenin a most important feature of its ability to take a scientific approach to one of the basic problems of party construction.

Problems of CPSU cadre policy play one of the central roles in the collection of I. V. Kapitonov's speeches and articles. This is entirely natural, for cadre policy, based on Leninist principles and enriched with extensive and comprehensive experience, is a most important factor in fulfilling the communist party's leading role in the implementation of our plans and

resolving the complex problems of domestic and international policy. It is natural for the party, its Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo to ascribe it prime significance and to perfect cadre selection, placement and training.

As the author notes, entering the period of developed socialism faced the party with new requirements in this area and triggered the need for further perfecting the entire system of work with cadres. "The systematic implementation of the Leninist principles of cadre selection and placement and their advancement in close connection with the specific conditions of a dynamically developing socialist society are considered by the CPSU a prerequisite for the successful solution of even the most urgent and long-range problems" (p 346).

The building of socialism and communism is impossible without corresponding ideological support. A strong ideological-political and social unity within society and the rallying of the people around the party are impossible without developing a strong awareness of the ideology and morality of the working class and a deep understanding of CPSU policy by all working people.

The party considers ideological work and propaganda tried means for instilling and developing in the masses a socialist consciousness. At the same time, the CPSU takes into consideration the tremendous role of this work as "feedback from the masses." "The party draws fresh thoughts and bubbling energy from the depth of popular life, accumulated and expressed in its policies and practical activities. In turn, the ideas formulated by the party are a powerful incentive for the constructive creativity of the masses, giving them the necessary organization and direction. Adopted by the masses, they acquire a truly physical power" (p 467).

The content of the entire collection convincingly proves that the party's supreme objective is to serve the people, to improve their well-being and to create conditions for the all-round development of the individual. The good of the person and the people are supreme values. All activities of the communist party and the Soviet state are subordinate to enhancing the material and cultural standards of the people's life.

The party's concern for the good of the people is covered particularly extensively in I. V. Kapitonov's speeches delivered at the ceremonies held in Moscow on the occasion of the 99th and 109th anniversaries of V. I. Lenin's birth, in the coreport submitted by the budget commission of the Council of the Union at the 8 December 1965 USSR Supreme Soviet session and in articles on housing construction and the production of consumer goods. It is noteworthy that the collection ends precisely with speeches and articles on this problem.

Soviet society has resolved or is close to resolving many problems of upgrading the well-being of the people. Working people's incomes are increasing and social consumption funds are rising steadily. Great changes have taken place in the life of the people in large industrial centers, villages and small and medium-sized settlements. Living standards in various parts of the country and among different social, age and professional groups

have become substantially equal. The positive results of the implementation of the Food Program are being felt.

However, difficulties and unresolved problems remain. Thus, the growing solvent population demand is still not being fully satisfied with commodities. This requires steady and even more persistent efforts to surmount the scarcity of goods and services and balancing supply with demand. "Faster progress in this area will contribute to upgrading the effectiveness of material labor incentives and the successful implementation of the social program," I. V. Kapitonov emphasizes (p 497). A number of articles reflect the main trends of the foreign policy course followed by the CPSU and the Soviet government and bring to light the peaceable nature of the foreign policy of the homeland of the October Revolution, based on Leninist principles and its profoundly democratic nature; the author describes the struggle waged by the party and the government to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and oppose the aggressive aspirations of imperialist forces, headed by the ruling U.S. circles, which are trying to organize a crusade against the USSR and the socialist countries. The idea of proletarian and socialist internationalism runs throughout the collection, an idea inherent in all the activities of the CPSU, which is an organic component of the international communist movement.

Unquestionably, along with the published speeches and articles by other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state, I. V. Kapitonov's book will be of great help to party cadres and ideological workers.

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